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Theory, Fieldwork, and Storytelling
I began spending time on Bernard’s Beach in Monrovia during 
2010, seven years after the final cease- fire that ended fourteen years 
of civil war in Liberia. The beach was usually quiet. Young men 
clustered under the coconut trees, out of reach of the sun, talking 
and smoking and passing the time. There was a pool table and 
some huddled around the games, taking small bets or waiting to 
play. Darlington was easy to spot among the others. Always clad 
in a sleeveless undershirt, shorts, and slippers (flip- flops), he cut a 
thin male figure, several inches shorter than me. When we met for 
the first time he informed me that he was security. He kept an eye 
out for any trouble on the beach as a favor to a friend. Though there 
were occasional kickbacks for his security work, he made most of 
his living selling rolled joints on the beach and in the neighboring 
area. He was a hustler, living on his own in a small room just off 
the main road. He talked to me at length about studying at a uni-
versity, but had no money to pay for it. His life and prospects for 
the future were limited in scope, much like those in ethnographic 
accounts of other youth in Africa and around the world.
One afternoon while we were passing the time on the beach 
I asked Darlington to speak about the condition of the coun-
try for young men like himself. He sat back, joint in hand, and 
delivered an articulate analysis of the opportunities available to 
young people. It included a descriptive account of the implications 
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of poverty, an evaluation of the government’s failure to meet the 
needs of the people— especially the young people— and the rea-
sons beneath local crime and violence. “The helping hand is not 
there,” he finished. So many parents had died or lost the means 
to support their children, and there was little work. “The helping 
hand is not there,” he reiterated. This book is about the presence 
and absence of a helping hand in young men’s lives, and what that 
means for their “life chances,” a phrase I borrow from Dahrendorf 
(1981) to indicate the options that people perceive based upon their 
social positions.
“A helping hand” might refer to a government program or a 
favor from a friend, but mostly, as Darlington used it, a helping 
hand meant the support of intergenerational relationships in fam-
ilies and kin networks. Family relations were a constant topic of 
conversation and concern for the young men in this book. Recent 
research in youth studies has ballooned with observations and the-
oretical interpretations about life chances, transitions, and trajec-
tories. An interdisciplinary literature portrays urban young people 
in the Global South1 as a marginalized generation (Mains 2012; 
Resnick and Thurlow 2015; Sommers 2003). More often than not, 
those who are studied are male. They can be found hustling for 
subsistence, or sitting with their peers. They are often away from 
their families, navigating individual trajectories toward uncertain 
future possibilities. They appear like Darlington and the youth on 
the beach. For the most part, and with a few exceptions (see Cole 
and Durham 2007), the intricacies of family life, household repro-
duction, and intergenerational reciprocity have been largely passed 
over in the literature. Though their familial networks might have 
been elsewhere, or fragmented by the destruction caused during 
the war, reciprocal obligations among family relations were essen-
tial to young men’s survival and their achievement of social respect 
in postwar Monrovia, Liberia’s capital and largest city. For most, 
their support networks were too depleted to offer a helping hand 
for education or livelihood support. The inability to make tran-
sitions and sustainable livelihoods is one they share with youth 
around the world, and which has become so pervasive that it has 
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been described as a “crisis” of youth (International Labour Organi-
zation 2013; Richards 1995). However, this book demonstrates that 
the marginalization felt by young people was not a generational 
crisis, but rather a crisis felt across generations, and one that had 
specific implications for young people. It provides an ethnograph-
ically grounded analysis of intergenerational hierarchies in Libe-
ria, and illustrates how networks of reciprocal obligation organize 
social life, forming the foundation of support for young people’s 
lives and future possibilities.
I began this research out of an interest in the life chances of 
ex- combatants, specifically those who had fought when they were 
young. Half of the empirical material comes from the postwar 
experiences of ex- combatant young men. There are two dominant 
perspectives that inform much of the discourse about “child sol-
diers”: a rights- based narrative that emphasizes how damaging 
war is for children (see Machel 2001), and a security narrative that 
constructs former fighters as posing significant risks to postwar 
stability (see McMullin 2012). I traveled to Monrovia with two 
related assumptions about young people who live to tell their 
stories about fighting with armed groups. First, I assumed that 
they had been deeply affected by their experience, that trauma is 
a real thing, and that it has lasting impacts on how people live 
their everyday lives. There is now an enormous amount of research 
concerned with trauma in the aftermath of war. I conducted this 
work under the assumption that everyone had been affected by 
the war, and that while trauma is part of postwar life, it is not 
the sum total. I have left the analysis of trauma to psychologists 
and their critics and pursued an ethnographic description of youth 
experience in the social landscape of the postwar city. Second, in 
regards to the security narrative, I assumed that ex- combatants 
could pose risks to the well- being of others, but that disruption of 
the peace was only one among many possibilities on their postwar 
horizons. In short, this ethnographic account of the experiences 
of ex- combatant and noncombatant youth in Liberia is designed 
to offer at least a glimpse of postwar life defined by more than the 
essentializing “damaged” or “damaging” narratives prolific to the 
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topic of child soldiers and postwar youth. I dedicate much of the 
narrative work in this book to challenging pejorative assessments 
of youth as security threats, and argue that such reductionist rhet-
oric is not merely a limited evaluation of young men, but a deeply 
destructive force that has its roots in the causes for war itself.
The ex- combatants in this work contribute to an urban under-
standing of reintegration in Liberia, and their stories provide a 
glimpse of what fighting and “reintegrating” is like within the city. 
They are only a few among thousands who have transitioned out 
of armed groups. It is difficult to account for the volume of lives 
lived and lost in wars, and especially those who served in armed 
groups for which we have no enlistment records. The total num-
ber of combatants who participated in the war will never be fully 
known. Approximately 103,000 were disarmed (they turned in one 
or more weapons), and approximately 101,000 were demobilized 
(formally discharged from active duty) following the 2003 cease- 
fire (see McMullin 2013). These numbers account for those who 
survived the perils of the war and who participated in the United 
Nations (UN) facilitated disarmament and demobilization pro-
cess. In the aftermath of wars like this one the UN leads a disarma-
ment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) intervention. The 
goal of this three- pronged approach is to secure weapons, break up 
factions, and return former combatants to “civilian life.” In Liberia, 
they tacked on a second “R” for rehabilitation. With admittedly 
minimal resources, the National Commission on Disarmament, 
Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration intended to 
provide some basic form of group psychosocial counseling and 
civic engagement along with the vocational skills and training that 
came under the reintegration program (see UNDP 2003– 2004). 
There are two primary strands of academic literature regarding ex- 
combatant reintegration, one that informs and critiques demobi-
lization, disarmament, and reintegration policy and practice (see 
Jennings 2008b; Knight and Özerdem 2004; McMullin 2007, 2012, 
2013; Muggah 2009), and the other that looks more intently at 
the lived experience of social, economic, and political transitions 
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after war (Blattman 2009; Blattman and Annan 2011; Peters 2007; 
Shepler 2014; Utas 2005a).
The research in this book contributes to both of these strands 
of inquiry and argument. First, the empirical material is rendered 
in a comparative perspective. With notable exceptions (see Blat-
tman and Annan 2010), the majority of postwar research about 
reintegration is conducted with ex- combatants only. Without 
empirical research with noncombatants, it is difficult to grasp the 
structure of broader postwar society, or the extent to which ex- 
combatants face unique challenges in comparison to others— an 
implicit assumption made by humanitarian discourse, though one 
that is difficult to challenge or inform without research among 
young soldiers’ noncombatant peers. This ethnographic account 
demonstrates that social isolation and stigma pose significant 
challenges to young men, irrespective of whether they fought in 
the war. However, the implications of stigma and social isolation 
appear more acutely felt by former fighters who have lost both 
the helping hand of their previous armed groups, as well as their 
families. Second, conventional wisdom of the DDR process asserts 
that armed groups must be demobilized— formally disbanded to 
prevent further uprising or instability. Though there are cases that 
confirm this concern,2 many of the ex- combatants in this research 
were able to make sustainable transitions to jobs and nonviolent 
ways of life specifically because they were helped and supported by 
former comrades and commanders, challenging the derogatory 
notion that networks of former fighters are always and only detri-
mental social communities. There is also a pragmatic question to 
be raised around whether “demobilization” is remotely effective. 
Even within an intentional, lengthy residential program in Libe-
ria, Blattman and Annan (2016) report that combatant networks 
seemed to retain their strength, even with intensive intervention 
through psychosocial and vocation training in a designated resi-
dential environment. Third, DDR discourse asserts that vocational 
skills that are appropriate to market needs are essential to sustain-
able reintegration. There is some evidence to support this. In rural 
farming contexts, some research finds that ex- combatants who 
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have the appropriate land, resources, training, and monetary incen-
tives have redirected themselves away from illicit activities (Blatt-
man and Annan 2016; Peters 2011). This work demonstrates that in 
war- torn urban environments like Monrovia there is an enormous 
amount of human labor, far more than the market can absorb. The 
ability to “make life,” as the young men put it, is far more depen-
dent upon having a helping hand than it is on the acquisition of 
skills, or entrepreneurial ambition.
Reciprocity and respect are defining themes throughout 
this work, shaping everyday life, and especially informing ex- 
combatants’ experiences of reintegration. As the book progresses, 
young people’s dignity and the dignity of their fellow Liberians 
emerges as a central feature of their stories as they are variously 
positioned within local, national, and international contexts. The 
dignity of these black men and women on the West African coast 
has always been in question, since before the nation was founded 
in the nineteenth century. And in the years following a long and 
bloody civil war, it remains vital to my account of their lives and 
their life worlds.
Like Jensen (2008) I did not set out to make dignity a con-
ceptual priority for this research. However, as this book has taken 
shape I have found myself brought back to questions and obser-
vations about dignity as it is claimed, bestowed, or denied in the 
everyday lives of the people who fill these pages. As dignity sur-
faces in the following stories, I draw on Jensen’s insightful expo-
sition of dignity as a product of dominance. Following Agamben 
(1999) and Coundouriotis (2006) he understands dignity not as an 
inherent quality of the self, but as a social distinction bestowed by 
the state (or the dominant) on certain individuals or groups who 
are deemed worthy. This inescapable theme is especially present 
in my understanding of the historical roots of the civil war, and 
threads throughout my observations of postwar life as it is enabled 




My theoretical orientation to the empirical material is oriented 
toward inquiry about structure, and how structure shapes and is 
reinforced by agency, in this case, young men’s agency. This theo-
retical approach elicits an account of social process within context, 
one that links youth actions to the norms and values of their soci-
ety, to their relations with the distribution of power or hierarchy 
in their context, to their lived experiences of exclusion, inequality, 
or privilege. A structure/agency approach avoids, or at least greatly 
reduces, the opportunity to misconstrue young men and postwar 
life based upon my own social and cultural biases— an occurrence 
all too common in the field of international development. It also, 
importantly, informs youth experience with international humani-
tarian and security efforts, providing a local description and expla-
nation of young people’s “bounded agency” (Evans 2007) from the 
ground up.
Structure is one of those constructs that, despite prolific use 
across the social sciences, can prove an elusive concept to pin down 
(Sewell 1992). Perhaps it should be, as it refers to the “commu-
nity of dispositions” (Bourdieu 1977) that influences routines and 
rituals in everyday life, and to the values and norms that guide 
important social dynamics. These unseen and often unconscious 
schemas shape society in particular ways, forming distinctions 
between classes, genders, and generations. Reference to “structure” 
actually refers to quite a lot, and nothing very specific, unless we 
set to work observing the social, economic, and political processes 
that are an outflow of these underpinning values and power rela-
tions. In this book, my emphasis is primarily on social structure; 
I understand political and economic realities as intimately tied to 
the ways that people relate with, and value one another. “Agency,” 
very simply put, is the ability to act or withhold action (Giddens 
1984). As structures inform action in everyday life, they are recur-
sively remade in our social worlds. So, with this research, my aim 
was to understand how unseen “recipes for action” (Sewell 1992) 
informed the motions of everyday life, shaping young people’s 
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perceived options and possibilities, and how their structural con-
text organized the distribution of resources at macro- levels that 
encompass politics, economics, and social relations, or in the most 
basic interactions within households or peer groups.
The analysis I articulate in this book is rendered through a close 
and descriptive inquiry into everyday life, and the underpinning 
schemas that inform action. Mains (2012) eloquently describes his 
work in Ethiopia as a continual movement between the abstraction 
of articulating broad structural realities and the depth of details 
explored in the layers and layers of people and places in which 
he submerged himself on a daily basis. Similarly, in the following 
chapters I have chosen to spend more time in the personal expe-
riences of everyday life in the postwar capital, though I zoom out 
at points in order to position actors more proportionately within 
the broader parameters of their society and their national position 
in a global context.
“Youth” as Young Men
Young men like Darlington are the subject of this book. Most were 
between the ages of eighteen and thirty- five. In Liberia, as in most 
other parts of the world, youth is a social category, defined not so 
much by age but by one’s position in society. Institutions use age 
ranges to designate who the “youth” are. Many of the UN bod-
ies define youth as between the ages of fifteen and twenty- four. 
In Liberia, this number was extended to thirty- five (Ministry of 
Youth and Sports 2005), “to catch everybody in the net,” as one 
youth worker explained. These are merely numerical approxima-
tions. Those who are considered youth in Liberia may range in 
age from thirteen or fourteen well into the midthirties and for-
ties (Moran, 2006). Within the society itself, youth are understood 
based on their social age, as being in a period between the depen-
dency of childhood and the responsibility and autonomy that 
comes with adulthood (see Durham 2000). Darlington was in his 
midtwenties, and had a small child. Though he was a father, he 
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was still considered a youth because he was unable to care for her 
or support her as a “breadwinning” male. He had yet to become 
“established.” He had no house, no ability to support a wife or a 
family of his own. He was able to independently support himself 
through his dealing and was responsible for his own shelter and 
food. Thus he was no longer dependent on the care of others as he 
had been in childhood. He could not support dependents of his 
own, however, a basic social requirement for an adult man.
In this book I focus specifically on young men for reasons that 
will be discussed later in the section of the introduction to field-
work. In so doing, my work has fallen into a large body of aca-
demic research in which “youth” almost always implicitly refers to 
young male people, whereas studies with young women often have 
to designate their focus on “female” youth in order to bring atten-
tion to otherwise “invisible girls” (Nordstrom 1999). In terms of 
invoking “youth” as a social construct, most of the young people 
who are considered youth in Liberia are male. Young women are 
not expected to experience transitional periods of time between 
households of caregivers and households of their own. Few 
undergo a liminal period of caring for themselves and working 
toward the financial and material status that demonstrates that 
they are adults, capable of caring for households and families of 
their own. I found this circumstance only among young women on 
the street, or those who were engaged in sex work, the two often 
going hand in hand. Because this in- between period is one of the 
primary indicators of being a youth, it is often synonymous with 
being male. Unless otherwise stated, my account of “youth” experi-
ence is limited to young men.
Reciprocity and Respect
This research illustrates how young men’s life chances, transitions, 
and trajectories were determined in large part by relationships of 
reciprocity that enabled and facilitated their achievement of respect. 
Each of these terms is rendered in specific ways throughout my 
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interpretation of the empirical material. Reciprocity is an essential 
aspect of Liberians’ broader social structure, which is known to 
anthropologists and Africanists as “wealth in people” (see Guyer 
and Belinga 1995). Wealth in people organizes a system of people 
who exchange goods and services for the purpose of maintain-
ing and accumulating social relations that ensure security, labor, 
and status (see Bledsoe 1980; Newell 2006). The manifestation and 
function of these relationships is articulated in detail in chapter 3.
Reciprocity itself has long been a point of empirical inquiry 
and theoretical debate among anthropologists. Lemarchand (1989) 
observes that the literature tends to fall along something of a con-
tinuum, with interpretations of exchange as a moral imperative 
on the one end, and as a strategic and functional social practice 
that ensures production on the other. In this work I understand 
reciprocity as a pragmatic necessity undergirded by moral values. 
Fulfilling obligations to reciprocate earns the respect of one’s social 
community and the recognition that one has conformed to the 
social structure that organizes everyday life.
Respect is intrinsically about one’s social standing and status 
in a given context. Respect, respectability, and dignity have fea-
tured in recent work with young people, especially marginalized 
young men (Di Nunzio 2012; Jensen 2008; Newell 2012), as their 
struggle for value and recognition in society is frustrated by eco-
nomic, political, and social constraints. Dignity becomes an issue 
or a struggle when dominance produces humiliation ( Jensen 2008) 
or “abjection,” that sense of being thrown down or excluded by 
boundaries that confine agency, and are largely determined by the 
“dominant cultural fraction” (Mahar 1990). Bourgois’s (2003) evoc-
ative and seminal work among crack dealers in Harlem illustrates 
how political and economic systems were set up in such a way as 
to deny access to sustainable economic opportunities, producing 
exclusion for his informants, most of whom became involved in 
drug dealing. The structure of a society, the values that underpin 
social worth, the distribution of political power and economic 
opportunities, creates access for some and inhibits access for oth-
ers. Dignity and abjection are inherently structural. The social 
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values that imbue or deny dignity are produced and reproduced by 
agency. As long as actors assimilate and accommodate the terms 
by which dominance bestows dignity, then those terms, and the 
struggle to achieve dignity, will persist.
Jensen’s (2008) iteration of the struggle for dignity in South 
Africa closely resembles the search for respect among Bourgois’s 
(2003) informants in Harlem. In this work I draw a conceptual 
distinction between the two terms. Dignity has to do with val-
ues that bestow worth. The struggle for dignity is the struggle for 
worthiness. When I speak about respect I am referring to some-
thing related to, but distinguished from, dignity. Respect manifests 
in two forms, for which I borrow Spencer’s (1965) constructs of 
“honor” and “prestige.” Honor is associated with socially acceptable 
conduct or benchmarks of achievement, and prestige is obtained 
through success in competition with peers.
On first glance honor and dignity may appear conflated but 
they are not. In the following chapter we will see how the domi-
nant cultural fraction of elite Americo- Liberians set the terms for 
inclusion in political power and access to resources. They confined 
access to their group. Though indigenous Liberians sought socio-
economic mobility in the urban capital and came to value emblems 
of modern and American culture— hallmarks of elite society— 
they were fundamentally denied equal opportunities to achieve the 
structural positions enjoyed by the dominant. They could be hon-
orably providing for families through socially acceptable means 
and conduct, yet as long as their pursuit of social worth conformed 
to the terms of the minority elite dignity would always remain 
largely out of their grasp. Thus it was possible to achieve honor and 
prestige in the sight of one’s peers and community, while strug-
gling to obtain dignity determined by the regard of the dominant 
cultural fraction. In summary, dignity is about worth. Honor is 
about conduct. And prestige is about achievement in competition 
or comparison with peers.
A sense of abjection and struggle for dignity mounted, creating 
the conditions that led to the inception of war. Before embark-
ing on that analysis I would like to turn our attention to the 
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young people who transitioned into armed groups, who fought 
in their ranks, and to how I have conceptually understood their 
“reintegration.”
Ex- Combatants and Reintegration
Who are the ex- combatants, and what does “reintegration” actu-
ally mean? Some scholars use a wide conceptual definition for “ex- 
combatants” in regards to the roles that they fill with armed groups. 
Some include, in addition to the armed fighters, the men, women, 
and children who acted in noncombat support roles like cooks 
and porters (see Gates and Reich 2009; Guyot 2007). In contrast, 
Lemasle (2010) limits her use of “ex- combatants” to those who have 
actively fought and are in positions to use arms to disrupt postwar 
peace. Such variations in definition may be relevant to these and 
other contexts. During fieldwork I spoke with people who had been 
forced to fulfill service roles that included cooking and carrying pos-
sessions, equipment, and supplies as porters. However, they did not 
identify as ex- combatants, nor were they identified as such by others. 
Similarly, though Darlington and I never discussed this, a friend of 
his alluded to his participation with one of Charles Taylor’s militias. 
Darlington carried a gun for a short while, and held some form of 
security and combat support responsibilities during the later years 
of the war. However, he never identified, and was never identified by 
his peers, as an “ex- combatant.” Thus, the only people I have chosen 
to refer to as “ex- combatants” are those who self- identified with that 
term and were identified in their community as former fighters. It 
should also be noted that I use “combatant,” “fighter,” and “soldier” 
interchangeably. I am certain that there are instances in which these 
terms require distinction. For this work, I see no need to do so, and 
have chosen to alternate the use of them to provide some variation 
in vocabulary. Some young men fought during most of the four-
teen years of civil crisis. Others served shorter periods. The common 
denominator is their participation and affiliation with a fighting 
force that separates their wartime experience from those of non-
combatants. All of them were young when they were incorporated 
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into their units. Most were in their teens or early twenties, and by 
any definition were considered “youth” at the time of their conflict 
participation.
The label “ex- combatant” is layered with meanings. Former 
fighters and others appropriate it in order to meet certain ends 
(McMullin 2012), and there is undoubtedly some error or misap-
propriation in much of its use, no matter the specificity applied. 
For example, a huge signifier of ex- combatant identity was 
attached to those who participated in the UN- led Disarmament, 
Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration (DDRR) pro-
gram. It publicly identified participants as former combatants in 
the civil war. Participants were given ID cards to identify them 
as ex- combatants who were enrolled in the program.3 However, 
given the amount of money offered in the Transitional Safety Net 
Allowance (see UNDP 2003– 2004), it is unquestionable that some 
of the participants presented guns and signed up for the program 
to claim the 300 U.S. dollars in cash even though they were never 
actively involved in the combat or with armed groups. Jake, who 
features later in this chapter and others, was never a fighter, nor did 
he belong to an armed group. However, when they were offered 
the opportunity to participate in DDRR, his friends in a rebel 
group gave him a gun to turn in so that he could claim the cash 
assistance. At the same time, many women did not participate 
in DDRR. Among the most pronounced reasons for this was a 
heightened fear of gendered stigma and exclusion in the postwar 
environment (see Christoffersen 2010; Coulter, Persson, and Utas 
2008). They were afraid that as women they would be treated with 
more severe disregard than their male counterparts. Thus, there 
is some margin for error no matter the discursive or institutional 
parameters in place. Suffice it to say, everyone included in this 
research identified themselves as ex- combatants.
We have arrived at ex- combatant “reintegration,” a construct 
often synonymous with the implementation of policies and pro-
grams, though as a term it suggests an experienced process, or a 
transition of some kind. “Integration” means being incorporated, 
or not differentiated from others. Reintegration as a UN policy 
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and program is a security measure designed to help ex- combatants 
to adjust to “normal life” through economic and social supports 
(UN 2016). It is framed as an attempt to put ex- combatants “back” 
(McMullin 2013). That there is a “normal life” to be put back into is 
an enormous assumption that compels an array of questions. Back 
where? Back with whom? Back into what exactly? What is “nor-
mal”? The policy narrative implicitly frames “civilian life” as nor-
mal, and conflict or life in armed groups as abnormal. I do not wish 
to digress into a lengthy deconstruction of such an obtuse term as 
“normal.” Rather, I would like to point out how dichotomous and 
unidirectional this notion is. In the UN and other international 
policy discourse, “reintegration” of ex- fighters implies an assump-
tion that the physical and social structures of communities exist 
in static form (Boersch- Supan 2009). It assumes that society is a 
homogenous “field,” unitary, whole, and different from the wartime 
life experienced by fighters. The narrative implicitly draws a rigid 
line between the kind of people who fight war and the kind of peo-
ple who do not, and assumes that one must become like the other. 
Thus “reintegration” is represented as a kind of “going back to,” as 
though these structures have been unchanged and are ready and 
able to receive and resituate former soldiers who “return” to civilian 
society (Schafer 2007). In fact, wars may deeply change communi-
ties. Combatants do not reintegrate into what was, but must inte-
grate along with the rest of the nation into what is becoming. It is 
a process of “motion within motion” (Vigh 2009).
Having problematized the term, I have chosen to keep and 
use it in this book, though I understand it more broadly and with 
fewer dichotomous connotations. In this work reintegration is first 
and foremost a social process, though it certainly intersects with 
and has implications for economics and politics. As the follow-
ing section and chapter 6 will make clear, ex- combatants do have 
to negotiate transitions from lives shaped and enabled through 
social structures in armed groups to lives defined and empowered 
differently in other social arenas after war. Former fighters make 
decisions about which social norms and values to reject, retain, 
or reconfigure after conflict, and those decisions carry significant 
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implications for incorporation in communities of noncombatants. 
So too, noncombatants exercise their agency, their acceptance, 
their rejection, or ambivalence regarding ex- combatants in their 
lives and their communities. This means that reintegration is a 
transactional process that occurs over time among and between 
former fighters and noncombatants. This being the case I have 
made a discursive choice not to use the term “civilian,” as once they 
are disarmed and demobilized, ex- combatants are civilians as well, 
and the postwar space is one that belongs to them, and is shaped 
through their agency as much as through anyone else’s.
About Guns
The depiction of wars that incorporate young people have become 
synonymous with images of AK- 47s, the assault rifles designed in 
the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, and that continue 
to be brandished by young children, youth, and adults in conflicts 
around the globe. War is much more than guns, or the violence dealt 
at the tip of a gun barrel. It is not my intention to reproduce a ste-
reotype with the title “Life after Guns.” However, in the Liberian 
context of my research, guns were a defining feature of the conflict 
for those who participated and for those who were affected directly 
and indirectly by a war waged in their backyards, on their streets, and 
in the bush. Guns symbolized what Shaw (2000) refers to as a “hab-
itus of war,” in which violence became an integral part of the envi-
ronment. Social and cultural reproduction continued, adapted, and 
reconfigured with the perpetuation of violence and armed conflict. 
Life did not stop because of the war, but it was drastically altered as 
a result of it. For the fighters, guns were a source of immense power, 
unlike anything they had experienced before.
“When I was a soldier I could go anywhere,” Jacob explained. A 
twenty- eight- year- old ex- combatant, he related well the sense of 
agency that many remembered fondly from their time with armed 
groups. “Anything I wanted I could get it. I got money. Anytime, 
anything I wanted, I get it. I bust people’s door, I bust people’s 
store. I take it. That’s when I had the arm [gun].”
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The gun was a symbol of power for ex- combatants— power to 
combat foes, power to direct subordinates, and power to control 
unarmed civilians. Guns were the instruments that enabled oth-
erwise small, relatively uneducated, and unskilled young people to 
take lives, to force old and young to fetch and carry, to go or stay. 
The “gun sound” instilled fear, sent people running into hiding in 
their homes, into the bush, and across borders. Memories of the 
beginning and the end of the war were invoked most often by 
reference to the sound of guns.
In the small community of Slipway, an elderly woman sat and 
talked with me one day, and related simply, “But for me, I alright 
now. There’s no gun sound. You can walk in peace.”
Life after Guns is an exploration of what it meant for young 
people to be armed, unarmed, and disarmed in the years during 
and after the Liberian civil war. It is about the social practice that 
enabled survival and imbued status among those who fought as 
well as those who did not.
Fieldwork
I spent seven months in the field during 2010 and 2011 con-
ducting ethnographic research in the greater Monrovia area. 
I rented a room in Central Matadi, a community located just 
behind Sinkor, to the east of downtown. Most of the homes were 
made of cement block and painted in bright colors, a structural 
and aesthetic step up from the straw woven huts or zinc sheets 
that sheltered those with the fewest means. Schools were dot-
ted throughout the community, and the roadsides were peppered 
with small stands where young men sold phone credit, charged 
cell phones, and changed money. Much of my analysis is the result 
of living alongside the families whose houses framed the param-
eter of my backyard. Though I was considered a guest throughout 
my stay, and never fully integrated into the routines of household 
reproduction, being grafted into the goings- on with the family 
and our social life in the yard was invaluable to my understand-
ing of daily life and social process.
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I gained access to a number of communities around the city, 
where I spent time with unoccupied youth, conducted informal 
and semistructured interviews, and implemented focus groups. I 
always entered with an introduction of some kind— through a pas-
tor, a youth worker, or a friend. The ex- combatants and street youth 
were the most suspicious, and building trust was not as quick or as 
easy as with others. That is quite understandable. Monrovia was a 
bastion for international journalists and researchers after the war. 
Many Liberians felt raked over by impersonal and exploitative 
interest in their postwar plight. One afternoon my research assis-
tant took me out to meet some young people in Red Light, the 
largest market within the capital city region. They were loud and 
rowdy, and some were agitated when Zawoo explained my purpose 
for being there. One responded, “All these people come in here. 
They get the stories and they leave and make money from them. 
We can’t see nah- ting!”
I heard the same thing in Bernard’s Farm, and Slipway, and 
from people who were formally a part of the research as well as 
others who were not. Assurances that my work was not a pathway 
to becoming rich and famous on my return to the university did 
little to ease the minds of the skeptical, most of whom had felt 
used and looked at, without being cared for or seen. With most, I 
built rapport slowly, over hours spent watching the pool on Ber-
nard’s Beach, smoking cigarettes with young men in Red Light 
and Slipway, and through respectful introductions made by allies 
to the work. On a visit to Gardnersville, an ex- combatant described 
his reluctance about my work: “This man [ Jake] came to me and 
convince me. He came to me first, he told me [about you]. I say ‘I 
refuse.’ I say, ‘I don’t want for anybody to interview and take any 
statement from me.’ But he still try to convince me this morning. 
And he went for me at the house. That how I came.”
“What did he say to convince you?” I asked.
“Really, he’s my brother, because he and I live together before. 
We did things in common. He said, ‘the woman means nothing. 
She only came to do a study with me. She came to find . . . she 
came on a’— how you call it?”
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“On a research,” Jake interjected affirmatively.
“Research! ‘Yeah, she don’t mean no harm. She only want to 
talk to you, to get your view . . .’ That’s what he told me. So I said, 
‘I ain’t got problem with that, so I will go.’”
Initial introductions like the ones Jake made in Gardnersville 
began the “snowball.” Once established in these communities, my 
informants could identify others who were willing to contribute 
to the work.
I used various qualitative methods in six areas around the city. 
I spoke with ex- combatants in Bernard’s Farm, Gardnersville, and 
Slipway in an attempt to find common themes about reintegra-
tion that were not particular to one community or subgroup. Most 
hailed from Charles Taylor’s forces, though I did not specifically 
target his recruits. As Taylor was based in Monrovia from 1996 
to 2003, when the war ended, it makes sense that there would be 
many of his former troops settled within the region. Young men 
on Bernard’s Beach and in the park at the University of Liberia 
informed my understanding of postwar life chances and trajec-
tories for noncombatant youth. In Red Light, my participant 
observation and interviews with youth on the street illustrated the 
constraints of life lived without intergenerational networks of sup-
port. This is a reality that many ex- combatants faced once their 
factions were disbanded. I wanted to comprehend the challenge of 
everyday life for the street youth in order to better grasp any added 
or different challenges that compounded the everyday struggle to 
“make life” among ex- combatants who finished the war but did not 
“have people” who would be part of that process with them.
The majority of young people who fought in the war were male, 
and I chose to limit my work to male experience. I have not offered 
a significantly gendered analysis because I do not have the com-
parative female data that would allow me to specify what aspects 
of life chances or trajectories are gendered in certain ways. With 
a larger research budget and more time, this would have been a 
priority. As it is, I chose to use my time and resources to focus on 
a comparison of young men who fought and young men who did 
not.
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Finally, I looked to elders who could inform my interest in 
intergenerational relations, and who could offer perspectives that 
would inform, compare, and contrast the perspectives that youth 
provided. Zawoo, who was an invaluable support and contrib-
uted a wealth of insight to this project, led several focus groups 
with me in West Point and in Slipway. These added to numer-
ous interviews I had with adults in other communities and with 
an important contingent of youth workers who had been on 
the frontlines of the reintegration and rehabilitation programs 
that were rolled out in the months and years following the 2003 
cease- fire. Confidentiality was of utmost importance to many of 
the people who offered their stories and their thoughts to this 
work. Pseudonyms have been assigned to all informants in order 
to protect their privacy.
Telling Other People’s Stories
Weber ([1904] 2004, 374) reminds us that “there is no ‘objective’ 
analysis of ‘social phenomena’ independent of special and ‘one- 
sided’ perspectives, on the basis of which such phenomena can be 
(explicitly or implicitly, consciously or unconsciously) selected as 
an object of research, analysed and systematically represented.” As 
an ethnographer, I was the instrument of research. The materi-
als collected for this work were my field notes, jotted from my 
observations, and transcripts and notes taken down from my con-
versations. They have been pulled together to present aspects of 
other people’s lives, and to demonstrate what I see as important for 
our understanding of their life chances in a postwar environment. 
As such, I have thought much about my own involvement in the 
research and how I present those who participated.
Bourgois (2003, 2009) worries about the problems that come 
with examinations of social marginalization and the politics of 
representing the experiences of the poor. He fears that viewing 
and appropriating meaning to another’s life and life circum-
stances could easily slip into preconceived stereotypes, and the 
research itself could be perceived as an exercise in voyeurism. I 
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would argue that this is a risk in research with any demographic, 
though perhaps it tends to render the ethnographer more self- 
conscious in research with the poor, as we perceive them in posi-
tions with less of a platform to give voice to the constraints in 
which they live. That is an uncomfortable dynamic to sit with, 
and one that many scholars wrestle with as they traverse bound-
aries of all kinds. Throughout this work I have felt acutely the 
words of Jamaican posse member Brambles to Laurie Gunst 
during her work in the underworld of Kingston ghettos (Gunst 
1996, 127– 128):
To enter into the study of this ghetto society requires a certain 
kind of courage. . . . It is an enormously variegated and complex 
subject. Those willing to take on the task must have an active, 
energetic mind capable of putting together infinite numbers of 
observations and events into something approaching a mean-
ingful whole. . . . To think and work in such a manner requires 
intellectual openness. Agility. Or the person must face the 
distinct prospect of being overwhelmed by the breadth and depth 
of social and political phenomena. . . . I have seen the incipience 
of intellectual arrogance in you, and sometimes you question 
the credibility of events. You are entering a new experience. You 
are writing something unique. You are white. It is difficult for a 
white person to simulate a black experience. And it is even more 
difficult to express or interpret something you have never experi-
enced. Be calm.
I rarely felt “agile” in my movements through Monrovia, with the 
youth in the market and on the beach, or even in my backyard. And 
I have been overwhelmed by the immensity of this task— small as 
it is— from the moment I began it. Nonetheless, I feel compelled 
by the work of authors like Bourgois and Gunst who, despite 
entering contexts that were not their own, were able to reflect back 
to a broader audience the destruction of violence spread unequally 
through the world, and the ways and means by which it main-
tains exploitative power. I was young, and white, and “other” in 
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the context of my fieldwork, and my position in an unequal world 
absolutely shaped the course of the research, the access I gained, 
and the story I have told. I say all of this not to issue a caveat about 
the integrity of the empirics, but to acknowledge where they are 
subject to my own subjectivities and to those who shared their 
lives with me. As Lammers (2006) writes of her work with ex- 
combatants and displaced youth in Kampala, Uganda, the work 
itself occurs between the lives of real people interacting with a 
living anthropologist, and the authenticity of the work is bolstered 
by our attentiveness to the variegated complexities that Brambles 
so eloquently describes.
Brambles was right. It is difficult to express or interpret some-
thing I have not experienced. At best, this is an ethnographic 
sketch of young men’s life chances in a postwar terrain. Much 
like Zeitlyn’s (2008) description of a silhouette, my aim is a pro-
portionate outline of actors in context, being honest about the 
incompleteness of the representation, and striving for faithful-
ness around the edges— without romanticizing the resilience of 
those subject to degradation, or gawking at displays of violence 
in an “exotic” context. I have sought to render their stories with 
as much intellectual openness as I am able, and to articulate the 
struggles they face with an analytical scope set wide enough to 




A History of Violence
Young people, especially young men, are regularly subjected to 
what I refer to in this book as the “loose molecules paradigm.” 
Kaplan (1996) famously (perhaps infamously) described West 
African youth as loose molecules in an unstable social fluid. His 
evocative assessment depicts young people as detached, unstable, 
and potentially explosive, objectifying a generation of young men 
as a hazardous material exposed in a combustible environment. 
Though his discursive representation of young men might be 
discounted as the sensational amplifications of a journalist, such 
notions about youth have gained traction in academia and policy 
discourse. Singer (2010, 97) argues that “once the ratio of young 
males grows too far out of balance, violent conflict tends to ensue.” 
They are by nature more psychologically aggressive, he continues. 
They are thus biologically predisposed to violence, and a deadly 
force to be reckoned with should their numbers grow out of pro-
portion. The panic over young men increases when the “Youth 
Bulge Hypothesis” is thrown into the mix, as it identifies countries 
with high percentages of youth as especially prone to armed con-
flict and civil war (Urdal 2004, 2006). Though this is an observed 
correlation— and not a direct cause— it is easily extrapolated by 
observers as further fuel to the loose molecules paradigm. Writ-
ing for the World Bank, Lin (2012) discusses youth in developing 
countries as a “demographic dividend or a demographic bomb,” 
reproducing a notion of youth as a highly explosive and destructive 
force. This ideology has gained traction in policy discourse, where 
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the assumption has taken hold that unemployment and “idleness” 
lead to conflict (see Walker et al. 2009, 29– 38), despite evidence to 
the contrary (Bøås and Hatløy 2008). The implication of young 
men as sources of instability fuels the “threat narrative” (McMullin 
2012) in postwar policy, reducing ex- combatants to security risks 
that must be managed and contained to preserve peace.
This essentializing discourse is associated with the “New 
Barbarism” (Richards 1996), a racist orientation toward Africa 
and African conflicts that “assumes that conflict makes no sense 
according to outsiders’ rules and must be a throwback to some 
African ‘Dark Age’” (ibid., xxi; see also McMullin 2012). In short, 
young people and the wars they fight are the results of some sort 
of primal, inherently violent nature that plagues the continent and 
thwarts sustainable peace and development. The New Barbarism 
places blame on (presumably) violent youth and their presum-
ably amoral, “belligerent” (see Achvarina and Reich 2006), venal 
leaders like Charles Taylor, neglecting the role of regional and 
international structures and power dynamics (McMullin 2012). 
This chapter provides a historical overview that stands in stark 
contrast to such reductionist views of the African continent and 
the country of Liberia. My aim is to challenge the fixation with 
violent young black men by repositioning our focus on the long 
history of structural violence that led to the war in which they 
fought and from which everyone struggled to recover. I trace the 
roots of the Liberian civil war to the abjection and exploitation of 
a whole group of people in the United States, an abjection that was 
transplanted to the West African coast, where it took root in the 
founding of the nation. Richards (2006) reminds us that wars do 
not merely “erupt.” They are, among other things, social projects. 
The social foundation for the civil war in Liberia was laid through 
over a hundred years of structural violence, in which ideas about 
social identities shaped political and economic forces that created 
unequal access to rights, privileges, and services.1 In short, the war 
was caused by the assertion of dominance, the denial of dignity, 
and a long- fought and multifaceted struggle to reclaim it.
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The Colonial Movement for Freed Slaves
In their Declaration of Independence from Great Britain, the 
American authors penned a challenge to structures that confer 
abjection. They asserted that all men were created equal, with cer-
tain unalienable rights— the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness. Shortly after the American Revolution several socio-
economic and politically charged issues surfaced with regard to 
the issue of slavery. Freed from the oppression of colonial rule, this 
newly independent country was instituted by a dominant group 
of white immigrants who lived and made livelihoods and profits 
from the labor of enslaved black men, women, and children. Sam-
uel Johnson captures well the irony of the slave trade in colonial 
America with his question, “How is it that we hear the loudest 
yelps for Liberty among the drivers of negroes?” (quoted in Shick 
1977, 2).
The architects of governance in the United States were not blind 
to the moral inconsistency in their society. Contestation abounded 
over what solutions could be applied to the problem of slavery in 
America. The subjugation of so many black slaves2 over so many 
generations created a multitude of challenges that would not be 
met solely through the act of emancipation. A number of key fig-
ures in the early years of nation building, among them Thomas 
Jefferson, James Madison, and James Monroe, began advocating 
for emancipation, followed by the relocation of freed slaves outside 
the United States (Shick 1977). To remove the subjected popu-
lation of black slaves appeared a far more durable and efficient 
solution than to address the gross inequalities that separated slaves 
from freed men, and to integrate as equals those who had been cast 
down for so long. In a letter to John Lynd, Thomas Jefferson (1811) 
wrote that it was “most desirable,” that emancipation to another 
land would be advantageous “for gradually drawing off this part 
of our population.” He continued, “Most advantageous for them-
selves as well as for us; going from a country possessing all the 
useful arts, they might be the means of transplanting them among 
the inhabitants of Africa; and would thus carry back to the country 
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of their origin the seeds of civilization, which might render their 
sojournment here a blessing, in the end, to that country.”
The American Colonization Society was founded in 1816. It 
adopted a public rhetoric for a movement that echoed Jefferson’s 
sentiments. The project presented a “win- win” situation that would, 
in theory, benefit everyone. A colony of freed slaves in Africa 
would rid white Americans of the social and moral problem of 
slavery by “drawing off ” the unwanted people among them. Evan-
gelical Christian preaching ascribed great spiritual significance to 
the project of sending freed slaves who were somewhat “civilized” 
back to Africa. They believed that an African colony would be a 
“promised land” for freed slaves, much like the land of Israel in the 
Bible (Shick 1977).
By colonization, Jefferson and others meant only a colony in 
the sense of a settlement. The intended U.S.initiated settlement in 
West Africa did not at the outset have the political or economic 
ambitions that European colonialism did. Expulsion, rather than 
territorial exploitation, was the primary goal. Exploitation was 
forthcoming in the years following the establishment of Libe-
ria. However, at its inception the project was one of population 
removal, and not an investment in an American political append-
age abroad (Liebenow 1962).
In 1820, efforts to establish the first settlement of freed Amer-
ican slaves came to fruition. On April third the Elizabeth set sail 
for the African coast with eighty- eight free blacks on board (U.S. 
State Department 2015). Most were former slaves on Southern 
plantations, and few had received any formal education. These first 
sojourners would be the forefathers and mothers of the nation of 
Liberia. Subsequent voyages transplanted additional freed men 
and women, though such efforts were hardly enough to quell the 
coming storm of civil war in the United States— a war fought 
chiefly over the right to own slaves. Though the project had gained 
significant momentum and support, there were those who saw no 
benevolence in the endeavor. In staunch opposition to the move-
ment, antislavery activist Giles Stebbins (1853) later wrote of the 
American Colonization Society, “Its highest form of philanthropy 
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toward the coloured man is to send him to Liberia. As for treating 
him as a man here, that is a different matter— the obligation to do 
so it repudiates— for slavery has created a stern and cruel prejudice, 
forbidding such treatment, and the easiest way to keep up this 
prejudice is to talk about African civilization.”
Those who left the United States for Africa met with unsurpris-
ingly difficult odds. After a failed attempt to establish a settlement 
in Sierra Leone, President James Monroe sent U.S. naval officer 
Lieutenant Robert Field Stockton to the colonists with instruc-
tions to use whatever means necessary to procure land for a viable 
settlement. Stockton and his associate, Dr. Eli Ayers, cruised the 
coastal area until they came upon what appeared to be a suitable 
location in Cape Mesurado, in what is now modern- day Liberia. 
Upon arrival in 1822, Lieutenant Stockton and Dr. Ayres engaged 
in several fruitless land negotiations with a native chief, King Peter, 
who eventually declined to engage in further meetings with them. 
Undeterred, the Americans plunged into the bush and made their 
way to his village. When their insistence failed to result in a land 
deal and the atmosphere became noticeably tense, Stockton and 
Ayers drew pistols on the chief. Given the display of force, King 
Peter conceded to the Americans’ wishes. He sold them a selected 
area of land for a payment made in guns, beads, tobacco, gunpow-
der, rum, and various other goods. Numerous subsequent conflicts 
ensued between the indigenous tribes and the newly arrived colo-
nists from America.3
The early settlers arrived on the continent under the auspices 
of a “civilizing” mission. They have been understood as elitist, 
even “pompous” (Shick 1977). Western style dress, attendance at 
church and other social activities, and proper spoken English 
were hallmarks of their early communities. I spoke with a gov-
ernment official who referred to his forefathers as having “that 
top- hat mentality.” The “cultural style” (Ferguson 1999) that set 
them apart from their neighbors has been interpreted as a sign 
of an arrogant and naïve population group. Such assessments 
may reflect historical realities, though it seems fair to keep in 
mind that the culture from whence they came was also the only 
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one they knew. It seems reasonable, for example, that they would 
reproduce American dress. By any account, the settlers’ way of 
life struck a sharp contrast between themselves and the indige-
nous communities around them. As their settlements expanded 
and developed it became evident that they wished to maintain a 
separation that was as economic and political as it was social and 
cultural.
Internal Mismanagement and International Dependence
National sovereignty was officially established in 1847. The consti-
tution and model of government were fashioned after that of the 
United States. From the founding of the Republic, Liberia was 
plagued by a series of economic crises that were alleviated through 
increased dependence on external actors, mainly in the United 
States. The early settler economy proved dysfunctional. During the 
initial settlement, immigrants were given land to cultivate (10– 25 
acres). However, the understandable distaste for agricultural work 
among recently liberated slaves, and the unsuitable tools provided 
by the American Colonization Society led most settlers to engage 
in two forms of economic activity: trade and politics. Trade was 
a challenge, as the indigenous tribes had a long- established rela-
tionship with European traders. The Americo- Liberians, as they 
became known, could not compete with indigenous communi-
ties who met traders all along the coast. The Ports of Entry Law 
addressed this dilemma in 1864. It limited the number of ports 
accessible to foreigners so that taxes could be enforced. This also 
inhibited indigenous tribes from trading with the Europeans. 
Further uprisings ensued as a result. Internally, corruption and 
embezzlement thwarted the economic capacity of the government 
(van der Kraaij 1983). By the turn of the century, the new nation 
was faced with a depleted budget and little manpower to oversee 
expanded government administration in the interior. The govern-
ment was so destitute that it had already been forced to take out 
two loans, one in 1871 and another in 1906. Additional loans were 
taken out in 1912 and 1917.
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It was against this backdrop of severe economic insufficiency 
and dependence that the infamous Firestone agreements came 
about.4 American businessman Harvey Firestone was in the mar-
ket for rubber in the late 1920s and early ’30s. He found it in Liberia. 
His company leased one million acres for a period of ninety- nine 
years at a rate of six cents per acre per annum. At that time, the 
government of Liberia required a sum of five million dollars to run 
the country. Firestone offered a loan, but the government refused. 
They insisted that too much power would be granted to one hand. 
Firestone then created the Finance Corporation of America with 
the help of some U.S. congressmen. The government of Liberia 
subsequently received pressure from the U.S. State Department 
and considerable encouragement from their own President Charles 
King and former president Arthur Barclay and Senator William 
Tubman— both having been hired to serve as Firestone’s company 
lawyers in Liberia (van der Kraaij 1983).
The government of Liberia agreed to a loan taken out with the 
Finance Corporation of America, a decision that was perhaps more 
serious than the exorbitant amount of land they had leased to Fire-
stone. With this agreement, Liberia became a country “virtually 
under control of American administrators appointed by a Govern-
ment on the other side of the Atlantic” (van der Kraaij 1983, 49– 50). 
With the Firestone Concession and the loan agreement, Liberia 
conceded a significant amount of economic and political control to 
an international corporation backed by the U.S. government.
Given the financial constraints, expansion of governance out-
side of Monrovia was relatively infeasible. The indigenous tribes 
were incorporated beneath the governance of the elite central 
government in Monrovia without equal representation within that 
body. Indigenous leaders agreed to the terms on the understanding 
that they would have better leverage with the American govern-
ment. The result was not at all what they had hoped for. Chiefs 
could be sent to present problems to the legislature. They were 
required to pay a $100 delegate fee for the privilege to present their 
case. However, they were given no voting rights in the legislature. 
Renegotiations on the matter were futile. Tribal authorities were 
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offered some degree of jurisdiction over matters of justice and com-
merce in the interior. They saw this as a useful way to improve links 
to the central government in Monrovia while maintaining certain 
degrees of authority in their own regions (d’Azevedo 1969). By 
the 1930s, during President King’s term of office, the transition to 
incorporation was acutely felt. One Gola elder explained (d’Aze-
vedo 1969, 55): “We old men were treated no better than small boys 
in the time of King. He overlooked us, and untrained young men 
and strangers were made into chiefs over us. Commissioners could 
place us in stocks before our own people and bad men from Mon-
rovia could take our wealth with the help of such chiefs. We were 
helpless and our people wept.” The exploitation and manipulation 
d’Azevedo captures in this elder’s sentiments reflect a common 
theme in Liberian history. Over the course of more than a cen-
tury practices of exclusion and differential incorporation solidified 
the social, economic, and political divide between urban Americo- 
Liberians and the rural majority.
Growth without Development, Integration without Inclusion
William V. S. Tubman was elected in 1944 and remained presi-
dent until he died in 1971. Great value was placed on “civilized” 
and modern education during the Tubman years. As a nation, 
Liberia experienced perhaps the most significant transformations 
during his long tenure. There were two policies that defined his 
presidency— the Unification Policy and the Open Door Policy. 
With them, Liberia experienced tremendous growth and struc-
tural integration between the urban elite and indigenous major-
ity, though by the time of Tubman’s death in 1971 it was apparent 
that the nation had achieved neither true unification nor lasting 
development.
Under the Unification Policy, Tubman sought to formally inte-
grate the indigenous majority, ending a long tradition of indirect 
rule. He extended suffrage to all property owners and to those who 
paid their hut tax (Rinehart 1985). With the Unification Policy 
Western educational institutions began to take precedence over 
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the traditional rural education in secret societies (the nature of 
which will discussed more fully in chapter 5). This educational 
transition was facilitated in part through the accommodation 
of Western Christian missionaries and educators in the interior. 
What was modern, urban, and Western took precedence over rural 
cultural and social practices.
The sociopolitical division between the elite minority and 
everyone else was further established with the economic devel-
opments that came in conjunction with these political develop-
ments. By the end of the Second World War, a port had been built 
in Monrovia, an international airport had been completed, and 
notably, the Firestone Rubber plantations had been established 
after the company was granted a ninety- nine year concession to 
a million acres in 1926. These were the first large- scale employ-
ment opportunities that incorporated indigenous Liberians into 
the wage economy. Wrubel (1971, 193) concludes, “Given access to 
a great many elements of western culture (a hallmark of the settler 
group), the large numbers of tribal people who had left their tradi-
tional villages would clearly become increasingly conscious during 
the 1950s of the evidences of differential incorporation.” In fact, 
the inequality was so apparent that Fraenkel (1964, 225) captures a 
prediction of civil war from a young university student who stated 
bitterly of the Americo elite, “these people are too hard in their 
hearts, they cannot change . . . There will be a civil war. They think 
so much of themselves, and who are they?” Although President 
Tubman spoke frequently on the importance of unification and 
equality, these statements were more symbolic than substantive. 
During Tubman’s long tenure, public services expanded, reve-
nue increased, and the number of resources for distribution grew. 
None of these advances, however, were significant in equalizing 
the two major social groups. Privileges and opportunities— social, 
economic, and political— continued to be accessible only to the 
dominant minority (Wrubel 1971).
In the 1940s, education became a primary source of socio-
economic mobility. Moving to Monrovia for educational attain-
ment became a growing trend among the indigenous people. 
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The population of Monrovia doubled between 1963 and 1972.5 
The educated people who had integrated (as much as possible) 
into Americo society strongly believed in unification. Those who 
were loyal to Americo society received low- level political leader-
ship (Hlophe 1979). A new social class of technocrats emerged. 
These were educated indigenous Liberians who had established 
themselves in midlevel management positions in the urban sector. 
Nonetheless, family affiliations with the Americo elites remained 
important social and economic links. What the indigenous peo-
ple could not seem to obtain were upper- level political positions. 
These remained firmly in the grasp of the elite families in the rul-
ing class (Hlophe 1979).6
In 1952 Tubman’s Open Door Policy continued a pattern of 
growth without development (Osaghae 1996). With this policy 
Liberia opened to foreign business of a particular kind. The policy 
allowed foreign businesses to invest. However, the constitution of 
Liberia forbade citizenship to white people. The Tubman adminis-
tration refused to provide investment incentives to black investors 
from neighboring countries while granting them to foreign white 
investors who could not be citizens, vote, or run for public office. 
This ensured that foreign stakeholders would not be able to become 
citizens and thereby involve themselves in internal politics. This 
strategy had two further implications. As in the case of Firestone, 
it further tied the economic growth of the country to the interests 
of foreigners, rather than to Liberians. It also thwarted the entre-
preneurial efforts of a rising middle class of indigenous Liberians. 
Foreign investors could come in with business plans and access to 
capital that few of the middle class could rival.
In short, the policy isolated economic opportunities from 
the indigenous community as well as from surrounding African 
nations. The Americo- Liberian elites were able to maintain dom-
inance by relying on the work and investment of foreigners to 
generate economic growth. The majority of companies and cor-
porations involved in lucrative enterprises like mining and rub-
ber were either solely or jointly owned by foreign businesses or 
the government of Liberia, or both (van der Kraaij 1983). Thus the 
32 Life after Guns 
country was run by an elite minority that offered the resources of 
a rich land to international investors. This political and economic 
development “from without” led Horton (1994, 2) to reflect, “The 
buildings, bridges, communication and transportation facilities, 
rubber and mining operations, and everything else that indicated 
development to me were not true development. They were mere 
installations, not representative of the Liberian people’s creativity 
and inventiveness. They could not be sustained without white for-
eigners and were certain to crumble.”
Political Discontent and Opposition
In the 1970s, two opposition movements were formed to create 
change, the Movement for Justice in Africa and the Progressive 
Alliance of Liberians (PAL). The Movement for Justice in Africa 
was committed to working toward social equality in the long term, 
but was not as aggressive in its political rhetoric as the PAL (Rine-
hart 1985). The PAL was committed to a critique of its class- based 
society. It demanded more immediate and drastic change in the 
government (Matthews 1980). The PAL became quite instrumen-
tal in the downfall of the Americo- Liberian government, though 
the course of events took an unfortunate, and unforeseen, turn.
In 1979, the minister for agriculture proposed an increase in 
the price of rice. A one hundred pound bag of rice, then sold at a 
subsidized price of 22 USD, would be raised to US$26, increasing 
the profit for farmers, and encouraging them to continue to work 
the fields rather than leaving their farms to look for wage labor 
in the city or on rubber plantations (Rinehart 1985). However, 
President William Tolbert (who had succeeded Tubman in 1971) 
had come under increasing criticism for corruption. That Tolbert’s 
family was in the business of large- scale rice farming and stood 
to benefit substantially from the price increase did not escape the 
notice of the PAL. A march on the Executive Mansion was orga-
nized to protest the price increase in one of Liberia’s most staple 
foods. Some 2,000 unarmed students and other citizens turned 
out. The government panicked and sent police to stop the march. 
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The protestors would not stand down. When tear gas failed to stop 
them, the police opened fire and rioting and looting ensued (Lieb-
enow 1985). The 1979 Rice Riots turned out to be the tipping point 
after more than a century of exclusion and differential incorpora-
tion. Two days before the trial of the opposition leaders, Tolbert’s 
rule came to an abrupt end.
A successful coup attempt saw Samuel Doe become the first 
indigenous head of state. Doe’s regime was characterized by fear, 
suspicion, and liberal use of the machine gun (Sawyer 1992). Unfor-
tunately, he continued the pattern of favoritism and exclusion of 
his elite predecessors. Doe decreed that thirteen elite government 
officials be publicly killed on the beach, an event that has become 
known as “The Beach Party” (Reno 1998). Americo- Liberians 
fled the country while the Krahn and Mandingo ethnic groups 
enjoyed privileged access to economic and educational opportuni-
ties denied to others. These and other events precipitated multiple 
coup attempts by excluded ethnic groups, all of which failed. The 
subsequent discrimination against these tribes caused an abun-
dance of interethnic tension within Liberia (Outram 1997).
Doe’s regime was immensely corrupt, siphoning millions off 
of the government for private patronage in the years following 
his takeover. Large formal sector exporters began to leave in the 
1980s, which resulted in a significant decline of export earnings 
(Reno 1998). This era of “unparalleled brutality” (Levitt 2005) was 
brought to a close by a man who claimed ethnic and elite origins 
(Harris 1999) and an army that espoused no ethnic agenda (Out-
ram 1997).
Civil War
On Christmas Eve in 1989, Charles Taylor and 168 trained soldiers 
invaded Nimba County from the Ivory Coast. The National Patri-
otic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attacked government troops, and 
from there quickly recruited hundreds of Liberians for the cause of 
overthrowing Doe’s government, initiating a new phase of brutality 
that lasted for over a decade. When the war did not end after the 
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assassination of President Doe in 1990, it became apparent that Tay-
lor was waging war not to overthrow a corrupt leader, but to establish 
himself as the country’s head of state (Moran 2006). He was trained 
as a “revolutionary” under Muammar Gaddafi, and his military cam-
paign was neither marked with the exclusion of prior elite govern-
ments nor the ethnic favoritism of Doe’s leadership. However, his 
political agenda turned out to be more of what Vigh (2006a) refers 
to as a “rebellion” than a revolution. The objective was to change 
the players, rather than to address the structural inequalities that 
caused the unrest in the first place. Numerous groups sprang up to 
challenge Taylor’s quest for state power. The Economic Community 
of West African States agreed to deploy the Economic Community 
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a joint 
military intervention force. ECOMOG moved in to protect parts of 
the city and the government administration in Monrovia.
During the years between 1990 and 1996 Taylor’s forces took 
over most of Liberia, controlling nearly 90 percent of the terri-
tory outside of Monrovia, and leveraging the nation’s resources 
for their military aims (Reno 1998). The NPFL launched multiple 
attacks on Monrovia during that time in an attempt to overthrow 
the Armed Forces of Liberia and the ECOMOG troops stationed 
as guardians of the state capital. A group known as United Lib-
eration Movement of Liberia (ULIMO) mobilized and fought 
with ECOMOG and the Armed Forces of Liberia against Taylor, 
later splintering into two groups, one under Roosevelt Johnson 
(ULIMO- J), and the other under Ahlaji Kromah (ULIMO- K). 
In 1996 there was a ceasefire, and in July 1997 elections were held. 
Charles Taylor won by a landslide, with most observers attributing 
the victory to his military dominance and the fear of the people. 
The interwar years (1997– 1999) were marked by tension and unrest. 
Organized armed conflict resumed in 1999, this time with Taylor 
cornered in Monrovia, and LURD (Liberians United for Recon-
ciliation and Democracy) and MODEL (Movement for Democ-
racy in Liberia) controlling approximately 70 percent of Liberia 
(Waugh 2011). In 2003 Taylor finally relinquished his power in 
Liberia and accepted asylum in Nigeria (Levitt 2005).
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Throughout the book, I have chosen to follow the lead of Libe-
rians like Darlington, who refer to “the civil war” as the entire 
period of fourteen years between 1989 and 2003. I have made this 
semantic choice because the country remained tense throughout 
the fragile “peace” in the late ’90s, and because this was how the 
Liberians in my work chose to refer to it. Other scholars choose to 
refer to the First Civil War (1989– 1996) and the Second Civil War 
(1999– 2003). This is also accurate, and a choice made by acknowl-
edging the cease- fire and the first DDR initiative that were all 
subsumed in the return to fighting in 1999.
The harm caused during the war was immense. Estimates sug-
gest that the death toll was extreme, numbering somewhere between 
300,000 and 500,000 between 1989 and 2003 (see McMullin 2013, 
66). An estimated 750,000 Liberians fled their homes (UN 2013). 
The infrastructure suffered from disrepair, with roads left to deteri-
orate as the war dragged on. Notably, the hydroelectric power plant 
that supplied electricity to the urban capital was damaged beyond 
use, leaving the city to function on generators.
What began as a project to transplant unwanted people from 
the United States grew into a country where a dominant minority 
elite built a state on the premises of exclusion and deferential 
incorporation. For the Americo elite, being in but not of Africa 
proved an impossible position to maintain (Ciment 2013). They 
mortgaged the resources of their country to foreign corporations 
who extracted them for foreign profit. As the oppression mounted, 
the gateway to civil war became more and more vulnerable to 
collapse.
Observing the exclusion of the indigenous majority by the 
Americos, Bøås (2001) argues that the war was in large part the 
result of neopatrimonial rule, a form of personal rule originally 
taken from Weber (1978), in which the leader seeks to acquire and 
ensure the well- being of his own group. It is “neo” in that such 
personal politics have been adapted to function within formal 
institutions. Bøås suggests that by redistributing resources among 
themselves, and by cultivating a pejorative and condescending 
view of the “other” (the indigenous communities), the Americos 
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set the country on a course that was simply untenable in the long- 
term. His assessment of the social and structural developments 
over time is a welcome addition in the midst of numerous ahis-
torical theorizations that put civil wars down to greed (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004), feasibility (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006), or 
demographic imbalance (Urdal 2004. 2006). The Americos’ nega-
tive view and treatment of the indigenous majority is uncontested 
by historians. However, if we leave it at neopatrimonial rule by 
the elite minority in Liberia, the interpretation remains a country- 
centric one. The earliest colonization efforts in the United States, 
which began the settlements that grew into the country of Libe-
ria, were rooted in racist exploitation that led to civil war in the 
United States, and that could only culminate in the sorts of struc-
tural violence observed throughout the history of the Liberian 
nation. The country of Liberia grew out of an attempt to export 
the enormous and unwieldy implications of the slave trade, and 
in so doing, transplanted the abjection of the less “civilized” in the 
United States to the shores of the West African coast.
The young men in this book have inherited the implications 
of that initiative. Their life chances are severely restricted because 
their lives, and the lives of their forefathers, mattered less than 
those of the dominant cultural fraction in their country, and in 
the international arena beyond their borders. Appropriations of 
young men as irrationally violent and prone to destruction reify 
the underlying prejudice at work in the New Barbarism, and hark 
back to the fundamental ideologies that fueled the brutality of the 
slave trade. In so doing, the loose molecules paradigm scapegoats 
young people as causes for wars, conveniently obscuring the dom-
inance and actions of international and regional forces that shape 
inequalities and marginalize huge numbers of people. My aim in 
this chapter is to set the analytical lens wide enough to expose the 
structural violence that led to the war, so that the young partici-
pants depicted in this book might be understood as much more 
than exotic, aggressive, and uncivilized young black men— a racist 




Reciprocity, Respect, and  
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The damage done by the war was immense and multifaceted. Roads 
were badly damaged and that made travel slow and uncomfortable. 
Schools and medical facilities were understaffed, undersupplied, 
and not nearly numerous enough to provide care for the urban 
population. City lights had only just been restored to a small, cen-
tral grid of the urban capital when I began fieldwork in 2010. Even 
then, a government official remarked candidly to me that the city 
and the country were not really in “reconstruction,” they were in 
recovery. Young people felt the lack of opportunities acutely. While 
the scholarship around young people often focuses on the dimin-
ished opportunities experienced by a youthful generation, in the 
case of the young men in Liberia, their parent’s generation was hit 
equally hard.
“There were jobs before. There aren’t jobs,” Andrew commented 
one evening in the yard. He was a good friend and a thoughtful 
guide to my understanding of his country. We had been talking 
about his experience of growing up during the war and his obser-
vations about how the country changed for the people since it 
ended. “It wasn’t like that before the war, Abby. Really, it wasn’t 
like that. Like for myself, my dad worked in the mines. We had a 
big compound. Everybody’s parents were working there. They had 
what they needed. . . . But, now, parents aren’t able.”
Like Andrew’s parents, many people were employed by foreign 
companies like Firestone or Liberian- American- Swedish Minerals 
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Company. Shortly after the war began in 1989 the vast majority of 
transnational corporations shut down or severely reduced operations 
in Liberia. Most had been slow to return and reopen, or had not 
come back at all at the time of this research. The physical and eco-
nomic destruction that was levied on the country resulted in signifi-
cant losses for families and households. Money, material possessions, 
and property were damaged, destroyed, or taken during the years of 
conflict. Many young people lost their parents to death or separation 
during the war, which meant that they were out on their own, hus-
tling like Darlington. This chapter explores the structure of support 
as it was meant to unfold through intergenerational reciprocity, so 
that the loss of a helping hand can be more fully understood.
During my fieldwork my home was in Central Matadi, nes-
tled on a curve in the road, under a line of big trees that shaded 
the yard from the afternoon sun. As the weeks went by I found 
myself frequenting one of the many stands where young men 
changed money (Liberian and US currency mostly) and sold 
top- up phone credit, or “scratch cards” as they are called. I usually 
went to Stephen’s stand because he was always there, no matter 
the time of day. Tucked under a bright, multicolored umbrella, 
Stephen could be found leaning on the caged box where he kept 
his stacks of currency, bound tight with rubber bands, or sitting 
just behind it in a short plastic lawn chair. He was wily, as many 
survivalists are. He cheated me out of change once. I returned to 
engage in a somewhat playful exchange of banter, an interaction 
in which I was the decided loser, and he kept the miscounted 
change he had taken in his favor. Stephen was nearly always sur-
rounded by a small posse of young men. They sat with him to 
pass the time, read the newspaper, talk about football, and com-
ment on the passersby.
On a slow afternoon I sat down with him and listened to his 
views of the country and his thoughts about the future.
“A lot of people have to live in the area,” he said, referring to 
the neighborhood. “They rent. They don’t have a house of their 
own. They don’t have the means, so they are just renting. They’re 
not investing for themselves, they just rent. You see some guys 
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around here, they might be thirty or forty years old, and they are 
not established.”
“What do you mean by established?” I asked.
“If someone is established, they might have their own house. 
They have a way of getting money. They have their family all 
around them, their children are in school. A lot of people are not 
established for themselves. It’s difficult, it’s difficult.  .  .  . As for 
me, my own parents were killed. My mother and my father were 
killed during the war. I have to make an effort. There is nobody 
to help me. I have to make an effort for myself. I graduated from 
high school in 2002. Since then, I haven’t been able to do anything. 
Eight years, and I haven’t been able to do anything, really.”
At thirty- three years old, he was not established, and still very 
much a “youth.” Despite his frustration, by comparison with so 
many of the young men in Monrovia, his conditions were relatively 
comfortable. At some point he had gotten work in private security, 
saved a little bit of money, and with the help of a patron, started his 
money changing and scratch card business on the side of the road. 
He rented a room, hoped to attend the University of Liberia one 
day, and took care to look after his siblings and remaining relatives 
when he could.
“I have two little sisters and one little brother, and I have to 
keep them in mind,” he said. “I have other relatives as well. If they 
need a little something, if they need help with school fees, they 
come to me. I don’t give them everything, but I give them some-
thing to try to help them out.”
Stephen’s inability to transition into a more established social 
and economic status is a plight he shares with young people, 
especially young men, around the world. In the literature youth 
are predominantly cast as a generation collectively thwarted 
from achieving status as adults. Their feelings of frustration with 
inhibited or foreclosed transitions take the foreground (see Jef-
frey 2010b; Langevang 2008; Mains 2012; McDowell 2003; Utas 
2005a). In some instances, environments have become so depleted 
that authors like Vigh (2006b) refer to youth as a “social mor-
atorium,” and in Jeffrey’s (2010a) estimation, a permanent social 
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condition for some. Substantial and insightful work has sought to 
locate and understand youth transitions within shifting political 
and economic structures that enable and inhibit their ability to 
make a living or to gain an education (Ferguson 1999; Furlong 
and Cartmel 2007; Jeffrey 2010b; Mains 2012; Vigh 2006a). This 
body of work situates the struggle to transition or survive within 
macro- level analyses of neoliberal economic reform, the false value 
of formal education, or chronic political instability that prohibits 
youth agency toward “established” lives. This is perhaps one of the 
reasons why familial networks of support are often omitted from 
the literature on youth. In the midst of challenging and informing 
the failure of large political and economic structures to support the 
young, there has been less attention given to the immediate social 
supports that remain essential to young people’s everyday lives and 
social standing.
Within this literature “navigation” has become a dominant and 
trendy metaphor invoked by scholars who use the term to describe 
youth agency in rapidly shifting socioeconomic situations (Furlong 
2009, 2013). Navigation, Vigh (2006a) argues, is able to capture 
a tactical exercise of negotiating immediate circumstances while 
maintaining focus on future possibilities and destinations. Though 
this agentive exercise may explicitly include navigating social rela-
tionships, as in Vigh’s work, the attention usually remains on the 
individual’s pursuit of opportunities and status, and we lose sight 
of their interconnectedness with families, kinship structures, or 
their broader communities. Part of this tendency is bound up in 
the liminal transition period of being a “youth,” which is often 
synonymous with movement outside of family households as 
well as migration beyond home communities. Young people are 
not physically with their parents, their siblings, or their wider kin 
relations. Their movements away from “hearth and home” tend to 
draw attention to their individual transitions and trajectories. My 
contention in this book is that family support systems are often 
more present and fundamental than they appear in much of the 
literature. When they are absent or unavailable, a neoliberal bias 
toward emphasis on the individual prevents us from appreciating 
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how significant the loss of reciprocity in family and kin networks 
really is.
The following sections illustrate how obligations in hierarchical 
social relations formed the primary supports for young people’s life 
chances, transitions, and trajectories. As Chabal (2009, 48) writes, 
“The web of obligations that link people is densest at the core of the 
kinship association and more diffuse at its periphery.” The chapter 
demonstrates how reciprocity works in families and households to 
facilitate youth transitions and the achievement of honor and pres-
tige. It serves as a foundation that allows us to better understand 
how significant these webs of obligations in kin networks really 
are, so that the challenge of living life without them, as Stephen 
and so many young people were, can be more fully appreciated. It 
also points to the postwar reemergence of structural power dynam-
ics depicted in the history chapter. Young men’s imagined futures 
indicate a continuation of value for Americo- elite culture and jobs 
in government, suggesting that the war has not caused significant 
disruption to a long- lasting pattern of value for assimilation into 
the dominant cultural fraction.
Webs of Obligation
The time and energy required to feed, clothe, shelter, and support 
young people’s transitions through childhood and toward adult-
hood was a collective, intergenerational effort among members of 
the household, family, and kin. Certainly, there could be important 
patrons outside of familial relations (see Bledsoe 1990); however, 
those who were most obligated were connected through kinship. 
Before I go any further, I should articulate how I am using these 
terms about family and kinship. In this work I use “family” to des-
ignate immediate relations such as parents, siblings, spouses, and 
children— the “nuclear” family, as they are known in the West. 
Wider kinship networks are those extending outward to in- laws, 
grandparents, cousins, aunties, and uncles. This is my semantic 
choice, made to establish a sense of degrees of proximity within 
hierarchical webs of obligation. It is by no means a fixed category. 
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“Family” as a term of reference was used quite broadly by Liberi-
ans to indicate all manner of kinship and fictive kin. Though there 
were significant expectations around reciprocity to one’s immedi-
ate family— for instance, to take care of aging parents— households 
were often composed of all manner of kinship ties, and the day- to- 
day reciprocity between them usually fell along gerontocratic lines, 
where younger members were expected to serve their elders.
Bledsoe’s (1980) work with the Kpelle in Liberia has been par-
ticularly useful to my theoretical understanding of young men’s life 
chances in Monrovia. Wealth in people is a form of social organi-
zation that functions through control of others. Traditionally, these 
hierarchical relations have been gendered, with men in positions 
of social dominance over women, and gerontocratic, with elders 
asserting control over younger persons. Among the Gola in Libe-
ria d’Azevedo (1962) observed that every male adult was a patron 
to a “lesser person,” such as women and children, and a client to 
others. Though I believe that we may observe some challenge to 
these elements of hierarchical structure, particularly as women 
take greater responsibilities as breadwinners in the urban environ-
ment, most Liberians, adults and youth alike, were embedded in 
kinship networks that were still more or less structured around 
gender and generation.
Unlike theories of social capital (see Lin 1999; Putnam 1995), 
in a system of wealth in people social relations are not merely 
helpful connections that assist personal development or socioeco-
nomic mobility— they are literally the means to these ends. “Labor 
and allegiance,” Bledsoe (1980, 48) writes, “are critical to people’s 
economic subsistence as well as to their political and economic 
advancement. Wealth and security rest on the control of others.” 
In Sierra Leone, Shaw (2000) traces the significance of wealth in 
people to agricultural reproduction and to the slave trade. At that 
time the successful cultivation of crops depended on the capac-
ity of a farmer to control the labor of others, something that was 
accomplished through accruing ties of dependency and indebted-
ness in kinship, marriage, parenthood, or fosterage. Circumstances 
precipitated by the slave trade required that groups be armed for 
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warfare to protect their people from slave- raiding posses, and 
leaders built a following of supporters whose security depended 
on them. They in turn provided services that would support the 
protection and well- being of the group. In such contexts, inde-
pendence or individual isolation from a group was dangerous. It 
was through belonging to and with others that one found security 
(Kopytoff and Miers 1977).
The role of patrons and patronage remains important for social 
systems throughout Africa, and Liberia is no exception. Though 
patronage is often observed within political contexts of leadership 
and authority— as with leaders who acquired the allegiance of war-
riors during the slave trade— it is also exercised within households. 
Interdependence through patronage is vital to survival and well- 
being in the every day as well as in the long term. Goody (1982) 
observes that the act of rearing a child creates a debt that the child 
is expected to pay back. The training, provision, and protection that 
parents and other caregivers provide to their charges creates a debt 
that children must repay through their labor and allegiance.
In my household, children were the primary task force that 
kept the household running. There was rarely a lull in the hum of 
human activity around the house and in the yard. I usually awak-
ened to the sound of a child sweeping outside, the coarse bristles 
of a broom brushing across the sand, gathering the trash that had 
blown into the yard during the night. Older children got the young 
ones ready for school. They dressed and fed them, reprimanded 
them when necessary— for whining, complaining, or dawdling. 
Mothers, aunties, and any other onlooking adults supervised the 
daily routines of the young household members. The patronage 
of the elders and their investment in the young ones was always 
near the surface of social interaction. I listened one afternoon as 
a mother in my yard slowly recounted the amount of money she 
had spent on her daughter’s clothes, the school fees she had paid, 
reminding the noncompliant child of her duty to fulfill a command 
made by her mother, a woman who provided for her so thoroughly.
What might appear to some, at least at first, as an authoritar-
ian and dominating role for older persons who were in positions 
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over the younger ones is actually part of intergenerational interde-
pendence, relationships that were far more reciprocal than might 
immediately meet the eye. These were relationships in which 
exchange and obligation in the mundane, everyday tasks laid the 
foundation of reciprocal support that would extend well into the 
future. Children were at the beck and call of their elders, but by 
fulfilling their obligations, the younger ones earned the right to 
make certain requests of them. If unmet, these requests would 
appear equally shameful for their older superiors. It would impinge 
on the bigger person’s honor. As an older guest, I was tended to by 
one of the children in my household. She prepared my food every 
day and she earned the right to make a claim on reciprocity from 
me— occasionally requesting phone credit, chocolate “from town,” 
or bootlegged DVDs sold by the road. I did my best to oblige 
and always felt a twinge of regret and shame if I did not meet her 
request.
Obligations between elder patrons and their younger depen-
dents extend well into later life. Children are the primary source of 
social security in one’s old age (Bledsoe 1980; Harrell- Bond 1975), 
and relations of intergenerational indebtedness are to be taken very 
seriously. My conversation with William illustrates how significant 
decisions to reciprocate in the immediate and short term could be 
for long- term security and well- being. William was a friend of my 
neighbors. We sat chatting with one another on an afternoon while 
he waited for someone to return to the house. He explained that he 
and his wife had two children together, and that his nineteen- year- 
old stepdaughter also lived in the household. He told me that he and 
his wife had experienced an enormous disagreement concerning her. 
It had reached such a fever pitch that he had left the household and 
chosen to live elsewhere for the past four months. His stepdaughter 
had gotten pregnant and had a child.
“No one to claim the child,” he noted. This was a huge concern 
to Liberian parents and caregivers throughout my work, and it will 
resurface in fuller detail in the following chapter.
William related that his stepdaughter had frustrated him by 
not attending to her obligations to him. She did not respect her 
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position in his household by contributing to the workload, by 
washing his clothes or taking care of things when he asked. He 
was feeding, clothing, and sheltering her, yet she failed to recip-
rocate, and had become pregnant with a second child, “another 
mouth to feed!” His frustration mounted with the second preg-
nancy, and tension escalated within the household.
“I got vexed,” he noted. He fell out with his wife because she 
refused to support him when he made requests of his stepdaughter 
and the young one refused to oblige him. He eventually left the 
household in anger, and had only just returned when he sat down 
and began talking with me. He said that he had resolved to come 
back and work with his wife and stepdaughter to resolve the issue.
“I should take care of my children,” he said. “If I don’t, they 
won’t be there for me in my old age.”
William’s struggle to maintain intergenerational reciprocity 
reflects the significance of being indebted to one’s dependents. His 
experience also highlights how challenging it could be to main-
tain reciprocity, and build intergenerational interdependence. Ide-
ally, fulfillment of roles and responsibilities strengthens reciprocal 
relationships. To have wealth in people is to have relationships in 
which obligations bind two or more parties together. The loyalty 
and labor of dependent children is contingent upon the provision 
and protection of their parents or guardians. Each must do their 
part for the other. Through the exchange of reciprocal obligations, 
each becomes increasingly indebted to the other.
What I have just described is a very functional arrangement 
of social exchange. As such, it might appear that there is never a 
“true” or altruistic gift, a point of extensive debate in anthropol-
ogy, and one that harks back to early works by Malinowsky (1961) 
and Mauss (1950). Though Liberian households, families, and kin 
networks operated on an explicitly conditional and contingent 
form of intergenerational reciprocity, I do not mean to suggest 
that there were never gifts, services, or favors that were offered 
without expectation of return or as an outflow of love or care. Nor 
should we make the mistake of assuming that duties and responsi-
bilities to reciprocate are devoid of affection or goodwill. Function 
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and affection are not mutually exclusive (see Mains 2013). That 
said, I did not observe a pervasive exercise of what Sahlins (1965) 
coined “generalized reciprocity” within households. He suggests 
that households are microcosms in which the freest gifts are most 
often distributed without expectation of return. Though I am sure 
that such gifts were bestowed among and between members of 
the household, the majority of social exchange was part of imme-
diate household reproduction and an investment in long- term 
well- being.
Respect through Reciprocity: An Example in Fosterage
These webs of obligations are intricately and intimately linked to 
achievement of respect— respect that Stephen’s generation was 
desperate to achieve and found difficult to accomplish. I have cho-
sen to make use of Spencer’s (1965) distinction of respect as honor 
and respect as prestige. Though Iliffe (2005) dismisses Spencer’s 
use of the two constructs, arguing that he has not seen them mani-
fested in his extensive work on the continent, I find Spencer’s work 
conceptually useful in the Liberian context. Liberians’ prolific use 
of patronage in foster relationships provides an excellent example 
of these constructs in everyday life.
Child fosterage was one way to increase the number of depen-
dents in a household— and therefore the number of indebted 
beneficiaries who would be obligated to their fostering patrons. 
Fosterage is a long- established practice in West Africa (Bledsoe 
1990, 1993; Goody 1982; Isiugo- Abanihe 1985). Fostering children 
has been done to free parents for other responsibilities, to pro-
vide relatives, especially elderly ones, with domestic labor, and for 
social mobility of the young. Most homes with room and resources 
hosted one if not several foster children at once. Many received 
children from outside the city. In some cases, parents were deceased 
or unable to pay for children’s education, and so they were sent to 
wealthier relatives in the urban area. In other instances, parents 
were alive but looked to relatives who could improve their chil-
dren’s life chances through access to better schools.
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By hosting foster children, heads of house earned respect as 
both honor and prestige. Prestige, according to Spencer, is respect 
earned for rising above one’s peers. Households with many depen-
dents were noticed and recognized for having the resources to 
handle many people. In that way, they increased their prominence 
in the community. The more dependents in one’s sphere of control, 
the more prestigious one’s social standing became. For the house-
holds with the resources to do it, fostering children was also the 
right and expected— the honorable— thing to do. Relatives of lower 
socioeconomic status had the right to ask wealthier kin to foster 
a child. The honor of those who were able to offer a helping hand 
depended on providing for those who were less socially and eco-
nomically established. Fosterage demonstrates how intertwined 
the two forms of respect often were. What was socially honor-
able led to greater prominence, to prestige. The more prestige won 
through rising above one’s peers, the more dependents could make 
claims on obligations to support and provide.
Fosterage was contingent on reciprocity. All of the foster chil-
dren I knew were incorporated into the household division of 
labor. Those who failed to comply with their hosts’ wishes lost 
privileges. I saw multiple foster children lose the privilege to stay. 
A boy I knew was living with his aunty to attend a better school. 
He could be slow with his household tasks, and at times disobedi-
ent. He was sent back to his mother after several of these episodes 
occurred. Foster children who worked hard and were compliant 
earned honor in the eyes of their elders and increased their chances 
of benefiting from the favor they achieved.
Mobility through Patronage
Hierarchical webs of obligation channeled goods, services, and 
opportunities. It is essential that we position young men’s strug-
gle to become established within the context of these unequal and 
interdependent relations. The density and durability of their core 
networks of support determined how enabled and facilitated their 
transitions toward adulthood were. Their access to school fees or 
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job opportunities was nearly always a function of their wealth in 
people. While we were talking beneath the umbrella at his stand, 
Stephen noted with frustration, “I just need the opportunity. That’s 
the problem— one of the problems in this society. You know, some 
people they get a job, and then they get their families jobs there too. 
It’s difficult. You don’t have a job, and you don’t have family to get 
you in.”
Though it would be a challenge to substantiate how prolifically 
patronage networks, especially within kinship, were mobilized to 
keep opportunities flowing within personal webs of obligation, 
there was every indication that procuring a spot in school or in 
a job was largely a function of personal affiliations. Patrons were 
needed for fees, for introductions, and for placements.
Titus provides a helpful example of family systems and kinship 
relations that facilitated young men’s transitions under relatively 
ideal circumstances— the kind of circumstances that most young 
men wanted, but very few seemed to have. A student at the Uni-
versity of Liberia, Titus presented a calm demeanor, noticeably 
lacking the edge of frustration I often picked up in conversations 
with Stephen and other young men. Both of Titus’s parents had 
survived the war. They had two small dwellings that sheltered the 
household, which included his grandmother, little sister, both par-
ents, and himself. His parents were able to help him with money if 
he needed clothes or supplies for school.
Hunched over a table in the upstairs library of the university, I 
asked Titus, “How did you wind up getting to come to school and 
so many others don’t?”
“I don’t pay tuition. The reason is because I’m on my grandfa-
ther. He’s an employee here. . . . I’m benefiting from his employ-
ment. . . . Yeah, so that’s how it come about.”
A well- connected grandfather provided possibilities that young 
men like Stephen lacked.
“There’s a very important word, Abby,” Moses, a local pastor in 
Monrovia, noted, leaning across his desk. “‘Interest.’ Let’s say you 
and I go for a job in the government. There is a big man there. Let’s 
say you and I are equally qualified, or even, you are more qualified 
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than me— but he says, ‘I know the man. I have interest in him.’ I 
will get the job, because he will say, ‘I know that fellow.’ That’s how 
it works . . . they’re protecting their own, individual interests.”
Stephen described the redistribution of opportunities within 
family relations as “a problem” in society. It meant that young men 
like himself faced reduced options because their links to bigger 
people were few and because their primary support in parents 
had been diminished or was entirely gone. However, because of 
the social value of intergenerational reciprocity, for bigger people 
being in the position to facilitate a job placement or to redistribute 
opportunities among their dependents was a chance to increase 
respect as honor and prestige. They were providing for those to 
whom they were socially obligated, for whom it was their right 
and expected duty to help, while increasing their investment in 
dependents who were under their control.
Dependence was a “mode of action” (Ferguson 2013). Young 
people’s ability to improve their economic or material wealth was 
inextricably connected to those upon whom they could call for 
favors, or lay claim to obligations. In this way, it is important to 
think about wealth in people as having people above and below 
one’s position in the social strata. Having dependents under one’s 
control increased status and security, but it was every bit as import-
ant to have others upon whom one could make claims.
Most youth that I knew were in Stephen’s position. They were 
keen to improve their life chances through education and work but 
they lacked the wealth in people to acquire opportunities. Edwin 
was an exception. His social status and social relations provide a 
useful contrast, one that points to the salience of the class divide 
that persisted in the years following the war. Edwin was estab-
lished. He had not chosen a wife, but he had the means to provide 
for one. He drove a car that had been brought over from America. 
Always clean, well groomed, and well spoken, he had a house and 
a job in the government.
“That’s everybody’s dream,” Jake commented. Edwin had the 
comfort he hoped to achieve. “You have a job. You have money. 
You have a television in your house. You have your own machine 
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generator, you know? You are living up to standard, you are living 
well.”
As an established man, Edwin had achieved the dream. Though 
we were friendly with one another, it would have been far too per-
sonal to ask him about his patronage networks and his links to the 
government. However, the topic came up one evening over beers 
with a mutual friend of ours. I asked Tee about how Edwin had 
managed to acquire a position when so many young men his age 
were struggling. I noticed that he carried an Americo (Western) 
name, and asked her about it.
“His father was Americo,” she replied. Edwin shared a surname 
with one of the most powerful and influential families in the coun-
try. “He had Edwin by an indigenous woman who could not speak 
English. Now Edwin uses his Western name to get the kind of job 
he has at the ministry.”
Edwin’s status through wealth in people reflects a historic 
and persistent class divide. Bledsoe (1980) provides an illustrative 
example of patronage in the decades prior to the war, of the kind of 
social connections that were now being reproduced among young 
men like Edwin in the postwar years. She tells the story of a young 
man named Dumu who was taken from his village in the inte-
rior to live with a high- ranking national leader. He lived in the 
household and was educated in exchange for his contribution of 
labor. He increased his status by becoming educated and having 
strong ties to the “civilized world.” Politically, his father gained a 
useful relationship with the central government that could benefit 
him in the interior. Connections to bigger people improved life 
chances for the individual as well as their networks of dependents. 
In Edwin’s case, his father increased political ties to the interior 
by marrying an indigenous woman. This gave Edwin a network of 
obligations to draw upon through his father in the urban center.
Big Men
The more prestige earned for rising above one’s peers, the bigger 
the person. The top positions in social hierarchies were held by 
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“big men” and a few “boss ladies,” with the president at the time, 
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, being chief among them. Big men and 
boss ladies held their positions of dominance by leveraging social 
relations to acquire and mobilize goods, labor, and services (see 
Sahlins 1963; Utas 2012). They had interest in and influence across 
many hierarchical webs of obligation.
While I was in Red Light, the market area that will fill the 
content of the following chapter, I asked some of the youth, 
“What does a big man look like?”
Pieced together from several interjections, they responded, 
“Big men ride in cars. They live in the fence. They don’t want 
to expose what they have. Their house, maybe they have two or 
three cars. . . . They hold position. Most of them work in govern-
ment. Other people work for them. They serve them. . . . When 
they come into the community (like Red Light), they come to be 
known. They want to be popular in the community. If they are 
good, they will help.”
Their observation that most big men worked in the govern-
ment always held true in my fieldwork. I never met or heard 
about a big man who did not hold a position of influence or 
power purely outside of the government. This was a pattern that 
had continued from the founding of the republic. Though they 
might have farms or other enterprises, the Americo minority 
elite made the business of government their top priority. In the 
postwar years, the government was again a primary seat of power. 
Big men were woven into the fabric of power relations within 
the state.
At one point, one of the young men in Red Light spoke up 
and said that he and all of his peers were looking for “somebody.”
“You looking for someone to help you?” I asked him.
“Thank you!” he replied, affirming my correct response.
“Big man?”
“Thank you! Someone who can help me [so] I can sustain 
myself. In the future, I help him.”
Everyone was looking for a person with power and influ-
ence who could improve their life chances and support their 
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trajectories toward higher social status. Utas (2012) notices this as 
well, observing that people seek out and maintain ties to multiple 
big men in their quest for the benefits of protection, provision, 
or opportunity. Young men who did not have patronage through 
family, as Edwin did, looked to big men who were on the periph-
ery of their core networks of obligations, and in some cases were 
outside of them altogether. For the big man, a significant part of 
maintaining the labor or services of his followers was to main-
tain popularity and leverage through demonstrations of wealth 
and goodwill, through largesse. They made displays of wealth as 
a means of demonstrating their prestige, and they redistributed 
resources of various kinds in order to maintain reciprocal rela-
tions with supporters who were under them.
In the postwar context, adulthood garnered respect as both 
honor and prestige. Socioeconomic establishment as an adult 
meant that young men were no longer depending on caregivers 
to support them, and could begin to provide for dependents. This 
was a socially honorable position that young men wanted to earn 
in the eyes of their family, kin, and communities. It positioned 
them well above most of their peers. It was also a difficult posi-
tion for most to achieve in an environment where maintaining 
sustainable livelihoods with the resources to support a wife, chil-
dren, or aging parents was impossible for many.
A Class Ceiling
As I listened to the youth talk about becoming established and 
looking for big men to help them, there was a common thread in 
their narratives that points to a resolidification of the class divide 
historically held by the urban, elite Americos. Nearly all of my 
informants aspired to jobs in the government. The elite minority 
of settlers established a clear pattern of choosing government 
opportunities rather than private sector employment. As the 
twentieth century progressed, the trend continued. Assimilation 
into urban elite culture meant looking for opportunities in the 
government rather than the private sector.
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“We feel that the best way to success is to get to government 
by any means possible,” Alex commented of his countrymen. 
“Steal from government, and get started. We don’t feel that if 
you work hard in the private sector or in our own businesses, we 
can succeed. The only way to succeed is to force ourselves into 
government.”
Alex’s comments were made from the outside looking in to 
the government. From the inside, an upper- level employee of the 
Finance Ministry described the benefit of working for the gov-
ernment in similar terms. There were ways of stealing gas money 
on the government’s tab or claiming expenses under the guise of 
state business. It was not that government jobs paid so well. It 
was that government jobs came with abundant opportunities to 
freeload on state money. This is how big men who worked in the 
higher positions of the government were able to pad their own 
pockets.
One of the biggest benchmarks of elite status was the human 
and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) that came in the form of a 
foreign educational degree, most often from the United States. 
Lower- level positions like Edwin’s job provided opportunities to 
access government resources for personal gain. Though his elite 
affiliations, his position, and his material possessions placed him 
well above young men like Stephen in the social strata, I spent 
enough time with powerful elites in the city to know that his 
patronage and level of prestige was not enough to win him status 
as a big man. The biggest men and women had lived and been 
educated in developed countries, most often in the United States.
There is a long tradition of elite migration to the United States 
for education. A large proportion of the ruling minority of elite 
men received university degrees from colleges and universities 
in the United States (Liebenow 1962). Elite money and wealth 
in people in the United States made these options possible. The 
same pattern was evidenced in government officials and repatri-
ated elites I knew during fieldwork. They hailed from universities 
such as Columbia, George Mason, Harvard, or the University 
of Wisconsin. Some members of this group were displaced with 
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their families when Samuel Doe took over in the coup in 1980. 
In their case, forced migration laid the foundation for pursuing 
American education.
Reference, resemblance, and affiliation with the United States 
produced a significant cultural capital among the elite. To have a 
U.S. credential was of significant worth among the ruling class. 
What was on “that side” in America was considered more civi-
lized, and what was civilized was considered more sophisticated, 
and hence more valuable.
“Yeah, on that part of Liberian history,” Jake noted. “What I 
read and what I see, only those that came from over there with 
degree, from Harvard University, from Oxford University, you 
know? England, Germany, you will find most of them working. 
But you come from University of Liberia with BSE or master’s, 
no one will see you [and] carry on serious— any of them you see. 
Any of them you see going and coming back have position.”
Those who were not of elite origin themselves often benefited 
from elite connections to the United States. President Johnson 
Sirleaf has said her education in the United States was enabled 
through the elite affiliations she possessed among family mem-
bers ( Johnson Sirleaf 2009). Her own education includes a bach-
elor’s degree from the University of Colorado at Boulder and a 
graduate degree from Harvard University. I met other, far less 
famous individuals who pursued bachelor’s and graduate degrees 
in a similar fashion. Although not all of them could boast the Ivy 
League clout of Harvard or Yale, it was a stateside degree more 
than an Ivy League credential that was so important.
Though Western, U.S. credentials were not necessarily the 
only indicator of elite prestige, they were a noticeable symbol 
of status that separated the ruling class from everyone else. The 
young men in this work made it abundantly clear that while 
pursuing a university degree or vocational training certificate 
in Liberia was better than nothing, it was not good enough to 
become a big man. The likelihood that it would provide lasting 
improvement to one’s situation was dubious. It was better to “go 
on that side,” where your chances were more certain afterwards.
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One morning I shared a taxi with a smiley young man who 
congenially commented, “We don’t even respect our own degree. If 
you come with a degree from University of Liberia and someone 
else comes with a degree from America they will give it to the 
man with the degree from America.” This issue was pressing on the 
young people, he asserted. It was better to leave the country and go 
somewhere else than to remain, because their progress would be 
slower than those who went to America and came back.
Young people from elite families that journeyed abroad and 
back again could establish comfortable lives in Monrovia. There 
are two further observations to make concerning migration to the 
United States. One is that the war opened a pathway for migration 
to the United States for a large cohort of nonelite Liberians who 
were granted access as refugees. What had been an elite privilege 
became a possibility for others. My informants knew many peo-
ple who had gone over to the United States because of the war. 
Some had done well, gotten jobs and education, and were able to 
send remittances back to their family. There were far fewer stories 
of families coming back to Liberia. There were even fewer stories 
of nonelite Liberians taking jobs in higher positions of the gov-
ernment. However, most of those who came back as big men to 
“hold positions” were from elite backgrounds. On the other hand, 
it was very common to find nonelite young men who had gotten 
into trouble in the United States and been deported, losing the 
educational and economic opportunities that were so sought after 
“on that side.” In short, the notion of going to the States to achieve 
something to return with was prevalent. However, the ability to 
achieve the privilege of prestige as a big man in the government 
seemed to remain with those of elite pedigree.
Conclusion
This chapter illustrates how goods, services, and opportunities were 
channeled through patronage, especially patronage within fam-
ily and kinship networks. Familial relations were extraordinarily 
important for youth transitions and life chances. Having made this 
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argument, I do not wish to present a romanticized notion of fami-
lies as ideal, catch- all, or fix- all solutions to the “social moratorium” 
of youth. William’s difficulty with his own family demonstrates 
that intergenerational reciprocity can be a challenge to maintain, 
and that when family relations are present, it is not a guarantee 
that reciprocity will follow and inevitably lead to well- being of any 
kind. What I am suggesting is that in the Liberian social structure, 
family and kin had the deepest and most enduring obligations to 
offer support. Patrons could also be found outside of the family. 
Bledsoe (1990) is clear on this point in Sierra Leone, and I did see 
indications of this in my own fieldwork. We had a young man who 
began spending time at our house, working on small projects for 
my host mother. She took an interest in him, and wanted to help. 
She became a patron for him, supporting his basic needs while he 
worked for her. Should push come to shove, however, her obliga-
tions to support the needs of her own children and her immediate 
family would always come first. Though she genuinely wanted to 
provide for this young man, and was increasing her prestige in 
doing so, his labor and allegiance were not nearly as important as 
those of her own family and kin.
Transitions into adulthood were significantly thwarted, and 
without personal affiliations to bigger people, most youth were 
relatively immobile. Stephen, like Darlington, could provide for 
himself but was unable to carry any dependents of his own. Live-
lihoods in the informal urban economy supported many young 
people in this way. They provided enough to subsist, but not nearly 
the means to become established.
Frustrated socioeconomic transitions among youth were in 
large part the result of the economic and material damage caused 
to their parents’ and kinship networks during the war. Systems 
of support were significantly depleted of land, money, resources, 
and big people to provide patronage to their dependents. Webs 
of obligation lost their capacity to carry the extensive networks of 
patronage that facilitated youth transitions into established lives as 
adults. The implications of losing family and kinship obligations 
will be more fully explored in the following chapter.
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Young men’s perspectives about earning prestige as big men in 
government reflect a reproduction of social values that has its roots 
in the very beginning of the country. What was modern, West-
ern, and from the United States was more valuable. The consoli-
dation of the ruling class’s power over the indigenous majority was 
maintained in large part through the maintenance of their own 
networks, and on the basis of difference in “cultural style” (Fergu-
son 1999) and the achievement of human capital from the United 
States. Positions of power in the government were kept to their 
class of people, while the rest of the country was co- opted and 
kept down.
The young men in this chapter did not voice opposition to 
these structural barriers, but rather, as their forefathers had done 
for so many generations leading up to the war, they sought to 
accommodate the demands of the dominant— to assimilate to 
their civilized culture and to achieve status by acquiescing to their 
norms and values. The historical struggle for dignity was being 
reproduced in the postwar terrain. As Jensen (2008) observes, as 
long as someone else— someone dominant— sets the criteria upon 
which social worth is conferred, it will remain largely out of reach. 
The reemergence of a structural class divide has implications for 
how we understand the postwar recovery of the nation, and will be 




Life on the Periphery
Wealth in people was vital to security and status. Historically this 
form of social organization emerged in circumstances where peo-
ple were understood as scarce and valuable (Ferguson 2013). Yet 
in Liberia, as elsewhere on the continent, people are in surplus 
and much less valuable as laborers. Hierarchical webs of obligation 
have not been able to carry the weight of so many dependents. This 
chapter illustrates how a lack of bigger people manifested in the 
lives of a group of street youth. Most had lost supportive elders to 
death or displacement. For those whose parents and kin remained 
alive and accessible, their ability to provide for dependents had 
been significantly reduced by their loss of resources in things and 
people. Some young men like Darlington and Stephen were able 
to hustle for themselves enough to make a living. Many others 
wound up on the street.
Kaplan (1996) describes “hordes” of young men, everywhere, in 
multiple West African cities, restless and aggressive. I arrived in 
Monrovia prepared to reject such pejorative appropriations made 
about young black men. However, I was struck by how many young 
men were visibly scattered throughout my neighborhood, along 
the streets in the urban center, and in most places in the city. This 
chapter provides an account of those to whom the loose molecules 
paradigm is most often applied, and whose life chances bear the 
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most resemblance to those of young ex- combatants who had little 
wealth in people after war.
Timothy was twenty- six years old when I met him. He spent 
every day in Red Light, one of the busiest markets in the Monro-
via area. He passed the time with a few friends at a small shelter 
behind the market stalls, just beyond the congestion and noise of 
the car traffic. Days were passed talking, sleeping, smoking ciga-
rettes and marijuana. Some occasionally found day labor hauling 
sand or laying cement blocks. Several, like Timothy, bought and 
sold small quantities of marijuana (which is technically illegal). 
Though their personal lives were all unique, what brought them all 
to the street was what Darlington emphasized that afternoon on 
the beach, the helping was not there.
I went to visit the youth in Red Light often, sitting to discuss 
their views on politics or their experiences of looking for work. We 
smoked cigarettes in the shade and watched the petty traders pass 
by, heavy- laden with bags or boxes stuffed with clothes, sheets, 
shoes, and any other item that could be sold, reused, or repur-
posed. Sometimes I walked with someone, so that we could talk 
away from the group, and listened to personal stories of surviving 
in their depleted postwar context. Timothy was the first youth that 
I got to know. A leader among his small community of friends in 
the market, he became something of a guide for me as I listened 
and learned about the hustle and flow of life lived on the periphery 
of core webs of obligation.
The everyday lives of these young people offer a challenge to 
some of the pejorative connotations linked to street youth among 
their communities and within academic and policy discourse. 
Liberians frequently disparaged the state of the country, and used 
the young people who were “on the street” as an indicator of hard 
times and the implications of the war that were yet to be rectified. 
Though everyone agreed that youth being on the street was a neg-
ative thing, sometimes it was hard to discern what that actually 
meant. Liberians bemoaned the lack of education and the way the 
young people’s lives were wasting away without proper opportu-
nities. Young men were highly visible on the streets, and many of 
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them were not only unemployed but also relatively unoccupied. 
Yet there was also an element of disdain and stigma at times, as if 
being on the street was something especially harmful, associated 
with drugs, theft, or gang activity.
“What does it mean to be ‘on the street’?” I asked Timothy.
“It means that you don’t have parents in your life,” he replied. 
“They might be alive, but you have left their house, their care. 
When you get up in the morning, you go on the street, and your 
activities probably revolve around drugs. You doing small jobs to 
support the habit, or dealing to support your habit and that of your 
friends.”
Smoking marijuana was a regular fixture of everyday life for 
most of the young men in his network of support. It became a cru-
cial means of “small money” for Timothy, which will become plain 
as his story unfolds. More central to his life story and to those of 
his friends is the first part of what he said. “It means you don’t have 
parents in your life . . . you have left their house, their care.” What 
defined the life chances of the young men I knew in Red Light 
was their lack of support in networks of obligation among family 
and kin. For reasons that were specific to each one’s story, their ties 
of mutual dependence among family relations had been signifi-
cantly weakened or completely severed, leaving them to struggle 
for survival outside of their core networks of obligation— which 
meant living or at least hustling on the street. Timothy is our guide 
through this chapter. Through his story, and with interjections from 
the voices of his friends, we see the implications of losing intergen-
erational reciprocity and witness the struggle “to make life” at the 
periphery of those networks. Within that struggle, stigma emerges 
as a prominent theme for these young men who hustle to survive 
the strain of survival on the streets.
Losing Reciprocal Obligations at the Core
In the years during and following the war, families and households 
were disrupted. Nearly everyone’s story featured a steady progres-
sion of loss— both of people and of things. As Flomo, a member of 
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the Elders Council of West Point, said, “Now, due to the poverty 
that affected the parents, it make it that we cannot meet up with 
our children’s needs. And because of this, and they too are try-
ing, one way or the other, to sustain themselves.” Most had been 
internally or externally displaced during the fighting. Some were 
pushed into areas within Monrovia, where the Economic Com-
munity of West African States set up secured camps. Others were 
taken across borders into Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Nigeria, 
and Sierra Leone. Timothy’s mother took him and his brother to 
Ivory Coast. There, as a refugee, he completed his high school edu-
cation. When the war ended, the family moved back to Liberia, 
to Nimba County in the northeast. His mother and father were 
separated during the war, and afterwards his father was not able to 
support the family. A few years later his father died.
Timothy’s mother was unable to offer much help, and was obli-
gated to support younger family members. “You know, she’s a poor 
woman,” he related. “She has nothing much. And you know .  .  . 
it’s like I was a burden on her too. She got three children with her. 
But that’s other people’s children she’s catering to.” Often, par-
ents in poorer households were not able to cater to (support) their 
older, male children. Younger siblings and girls were considered 
more vulnerable, and foster children needed the support. Nearly 
everyone was facing depreciated circumstances while dealing with 
immediate and unrelenting needs. With no father and his mother 
unable to help him further, Timothy looked to an uncle who had 
moved to the United States. His uncle agreed to send money back 
to sponsor Timothy’s education at a technical school in Monro-
via. With the financial means to continue school, Timothy moved 
from Nimba County to a community outside of Monrovia to begin 
an engineering course.
The challenge that surfaced immediately was that Timothy 
did not “have people” in Monrovia. There was no kin relation with 
whom he could stay. There would be no children to cook a midday 
meal. No small girls or boys to do the washing and buying, no mat 
and no roof to share with others who could look out for his well- 
being, his security, or any other needs. As an isolated individual, 
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the mundane everyday stress of living alone in the city quickly 
became difficult to manage.
“He [his uncle] was paying my fees, but not my bills,” he 
explained. “As a young man, I went to school, I got plenty necessi-
ties . . . Clothing, shelter, food, and things— yeah, and you know it 
was kind of tough on me.”
Unable to find a place to stay close to the school, Timothy 
found a manageable rent thirty minutes away. This meant that in 
addition to the monetary costs of food and shelter, he faced the 
additional time, money, and stress associated with transportation 
in the city. Commuting took a significant amount of energy in the 
overcrowded vehicles that traversed the rough, unrepaired roads. 
I learned how daunting it could be to “fight for car!” Motorbike 
taxis were readily available, but they were always twice as expensive 
as the car taxis that followed standard routes through the urban 
landscape. At peak times of the morning and evening large clusters 
of expectant people stood at heavily trafficked junctions, ready to 
throw elbows and hips in the way of anyone who challenged their 
prospects of a spot in a car. Taxis were packed so full of human 
bodies that it was often a chore to get the doors closed. It was 
indeed something of a fight to catch a ride, and one that could take 
an hour or more at the busiest parts of the day.
“I started dropping on my grades,” he remembered. “And I 
couldn’t study on time because you go and come from school— 
when you come from school, no food. You won’t study.”
Just attending to basic needs of everyday life took quite a bit of 
energy. The time- consuming, routine tasks of finding and prepar-
ing food would have to be handled on his own. The only alterna-
tive would be a cook shop or “street food.” Either was convenient, 
but both were more expensive. Additionally, there were all sorts 
of hidden costs associated with attending school. Notebooks and 
writing utensils were only the beginning. Many instructors sold 
their lecture notes, without which it was difficult to pass exams. 
There were few textbooks, which meant that students had to make 
copies of reading materials because there were not enough books 
to go around. This too cost money. It was equally common for 
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teachers and professors to take “small money” (bribes) for grades. 
All of these expenses compounded the cost of education. Timo-
thy’s uncle had not taken these expenditures into account.
“The man don’t understand it from that perspective. He want 
me to just go to school. Going to school now, there are plenty 
things involved in school. You won’t just pay the fee and enter the 
classroom just like that. I couldn’t cope. When I call [my uncle] I 
try to explain things to him. You know, things are hard on this side 
in Liberia. We’re just from war and no work for me. So if he really 
want to be helping me, let him send me some money . . . so I can be 
sustaining myself while going to school. But he never understood 
it from that point of view.”
Unable to manage the stressors of solo existence in the city, Tim-
othy eventually dropped out of his engineering course. When his 
uncle heard that he had dropped out, he resolved to try again to 
provide a helping hand. He committed to sponsor Timothy’s fees 
out of an obligation to his nephew. It would have infringed upon his 
honor in front of the family to decline Timothy’s needs. “You won’t 
easily say ‘no,’” as one woman put it to me. Social honor was con-
tingent on fulfilling responsibilities to dependents. The obligation 
to act as a patron and to support those at the core of one’s network 
was a responsibility taken seriously. However, from his position in 
the States, Timothy’s uncle could not directly verify that Timothy 
was abiding by his expectations to use the money for school and liv-
ing expenses, and suspected that Timothy might be squandering the 
funds in unnecessary ways. As a result, he chose to send the money 
through a male relative who was entrusted to mediate the monetary 
transaction between himself and his nephew. The man sent Timo-
thy’s school bill to his uncle in the States and received the money 
from his uncle to pay for his fees. This too became complicated.
“His only responsibility was to tell [my uncle], say, ‘this is the 
bill.’ And when he pay it, say ‘here is the receipt,’ scan the receipt 
and send it. I would tell him, ‘I’m a technical student, I need so, so, 
and so tool.’ He would tell me, ‘it much.’ When he writing [to my 
uncle], he won’t tell him these things . . . So when he not [telling 
him], I kept my uncle informed.”
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Timothy’s uncle had started this new mediated arrangement 
because of insufficient trust in Timothy’s word. Now, sufficiently 
convinced that his intermediary was misrepresenting Timothy’s 
circumstances, his uncle decided to send money directly to Tim-
othy behind the relative’s back. When the man became aware of 
the communication transpiring between Timothy and his uncle in 
the United States, he was angry. He called a family meeting, and 
questioned Timothy’s honor in front of his relatives.
“He said that I can even be killing. Why? Because I can be doing 
something behind him. So you see, it got me downhearted. . . . He 
started saying plenty things about me to people. How in fact, I had 
undermined him. . . . Problems started coming from the family . . . 
so I myself decided to stop school.”
Life on the Periphery
With the loss of his uncle’s support and his reputation tarnished, 
Timothy found himself at a turning point. He would have to sup-
port himself one way or another, and there were no more obliga-
tions to tap for material support in his core network.
“I went to my mother in Nimba,” Timothy said. “I went there 
and explained things to her. I spent two months with her and I 
came back.” He had no means of contributing to the household in 
Nimba, and would be, as he put it, “a burden on her” if he chose 
to stay. Inability to engage in reciprocities within the household 
meant that young men like Timothy became financial drains to 
their families. It was difficult to justify staying in a household 
without the ability to contribute. In Timothy’s case, when he left 
his mother’s house in Nimba, he returned to Monrovia with few 
prospects and no money.
“From Nimba, I came back. . . . Really, at the time, I had noth-
ing doing. And you know I never wanted to find myself in the 
streets jacking (stealing) phones. Once you on the streets you just 
gotta do something to get money. You’re forced to get money to 
sustain yourself. Yeah, so one of my friends encouraged me. He 
had a little money. He took me, he carry me. That’s how I started 
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selling [marijuana] at first. From there, that’s how I started selling 
for myself.”
Liberians talk about parents “turning their children loose” 
because they do not want to care for them. They speak regretfully 
about impoverished parents who allow their children to run ram-
pant in the streets. “There are parents who don’t care,” a man said 
to me. “They just born the child. That’s a problem in Liberia.”
It was a common view, one also reflected in early literature 
that constructed “street children” and “street youth” as runaways 
from family breakdowns and the implications of severe poverty 
(see Ennew and Swart- Kruger 2003). The National Youth Policy 
adopted similarly reductionist— even demeaning terms— stating 
that street youth were those who “lack any protection supervi-
sion or direction from responsible adults” (Ministry of Youth and 
Sports 2005, 9). There certainly were neglectful parents. However, 
neglect was not always the reason young people ended up on the 
street. Many young men like Timothy still had an open connection 
to family. They did not leave because they were put out or because 
they were not cared for. Often, their reasons were related to the 
financial strain on their families, and under those circumstances, 
transitioning out was more honorable than continuing to stay.
Timothy was fortunate enough to have a friend in the city who 
was willing to help him make a sustainable living. Most of his 
friends were less fortunate. Washington’s experience of moving 
onto the street illustrates how demanding the hustle to find “daily 
bread” could be. When he had exhausted any chance of support 
from his relatives, Washington began “making life on the street.” 
He started in the market.
“When we see a coal car come, we go unload it.” The trucks 
arrived with flatbeds piled high above the side railings, lashed tight 
to keep the contents from brimming over the edge on the bumpy 
back roads and washed out urban byways. Young men tossed and 
carried huge sacks of the dusty black lumps of fuel, skittering 
through the congestion, nimble and agile in the sweaty flow of 
people and goods and traffic. “Then they give us small thing, you 
know? .  .  .  It was very small. They give us 300 Liberian dollars 
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[LD].1 Four persons, 300 dollars, so that money was not really 
enough to sustain me for the day.”
When there was no day labor available, young men hustled for 
other opportunities. James related the way that he had worked to 
find his daily bread in the market: “Everybody sweep the market. 
Take the broom, and sweep the market. Okay, in the morning when 
the people come, we take plastic and we carry it around and say, ‘oh, 
oh let me clean the table.’ Yeah, that how we were doing things.”
It was work done without request and in hopes of a small hand-
out from the vendors. Busy intersections in the crowded parts of 
town were similarly inundated with young men hustling for small 
money. They called out and “fought” for cars on behalf of waiting 
bystanders. Whether requested to do so or not, they pushed their 
way through the clogged streets and sidewalks to find an empty 
seat, save it for a passenger, then ask and sometimes demand a fee 
of five Liberian dollars. Youth who hustled in such venues were 
literally fighting to push their way onto the goodwill of other peo-
ple, hoping to be offered something in return for a service. There 
was no guarantee that passengers would give five LD for a saved 
seat. There was no certainty about the amount of small money that 
might be received for cleaning tables in the market. Making life in 
this way meant hard work in the present moment, done through 
uncertain conditions, with inconsistent returns on often frenetic 
and ongoing efforts.
Finding shelter was an equally crucial part of the hustle to make 
life on the street. One afternoon Joshua took me on a walking tour 
of the market area, pointing out dwelling after dwelling where he 
had been a temporary resident. “I used to live here . . . I used to live 
here.” A dealer and a charming businessman, Joshua’s customer 
base had grown to the point that he could be found wearing clean, 
button- down shirts, a thick roll of Liberian dollars folded into a 
bulging pocket. Before he had accrued the means to have a shelter 
of his own he had bounced all over the community, staying here 
and there to avoid sleeping on the street. All of his former shelters 
were in the households of friends or extended kin of some kind.
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Joshua’s patchwork of temporary living conditions was reflected 
in the circumstances of nearly all of the street youth I knew. It was 
dangerous to be caught out at night, alone and unprotected. The 
young men told stories of theft and abuse of people who were 
exposed in the late hours, vulnerable to violence and exploitation. 
Friends and family, unwilling to leave them out on the street at 
night, allowed some youth to stay beneath their roofs. James was 
staying with his sister in a mat hut in the backyard, Timothy with 
an elderly friend he called “uncle” out of respect, Washington with 
friends. Some were fed by those with whom they sheltered, others 
were not. Timothy could sleep at the elderly gentleman’s house, 
but had to hustle for his own “daily bread.”
Wanting to understand the extent of reciprocity that remained 
in their lives, I asked James and Washington about whether there 
were small boys and girls who were at least helping to wash their 
clothes or help in ways that younger household members typically 
served the older ones.
“You see . . . when you get a little brother, and you don’t provide 
for them, they will not work for you,” James explained.
“Yeah, they don’t respect you if you don’t have anything to give 
them,” Washington chimed in.
“The first thing [you say to] a little brother,” James continued, 
“‘Come give me water, let me take bath.’ But little brother will say, 
‘Every day I can bring you water what you do for me? What you 
have for me if I give you water?’ It looks shameful [if you have 
nothing to give]. So we get up and we do our own thing by ourself.”
Not only were youth in a delicate position with family mem-
bers who provided for them without reciprocity, all were subject 
to varying degrees of stigma as unemployed, liminal young men 
who moved about the street. Tito, a timid member of the swath 
of young people in the area, related very shyly one day that he was 
allowed to sleep and eat at his sister’s house, but that he was never 
trusted with money.
“They say I’m on the street. Her husband will not trust me. She 
will give money to her husband, but not to me.”
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“But what does that mean?” I probed. “You ‘on the street?’ You 
live with her. You eat [at] her house. What does that mean, you ‘on 
the street?’ You selling drugs?”
“Yeah.”
There was a pervasive stigma associated with unoccupied young 
men smoking drugs in the street, and it led to feelings of abjection. 
Respectable parents and caregivers would not accept their sons 
choosing to deal or smoke drugs. “A real mother will not accept her 
child doing drugs,” Timothy explained. “So you won’t be with your 
parents and doing it.” Liberians regarded smoking marijuana as 
dirty, degrading of one’s character, and it was often accompanied, 
at least in the collective consciousness, with theft and other delin-
quent and problematic behaviors. The war was blamed. Flomo, 
who was quoted earlier, commented, “Some of our children, some 
of them they were vulnerable. During the war there were a lot of 
children who engaged themselves in war activities, child soldiers 
and other things. And within that, they began to take drugs. That 
not used to happen. Now, right now we’re not fighting the war. 
But the remnant of the child soldier is still in our midst, polluting 
our children.”
His use of the word “polluting” caught my attention. Others 
had spoken to me of the war as “spoiling” the children. “Polluting” 
offered a more vivid description. The remnant of the child sol-
dier as a pollutant depicted a substance that had gotten into the 
young people, into the very tissues of society. Like a seeping toxin, 
the residue of “war activities” continued to ooze and contaminate. 
Goffman (1963) explains the experience of stigma as having been 
attributed with some natural quality that makes one “unfit.” It 
denies the dignity enjoyed by onlookers and incurs their disdain. 
Stigma is at the root of many prejudices, attributing negative value 
to something innate in a person— the color of their skin or their 
sexuality, and in the case of these young men, appropriating delin-
quency with some kind of internalized drives left over from a time 
of pervasive violence and upheaval.
There is an important relationship between stigma and feelings 
of abjection, a relationship we ought not to miss. Abjection has 
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been understood as an experience of social demotion (Ferguson 
1999; Utas 2008), and this is an accurate use of the term. Jackson 
(2006, 43– 44) pushes us deeper into the internalization of abject 
experience. It “can make a person feel as though he or she is a mere 
object,” he writes, “nameless, of no count, ground down in a world 
where agency seems to be entirely in the hands of others.” In this 
way abjection is more than being thrown down or demoted. For 
the street youth it was an experience of unworthiness, of being 
unfit based upon being young, male, and out of the house but not 
off of the street.
The contaminating effects of drugs translated to perceptions of 
youth who were seen as deviant, dangerous, and untrustworthy. We 
should also notice the conflation of stigma attributed to children 
and youth who fought in the war and engaged in “war activities,” 
with all of the other youth.2 Though Timothy had not participated 
with armed groups, in the public eye he was often cast as equally 
problematic to society, a burdensome result of the child soldier 
run amuck in his generation. “Anything, anything that happen, the 
people will say, ‘Oh, it the youth again,’” Timothy lamented.
There was also a gendered demarcation to negative ascriptions 
applied to young people on the street. Young men were assumed to 
be stealing and engaging in “dirty” behavior such as smoking and 
selling marijuana. Girls were assumed to be selling their bodies, 
and many of them were.
“The girls, all in the street, selling theirselves for little bit of 
nothing,” James commented. “Some of them can sell themselves 
for 50, 75 LD [for] fifteen minutes,” which was roughly equivalent 
to one U.S. dollar at the time. While Liberians throughout my 
fieldwork spoke regretfully of the plight of young girls who were 
selling sex to survive, there was a different quality to their percep-
tion of young men. It was fearful and suspicious.
Though such stereotypes were oversimplified and often mis-
applied, there were many youth who earned the reputation that 
was applied to everyone. At one point Joshua mentioned to me, 
“You know you see those guys there,” referring to an area near 
Timothy’s place in Red Light. “They look common in the face 
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but they do many things. They hijack. They pick pockets in the 
market when people are busy. For true.” Some young people oper-
ated independently. They roamed through communities stealing 
batteries from parked cars, lightbulbs from porches, phones from 
preoccupied people in the market. Others became part of orga-
nized gangs. As far as I knew, none the young men I spent time 
with were actively working with gangs, though Timothy, Wash-
ington, and Joshua all alluded to former involvement with groups 
that stole and took advantage of other people.
Liberian adults regularly described this problem as a result of 
“peer pressure” and “bad friends.” It sounded at times as oversim-
plified and pejorative as Singer’s (2006) suggestion that children 
are so impressionable that they would participate in war on a mere 
whim. Timothy described something far more systemic:
A teenager, yeah, around fifteen, sixteen, he start coming in the 
community, seeing people of his age playing with some kind of 
huge amount of money, 2,000, 3,000. He will go with them. At 
times they will share with him. . . . If you follow someone who is 
doing things for you all the time, it’s like the person keeps help-
ing you. And you don’t have nothing. At the end of the day, you 
will be encouraged to follow the person. If the person is a rogue, 
one day he might initiate you, and you will become a rogue. They 
won’t continue doing it for you all the time. So once you with 
them, at a certain point in time, you gotta pay. And you know 
you gotta do likewise for them too. So, they will force you, they 
will encourage you now to [start] stealing. That’s how you [start] 
stealing. You’re among your peer group. You are doing certain 
things that you know that— you don’t like it at the time, but you 
want to maintain that relationship. And you know, for the main-
tenance of the relationship, you will be forced to do it.
When the helping hand was not there in families and extended 
kin, some young people found it in gangs. Incorporation into 
gangs has been described similarly in other contexts. One infor-
mant in Eugene Jarecki’s (2012) film on drugs in the United States 
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described the experience of being provided for by the drug lord 
in his neighborhood. Once a helping hand had been received, 
“it’s like you were under him.” There was an obligation created 
by receiving help from a patron, and reciprocity was required to 
“maintain the relationship.”
In Red Light, I was not aware of any of the young men being 
actively involved with gangs. In fact, the ones who intimated for-
mer involvement with crime had brushed against experiences they 
were keen to avoid in the future. Timothy and Washington had 
done things they regretted, and had chosen to distance themselves 
from further violence or theft. Joshua got arrested and sent to jail.
“They took me into the Police Depot,” Joshua related. “My 
mother came. She left me there. I spent three months in jail. She 
said it was better that I suffer and learn my lesson. So she didn’t 
get me out. Since then, I have not done anything. I don’t want to 
concern her.”
Some time after his release he began selling marijuana. It was a 
means of survival in an urban terrain where there was not enough 
work, and gangs and crime presented stress that he wished to 
avoid. Being able to sustain himself meant that he was no longer 
a burden on others, or a worry to his mother, whom he wanted to 
please. Joshua is an example of a young man who was not thrown 
out or uncared for, but very much loved.
“One ex- general for Taylor . . . there’s one big place where he 
can get it in the bush,” Joshua said. “He brings it. Last time he 
brought it in big bags. I just buy a little bit to sell in our area. . . . 
You can make a little money. This Christmas I went up to see my 
mother in Buchanan. I took [a gift] and 500LD. She was pleased. 
She doesn’t care if I sell the marijuana. She says she doesn’t mind, 
as long as I’m providing for myself and staying out of trouble.”
Though smoking and selling drugs was not a dignified way to 
make a living, selling drugs in the street enabled some youth to ele-
vate their socioeconomic status above others. Cheap and addictive, 
marijuana and other drugs provided an ongoing, consistent means 
of small cash flow. Regular users meant that young men who sold 
marijuana could count on the cash flow in ways that youth who 
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struggled for day labor could not. As “dirty” and deviant as it might 
be seen in public discourse, selling marijuana made it possible for 
Joshua to achieve social respect from his mother by becoming self- 
reliant, even able to provide for her in a small financial way. He 
achieved honor in her eyes. This pleased him, and it also meant 
that he dodged the feelings of abjection expressed by others.
Parenthood: Additional Dependents
Joshua was the most financially comfortable of any of the young 
men I knew in Red Light. He also had fewer outstanding obliga-
tions. One of the regular stressors in many of their lives was the 
added weight of parenthood without the material means to pro-
vide for children. Most of the youth I knew had “born” (produced) 
at least one child, and none of them were able to adequately fulfill 
their parental obligations.
“Early pregnancy is a problem,” a woman explained in a focus 
group. “We tell them [young women] not to get pregnant. They 
become young parents. At the end of the day, your parents are 
struggling to support you— you get pregnant. The man can’t sup-
port the child. He refuse the pregnancy. It brings the whole family 
down. We tell them to keep out of it. Unwanted pregnancies caus-
ing problem. The family is unable to maintain, the whole society 
is affected.”
Young men felt the burden of their unfulfilled obligations quite 
acutely. I found James particularly fidgety on an afternoon I spent 
with him near his house just outside of the market.
“Your leg’s been shaking since you sat down,” I commented.
James explained that his ex- girlfriend would be coming to col-
lect child support from him in the next few days. “I told her, I say, 
‘I not working. How will I afford that money?’ The month coming 
to an end  .  .  . the mother will come. If I don’t get [the money 
together] the police will come.”
“The police will come, and straight to jail if he does not pay 
child support,” Washington piped in.
“It’s very difficult. It’s hard in life.”
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James’s ex- girlfriend had been especially proactive. She had 
pressured him to provide for his young daughter, and when he 
couldn’t, she had taken him to the police. At the station they had 
publicly reached an agreement about child support. If he could not 
fulfill that obligation, he feared she would come with the police to 
put him in jail for reneging on their contract.
Youth who were not attempting to satisfy the requests or 
demands for child support from the mother were often leaning 
on the willingness of others who, as Timothy’s mother was doing, 
raised other people’s children for them. Young men’s inability to 
provide for and protect their children meant that they became 
indebted to others. Siblings, cousins, aunts, and uncles were called 
upon to foster children that young men were unable to manage. 
It was a position that was both shaming and stressful. Their net-
works of support were unable to assist them into independent 
adulthood, and in their prolonged youth, they created situations in 
which their insufficiency to parent their own children meant rely-
ing on the very people who were too overextended to help them 
in the first place. This is one of the ways that hierarchical webs of 
obligation became so bottom heavy. Dependents accrued far more 
rapidly than patrons who could care for them.
“Nothing Doing”
Life on the street, on the periphery of core networks of support, was 
inundated with all of these and other stressors— they were pervasive 
and continuous, mundane in the everyday. With no household to 
contribute to, no steady work or patron to answer to, most of the 
youth spent long hours watching the day go by. In the early weeks of 
fieldwork I wrote in my notes, “There are lots of youth you see sitting 
around, two or three to a little stand of oranges and Cokes— far more 
than are needed to sell them. There are often three or four sitting in 
the shade behind Stephen while he and his mates are selling scratch 
cards. They just sit and watch the day go by.”3 They reminded me of 
Mains’s (2007, 659) observation of young men in Ethiopia, where 
there seemed to be little else to do than to watch the “contours of the 
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shade from one side of the street to the other with the passing of the 
sun.” “The day is reduced to little more than a mundane rhythm of 
slow, hot hours, spent smoking and sitting,”4 I wrote later. “Haggling 
over who owes the other what thing or amount of money. They are 
not complaining. They are not striving. The boys there don’t even 
seem to be waiting. They’re just there. They’re just living, existing. 
‘Nothing doing,’ they say.”
The haggling over which person owed someone what thing was 
a regular occurrence, and an important part of their reciprocity 
among one another. With no intergenerational patronage to rely 
on, they contributed to each other’s survival in small ways.
“Darus! You can’t pay my money?” Timothy called to someone 
one afternoon. I scanned the large, open passageway beneath the 
trees. It was well trafficked with petty traders moving in and out 
of the market area. “Darus where my trouser?” he continued. “I see 
used clothes.” He continued to harass the young man who eventu-
ally came into view shouldering a large bag of used clothes. Darus 
smiled sheepishly and pulled a pair of jeans from the folded mass 
of clothing and handed them to Timothy.
“We use the barter system a lot here,” Timothy noted, turning 
to explain the scenario to me. “Something for something. That’s 
how we can do it. We share everything. If I don’t have, maybe you 
do, and you will help me today. Tomorrow, maybe it will be me that 
has, and I will share with you.”
Though youth were often sitting still, they were constantly on 
the watch for opportunities to make good on a debt or an oppor-
tunity to indebt themselves to someone who could help them. 
They were perpetually “scanning the environment” as Vigh (2012) 
recalled of the young men on the streets of Bissau. When Darus 
walked through the area by Timothy’s place, Timothy began call-
ing to him immediately, and did not let up until the young man 
acknowledged his debt and repaid it with a pair of jeans. Their 
circumstances offered few material comforts, and opportunities 
missed might not present again for quite some time.
Uncertainty has become a dominant trope in ethnographic 
work on the African continent. Cooper and Pratten (2015, 1) 
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describe uncertainty as a lived experience in which a pervasive sense 
of vulnerability, anxiety, hope, and possibility compete for space 
in one’s outlook. When socioeconomic resources are immensely 
depleted, and opportunities to better one’s circumstances become 
consistently unpredictable, part of the tactic of everyday survival is 
to stay in a constant position of readiness to “pounce” (Hoffman 
2011a) when chances reveal themselves.
One morning while we were smoking cigarettes I asked Timo-
thy about a pastor who had been visiting him and his friends. He 
had come to offer spiritual encouragement in the past. Timothy 
said he had become busy, and no longer came out to their area in 
Red Light. Instead, he had told them to come by his house, where 
they could read the Bible and pray together. Timothy and the oth-
ers refused.
“We can’t just be leaving like that.” There was indignation in his 
voice. “We have busy schedules, things to do. We can’t just leave.”
I looked around the area. Everyone was sedentary. The steady 
flow of petty traders continued, but none of the youth moved. 
There was “nothing doing.”
“What would you miss if you left and went to see him?” I ven-
tured carefully.
“Someone might come with something for me. How can I get 
it if I am not around?”
Indebtedness and obligation were only as good to young men 
as their access to those who owed them or could help them. They 
needed to be available and accessible and most did not have cell 
phones. Their remaining family, friends, or potential employers 
could not merely call up when opportunities arose. Those who did 
have phones often had no credit to make calls. It cost money to 
charge their phones at local stands like Stephen’s. Those who pos-
sessed phones regularly switched them off to conserve battery life 
until they were needed to make a call. This meant that anyone who 
“had something” would have to find the person, or send a message 
to them through someone else.
Repayment of debts insured that one’s social honor among peers 
was not diminished. The social honor, earned through reciprocity, 
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strengthened trust and bolstered the durability of support among 
peers on the street. Social hierarchies of obligation and depen-
dence emerged even in the small groups of youth at the margins 
of society. Young men like Timothy and Joshua rose high enough 
above their peers that their small amounts of cash and resources 
meant that others were often coming to them for help. However, 
the reciprocities that these young people maintained among one 
another could not provide the helping hand that was needed to get 
them out of the street and onto a viable pathway of socioeconomic 
achievement. It meant that most were trading favors and material 
goods among themselves. They were sustaining life on the periph-
ery with little hope of transitioning off of the street and into more 
respectable trajectories toward adulthood.
Conclusion
The persistence of insidious ideologies like the New Barbarism 
or the loose molecules paradigm is due (at least partially) to the 
empirical evidence to which they are tethered. The urban capital 
was jammed with young men who had little to do. Some of them 
were aggressive at times, and involved in illicit activities for which 
their generation was stigmatized and bemoaned. As Philippe 
Bourgois (2003) reflected of the crack dealers in Harlem, with the 
structural limitations imposed on the entire country and especially 
in the densely crowded landscape of Monrovia, it was little wonder 
that youth with inhibited prospects and little support resorted to 
drugs. Unlike the depictions of street youth in the National Youth 
Policy, few of these Liberian young men were lost to caring adults, 
or entirely “turned loose.” They were attached to one another and 
most remained attached to some form of kin relation, if not a close 
family member. The available support across generations had sim-
ply diminished to the point that young men were hustling on the 
street. The rejection of theft and violence that Timothy, Washing-
ton, and others exhibited demonstrates that they were far from 
the mindless reprobates they are so often portrayed as in local and 
international discourse. Those who sold drugs had become involved 
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in dealing like Timothy and Joshua had— they were pressed to 
survive in an environment where other avenues were unavailable.
In many ways Stephen’s life in the previous chapter is not much 
different from Timothy’s. Both were no longer in the care of par-
ents, or residing in their homes, and both were stressed by the dif-
ficulty of making life and finding their daily bread. The difference 
was that Timothy’s livelihood incurred a stigma that Stephen’s 
did not. Though both felt frustrated by the lack of opportunities 
in education and the economy, Stephen’s money changing stand 
avoided the disrespect of the community, and the abjection that 
Timothy felt.
Joshua’s relationship with his mother offers a thought- 
provoking example of how experiences of personal relationships 
can challenge and inform structural norms and values. Dealing 
drugs was the very sort of behavior that separated the dignified 
and respectable from the undignified and disrespected. It was the 
kind of thing that went along with being outside of the dominant 
group, and had no respectability in collectively internalized social 
norms. Joshua’s mother takes exception, however, and regards him 
favorably for his self- reliance. Her assessment of him could be 
put down to the blind affection of a relieved mother, though for 
me it has prompted much reflection. It is an instance in which 
the terms of honor are adjusted. Joshua is providing for himself 
under extraordinarily depleted circumstances. He is as worthy of 
respect as honor in her eyes. Joshua was surrounded by peers who 
felt their abject social status acutely. By honoring his efforts, his 
mother seemed to defuse much of the weight of disdain levied 
by the dominant discourse. When I think about the buoyancy of 
his demeanor and his well- being among his peers, I am left with 
the sense that Joshua’s mother has helped him claim a dignity not 
defined by the dominant, but rather bestowed in their relation-
ships with one another as mother and son. If we understand the 
construct of dignity as a feeling of worth bestowed on individuals 
or collectives, then it is the value of the beholder that matters the 
most. If the gaze of his mother matters more than the evaluation of 
the dominant, then his dignity can be defined and claimed outside 
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of “society’s” regard for him. He is then released from the pressure 
to conform to a code of conduct that was not of his choosing any 
more than the socioeconomic status in which he was born and in 
which he struggled during the postwar recovery. His dignity could 
be the measure of his worth in her eyes and his honor could be 
earned under an adjusted code of conduct— one that respected his 




Life in Armed Groups
The violent social terrain in which young soldiers lost, formed, and 
renegotiated relationships of interdependence with armed groups 
is important to our understanding of reintegration. Their experi-
ences of incorporation and fighting during the war are the subject 
of this chapter. It addresses the question of “why do they fight?” 
and presents my analysis of why that matters. Much of the liter-
ature has focused on vertical social transitions toward adulthood 
or status as big men. In this chapter, I argue that their horizontal 
transitions from families and communities to armed groups is just 
as vital to our analysis of their experience as their transitions from 
boys to men.1
Various theoretical and empirical accounts of youth involve-
ment highlight certain aspects of conflict participation. I have 
approached my empirical material and the literature on young 
soldiers as though it were something of a knot, made up of many 
strands tangled together and bound up in youth experience. For 
example, rights- based approaches focus on victimization of young 
people while anthropologists tend to emphasize youth agency and 
resilience. Some research presents youth involvement in conflict 
as a time of increased life chances while others focus on abuse 
and trauma. The narratives of the young men in this chapter reso-
nate with a number of discursive approaches to the topic. Rather 
than take aim at one or more of these theoretical strands, all of 
which have been brought to bear on a highly complex experi-
ence, the empirical material often holds competing theoretical 
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interpretations in tension. I am comfortable with this, as I agree 
with Shepler (2014) that there is no single, overarching experi-
ence of “the war.” The most important point to take away from 
this chapter is that participation with armed groups meant expe-
riencing a significant rupture from core networks of support in 
families, kin, and communities. Young recruits became integrated 
into a new and alternative social context. The more nuanced and 
analytical our understanding of that experience, the more likely we 
are to grasp the challenges of “reintegrating” once the war was over.
I begin with the difficult story of Morris, an ex- combatant who 
served in Charles Taylor’s Anti- Terrorist Unit. I have chosen to 
begin with Morris’s account of becoming a soldier not to be shock-
ing or sensational, but because his experience demonstrates the 
means by which armed groups had the power to terrorize civilians, 
how uncertain and violent the environment could be, and because 
his choice to fight with Taylor challenges some of the more basic 
and reductionist interpretations of why young people involve 
themselves with armed groups.
Morris’s “War Story”
Morris was around the age of fifteen or sixteen when an armed 
group moved into his region and took over his village. He remem-
bers walking into his community to find a shocking scene.
“They got a big town,” he said. The rebels had moved through 
a bigger town on their way to where he was. “Yeah, and they catch 
all the people there. They catch the pastor. They kill the pastor, cut 
off the pastor’ head. Put the pastor’ head on a [stake] on the car 
road, so that anyone who come in the car road will see the pastor 
for the town that they killed. Killed the pastor son too. Kill him 
and put him by the pastor’s side. Anybody come by that side will 
see the head.
“I was small at the time. I [was afraid]. Go straight in the bush. 
I pray. But after when I pray, I start creeping. Start creeping small, 
see the people digging the hole. I see them putting my people 
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inside. . . . The rebel came, said ‘we gonna put all of you together.’ 
They dug a big hole. They put my little sister, my mother and my 
father inside . . . just waste dirt inside.”
Morris watched from the bushes as everyone died, buried alive 
in a mass grave they had been forced to dig themselves.
“Not a small thing. I cry, shed tears . . . I run. I run hard. I take 
off my shirt, put it in my mouth for me not to shout.”
He fled the village, running through the bush on his own, 
senses heightened for indications of rebel movement. He remem-
bers running for three days. Eventually he came to a river crossing 
where there was a canoe. He got in and began to make his way 
across the water. Rebel soldiers spotted him crossing the river.
“The rebel see me, they start firing. That whole canoe, it was 
torn. During that time I was in water business . . . I swim, swim, 
swim. I was looking for the shore but I don’t see the shore. . . . But 
there was a fisherman . . . I see the net. So I hang in his net, just 
like a fish, start crying, ‘Hey! Somebody help me! Somebody help 
me!’ Yeah, for that man to help me. The man carry me in the town. 
The man carry me in the town. He give me food to eat.”
The fisherman quickly became a friend to Morris, a helping 
hand. He got him medicine. In the violent terrain in which his 
family had just been ruthlessly murdered, a friend and a support-
ive figure emerged to rescue him. When they felt it okay to move 
again, the man took him into the bush.
“During that time, we can’t see war,” Morris noted.
I would like to note that at many points during the research it 
was difficult to determine the time frames along which memories 
were strung together in the narratives of my informants. Each mem-
ory was also subject to the erosion and re- formation of events, feel-
ings, and meanings, a metamorphosis that occurs over the passage 
of time, with the tricks of memory, and a past understood through 
a lens of the present (Schafer 2001). I am not sure how long their 
reprieve from the violence lasted in the town, or how long they were 
in the bush. However, it is painfully evident that it ended suddenly.
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“The man got killed. They killed that man. Stray bullet kill him. 
We were not expecting it, nothing. It just bust his whole head. We 
were not expecting. He just die.”
Morris could not cope with the insecurity and uncertainty 
of the violence any longer. He went straight to Charles Taylor’s 
forces and volunteered to join. He referred to himself at that time 
as a “frustration child,” an angry young man in Taylor’s Anti- 
Terrorist Unit.
Motivations to Fight
Morris’s experience leading up to joining Taylor’s army illustrates 
two important themes common to most young men’s stories. First, 
there was a degree of uncertainty and insecurity in the environ-
ment. One could never be sure when violence would occur or how 
it might manifest. Young people who joined would have the inside 
knowledge that might be helpful to their families, or so they hoped.
“The kids were keen about how they joined these guys [armed 
groups],” Peter remembered. An elderly gentleman, Peter’s coun-
tenance was that of a man who had seen a great deal, and yet 
retained the spark and softness of a person who enjoyed life. He 
was involved in the rehabilitation and reintegration portion of the 
national DDRR process, and worked in a residential program with 
young ex- combatants who disarmed and demobilized. “They were 
keen in the sense that people were always asking them question. 
Many times they were asked that question, ‘Why did you join 
these people?’ They had their different stories. From angle to angle, 
they all had their stories about how they joined these guys. Some 
of their reasons were really life saving. They wanted to save their 
lives. Some of them would say ‘when I got into the army I was able 
to rescue my family.’ . . . So that why, you know, I’m stressin’ how 
keen they were; because they felt that it helped them to save their 
families as well.”
Humanitarian discourse about young fighters tends to coagu-
late around categories of recruitment such as “forced,” “coerced,” 
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or “voluntary” (see Machel 2001; UN 2016b). The juxtaposition of 
“forced” recruitment next to “voluntary” can make it deceptively 
easy to slip into the notion that young people make decisions to 
join from within a vacuum, unprompted and of their own accord. 
Yet as Morris’s experience demonstrates, in a habitus of war nearly 
everyone’s daily lives were directly affected in some way by the 
presence of armed groups waging war in the country. No matter 
how much young people agreed with the “revolutionary” motiva-
tions pronounced by an armed group (Richards 1996), or believed 
that fighting might confer status that much of their generation 
lacked (Utas 2008), decisions to “volunteer” could not be made 
as “free choices.” They were decisions taken in an environment 
charged with violence and exploitation that produced a pervasive 
sense of insecurity and uncertainty.
There are several dominant tropes regarding youth participa-
tion in armed conflict (see Murphy 2003). The rights- based dis-
course portrays young recruits as “coerced victims,” forced into 
participation through abuse and manipulation by brutal abductors. 
A report from the war in Liberia refers to child soldiers in the 
title as “Easy Prey” (Human Rights Watch 1994). Some young 
people in this research were unwilling even to broach the subject 
of why they joined. Those who did share their experiences were 
usually abducted or intimidated, pressured into acquiescing to the 
demands of an armed group. Hurting family members was a com-
mon method of pushing them to join the ranks. This is a tactic that 
has been used in conflicts across the continent (see Marks 2013, 
113), and it usually works.
“Yeah, because once you a soldier, nobody can embarrass2 
you,” Boima explained. A former driver for Taylor’s forces, he was 
articulate and reasoned about the constraints of the environment 
during the civil war. “They can’t embarrass your family. But if you 
not a soldier, they will embarrass you and they will embarrass your 
family. They will continue to use you and your family. So you will 
look at that and say, ‘No, I won’t sit there and let this man who 
will know that I can do more than he to come and use me and 
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my family.’ So it would be better that I what? That I go and join 
to protect me and my family. So that what encourage more child 
soldier to go and join the revolution.”
Scholars have challenged the rights- based discourse of youth 
as “easy prey,” arguing that representations of children and youth 
who are “used” by others, without attention to their own decision 
making, political worldviews, or structural positions, denies their 
agency in the situation (see Boyden 2007; Hart 2008; Honwana 
2005). The UN (2016b) takes the position that the distinction 
between voluntary and forced recruitment is meaningless, because 
all participation is the result of a desperate attempt to survive. This 
appears overreaching. I would argue that while no one of any age 
makes a “free choice” to fight in wars (see Rosen 2007), there are 
certainly degrees of agency applied by actors who take up arms. The 
response to the rights- based approach builds from a body of work 
in the critical sociology of childhood, in which theorists challenge 
the discourse on the “rights of a child” in developing countries as 
a misappropriation of Western norms and values about childhood 
as a time of innocence and immaturity (see James and Prout 1990). 
They argue that such representations lead to constructions of chil-
dren and young people as passive receptacles for input from adults 
and society. Within the context of armed conflict, Hart (2008) 
insists that children are acutely aware of their sociopolitical cir-
cumstances, that they exercise their own agency within war zones, 
and that they are much more than mere victims of circumstance 
or coercion.
I am inclined to agree with Jeffrey (2012) that we are now well 
accustomed to the notion that young people “have agency.” It is 
the extent to which they are able to exercise choice, and to take 
action, that interests me in this work. Morris’s experience of los-
ing his family, running from the soldiers, and eventually joining 
Taylor’s forces demonstrates how constrained any sense of control 
could become in a habitus of war. Most of the young men in this 
study were acting from positions of very limited agentive capacity. 
Their options were few, and the implications of their choices were 
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enormous, often fatal. It seems more helpful to me to think about 
coercive methods and forced recruitment in terms of power to ver-
sus power over. These young men were faced with armed groups 
who had power over them. They came in uninvited and held the 
means to life and death. Youth had power to choose fates that were 
imposed upon them. If they joined they believed that they would no 
longer be in a position where their lives could be placed in these 
dominated positions. Joining a group and holding a gun would 
give them both power to act in a less constrained scope of possibil-
ities and power over others through their possession of weaponry 
and their incorporation with a mobilized group.
In Sierra Leone, Richards (1996) has argued that young people 
fought consciously, out of convictions that the dominant political 
regime had restricted their life chances. This echoes Hart’s (2008) 
assertions earlier. In Liberia, though some ex- combatants occa-
sionally referred to “the revolution,” and to fighting in order to 
make things better in the country, there is no evidence of any sub-
stantial, ideological foundation that guided the politics of warring 
factions, not least of which was the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia, which was responsible for the inception of war.
Even in Sierra Leone, where the use of the Muammar Gaddafi’s 
political philosophy espoused in the Green Book was incorporated 
into the rhetoric of the military campaign of the Revolutionary 
United Front, scholars have held serious objections to Richard’s 
assertions that youth conscientiously participated for political rea-
sons.3 The included authors insist that Richards overstepped his 
ability to understand the context for war in Sierra Leone. They 
portray youth as relatively delinquent, and Richards as attempt-
ing to apply logic and reason to what was, in Abdullah’s (1997) 
frank assessment, senseless and irrational violence. There are cer-
tainly reports of marginalized youth from the streets who took 
the opportunity to fight with armed groups in wars like those in 
Sierra Leone and Liberia (Cohn and Goodwin- Gill 1994; Zack- 
Williams 2001). There is no doubt that some marginalized youth 
found a support system and a purpose in armed groups. It seems 
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quite likely that they were easy to recruit, though we should be 
careful not to extrapolate this idea of “delinquent youth” as alien-
ated opportunists. Most of the ex- combatants in this research were 
not on the street waiting for something better to do. They were 
not “idle” and vulnerable to conscription by promises of material 
wealth or increased social status. They were like Morris. They lived 
with families and within communities. They were pressed to join 
out of fear for their lives and those of the ones they loved. This 
pattern of joining is reflected in more representative, and quanti-
tative, data with ex- combatants in Liberia (see Pugel 2007), which 
finds that the majority of recruits joined out of fear or as a means 
to protect loved ones.
All of this said, I assert that the distinction between voluntary 
and forced recruitment is absolutely meaningful. All agents operate 
within structural parameters, the vast majority of which are not 
under their direct control. Their choices and their actions within 
those boundaries have much to tell us about power and possibility. 
There is a significant difference between Boima’s description of 
choosing to fight to preserve the family from embarrassment, and 
having the opportunity to choose that path taken away by a sol-
dier at the tip of a gun barrel or the edge of a machete. In the first 
instance, a decision is made and acted on, and there is ownership 
of a choice. In the latter there is helplessness. They are not the 
same. Though the degree of choice between these two examples 
may appear small, even minute, in such violently charged arenas, to 
conflate one with the other is to suggest that all young people are 
mere victims of circumstance, that adults (persons eighteen years 
of age and older) are not, and that only the decisions of adults 
are of consequence. In fact, many young people around the world 
take risks and make decisions that have enormous impacts on their 
lives and those of others. Surely their action under such immense 
pressure is worthy of a meaningful distinction between voluntary 
enlistment and absolute, victimizing force.
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Initiation and Inoculation
Armed groups became the relational and institutional supports 
that in many ways replaced families, kin, and communities. This 
is not to say that young people were always cut off from families. 
However, it is evident that their incorporation into armed groups 
required that they realign their allegiance to hierarchical networks 
of comrades and commanders. Much has been written and specu-
lated about the rituals and training practices that are used to turn 
young people into soldiers, especially those practices that have spir-
itual and secret elements to them. While media coverage of wars 
like those in Liberia and Sierra Leone put the exotic and bizarre 
on display, anthropologists have responded with interpretations 
that are primarily concerned with grounding initiations in context. 
They inquire and make arguments about the extent to which ini-
tiation practices are new, or renewed from long- standing cultural 
processes and beliefs, and seek to interpret what they really mean 
or symbolize. In the following discussion, I have tried to offer a 
thoughtful contribution to this literature from the narratives of the 
ex- combatants in my work. What is apparent to me is that there is 
a great deal that we simply cannot know about rites of passage in 
war. What we can be sure of is that they signal transitions into a 
violent community, and a violent way of life.
Becoming a member of an armed group meant entering a new 
social entity. Young soldiers were trained through boot camps in 
some instances, and apprenticeship under comrades in others. My 
data cannot support a substantive analysis of training practices, as 
I spoke with ex- combatants from a number of factions who had 
participated at different points in the war. The extent to which 
there was a training regime commonly used among factions is 
unclear. Certainly, rebel groups have used training protocols that 
reflect much more order than the rag- tag stereotype that has been 
applied to armed groups in Africa (see Marks 2013). Some of my 
informants who joined early in the 1990s recalled boot- camp- like 
experiences that varied in detail, while others who joined later 
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remembered much more informal mentorship under seasoned 
fighters.
Much of the interest in initiation, rites of passage, and prepa-
ration to fight has been concerned with social transitions within 
West African civil wars. For instance, Ellis (2003, 2) suggests that 
forms of initiation into armed groups resemble traditional ini-
tiation rituals “used to manage transformation of children into 
adults.” I am cautious about this assertion on two counts. I am 
cautious of what has become a relatively standard “boys to men” 
narrative that links youth initiation with a rather instantaneous 
transformation to “adulthood.” I am also cautious concerning 
inferences made about how ritual practice was locally understood 
in the context of armed groups.
Moran (2006) jabs at anthropologists for their “obsession” with 
secret hierarchies in West Africa, where secret societies and their 
occult practices have been a source of deep intrigue for scholars. 
She believes that the focus on secret rituals has distracted theorists 
from other interpretations that are pertinent to an understanding 
of the structural environment. The fascination is understandable. 
“Bush schools” in Poro secret societies (hierarchical leadership 
councils within and across ethnic groups throughout West Africa), 
are rich with exhibitions of high drama, intrigue, and identity 
exploration. The sensational displays of costume, kidnapping, 
and training recounted by ethnographers like Bellman (1984) are 
unquestionably exciting. During bush school, Poro elders were 
given complete oversight of youth. Young men were kidnapped 
by their elders and taken into the bush behind an enclosed space. 
They were symbolically “eaten” by a spirit in the forest and given 
cuts that would scar, marking them as members of the Poro. They 
were not allowed to leave, nor was there any visitation by their 
families. When they were returned, they had been taught how to 
survive in the bush, to hunt and fish. They were taught the secrets 
of the Poro tradition and a devout respect for the community of 
elders. This was an education that took two to three years in the 
bush, if not longer in the days before modernization crept into 
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rural communities and infused its social and political structures 
with a value for formal (Western) schooling (Little 1965). When 
young men were returned to their communities and their families 
they had been given a new name. They were to be treated differ-
ently by their mothers. They were no longer “small boys.”4
There are clear similarities between some of the primary rituals 
used to prepare youth for life in rural society and those used by 
rebel groups like the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone 
and the NPFL in Liberia (Ellis 2003; Richards 1996, Shepler 2005, 
2014). Young men were commonly abducted and taken into the 
bush. They were cut to create scars marking them as members of 
their units. They were given medicines to inoculate them from 
enemy fire, and trained to fight and to respect the social hierar-
chies of the group. If there is a tendency toward fascination with 
bush school in its original form, it certainly has not lost its cultural 
interest once armed rebel movements adopt aspects of those ritual 
practices. The emphasis on rituals that “transform” youth into adults 
places the majority of attention on the ritual itself, and on rituals 
as spiritual practices that move young people from one social cat-
egory to another (see Bragg 2006; Ellis 2003). The extent to which 
these ceremonial elements of initiation transitioned them from 
young boys or “youth” into adults seems an exercise in speculation. 
It is possible that young people felt themselves given a new charge, 
a purpose, and a responsibility that reflected a more mature social 
status. Yet initiation practices and trainings in armed groups did 
not last for nearly the length of time that traditional bush schools 
had. My informants remembered time scales that varied from a 
few weeks to a few months. This seems to have been dictated at 
least in part by the manpower needs of the armed group, and the 
manpower availability to formally train new recruits as the war pro-
gressed. My conversations with young men indicated that higher 
social status as adults and even as “big men” was achieved through 
performance as soldiers, and acquired over time. They came to feel 
“big” through executing orders, running missions, and achieving 
recognition for victories and successes that were important within 
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the context of their military unit. In short, achieving higher social 
status occurred more through performance and experience over 
time than through ritual and symbolic initiation.
One of the most prolific parts of the initiation and preparation 
of new recruits was a bulletproofing ritual, which was practiced by 
most factions, and has been observed throughout West Africa (see 
Hamer 2011; Hoffman 2011b; Marks 2013). A young man named 
Sekou remembered his bulletproofing experience with the NPFL 
as follows:
They force you to go to the medicine man. They do different, 
different things to you. It is to help make you to be brave. . . . 
The medicine man marks you, he gives you medicine. You have 
to take the medicine. Then they stand you up against a palm tree. 
You know Arnold? You see Terminator? They stand you up. They 
fire automatic weapons at you [he motioned to indicate big guns 
like AK- 47s]. It’s just like Arnold. The bullets do not penetrate. 
It feels like someone is chunking small rocks at you, or like rain 
hitting you. The bullets cannot hurt you. It makes you brave.”
In his detailed and attentive account of bulletproofing among the 
Kamajor fighters in Sierra Leone, Hoffman (2011b) describes bul-
letproofing practices as military innovations, as new spiritual pro-
tections designed in response to modern weaponry wielded during 
the civil war. Though the actual rituals and medicines themselves 
may have been new recipes and practices created to protect the 
Kamajors in their current situation, the actual act of spiritually 
imbuing fighters with invincibility is not a new innovation within 
the region at all. In Liberia, there is a long tradition of using med-
icine for protection during warfare. Individual warriors could have 
medicine prepared by a Zo (also known as a medicine man) in the 
form of various objects such as skins, teeth, beaks, and so forth, to 
ward off blows, to cause invisibility and invincibility to arrows and 
gunfire (Schwab 1947). It is an old ritual practice applied to current 
warfare where modern, automatic weapons would test its strength.
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Analytical attendance to a site of new innovation or continu-
ity of tradition is important. It demonstrates a critical and care-
ful treatment of another culture, one that avoids the pitfalls of 
exoticizing narratives to which this region is no stranger. In our 
attempts to accurately situate what is “new” or “old,” which phe-
nomena presents a break with norms or a pattern continued, it 
is also important that we do not miss the functionality of these 
events in our quest to understand the symbolism and cultural 
relevance. Young men, and more than a few young women, were 
being equipped to handle new responsibilities, ones that could be 
quite deadly. The act of bulletproofing was described by soldiers 
and their initiators as a ceremony of high drama. As Sekou related, 
young men were literally fired upon in front of their comrades as 
a demonstration of the power of their newly applied protection. 
This ceremony also signified a dramatic transition into a violent 
life, one that was quite removed in most respects from the lives 
they had lived in their home communities and with their families.
Fighters used other forms of medicines and drugs in addition 
to bulletproofing. “Medicine” as it was commonly used referred to 
conjured spiritual powers that were housed in objects that could 
be worn, or in substances used to provide protections of specific 
kinds.5 Sekou had a valuable ring that he wore when he was a gen-
eral for the NPFL. The ring warned him when danger was coming. 
He explained how it would begin to hurt his finger, signaling the 
approach of something bad. If food was offered to him under these 
circumstances he knew to abstain, as it might be laced with poison. 
If it was hurting him while with his men, he knew it was time to 
pack up, and he would order them to break camp and leave. A vari-
ety of charms, rings, and necklaces made of teeth or other mate-
rials were worn or carried by soldiers to protect them from harm.
If medicine could prepare soldiers to face the guns, drugs helped 
to empower them to use guns of their own. Drugs were a powerful 
source of mental separation from conscience and emotion.
“Anybody can understand why they did what they did,” 
Michael observed of his ex- combatant peers. “In order to numb 
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their fear, in order to do what they did, you get what I’m saying? 
The humiliation— they must take something to remove that sense 
of normalcy, that sense of consciousness.”
Substance use among soldiers enabled them to distance them-
selves from the emotional response that would ordinarily occur in 
strenuous and violent situations where their lives could be taken 
from them and where they were under orders to take the lives of 
others. Because drugs chemically modify a sense of reality, the 
lived experience of fighting was literally changed, and became a 
less emotional or familiar human experience.
Thomas, a former NPFL soldier, had access to cocaine during 
the war. “When I was given gun, I take drugs. I take cocaine . . . 
real cocaine, that if I see you, I see you like an animal. I shoot you 
good. I kill you, and I don’t think, because I was in drug . . . I was 
addicted to drugs. If I don’t take drug, I won’t eat, I won’t do any-
thing. [They] give it to the child soldiers to make the brain brave 
for us to do things.”
Rampant use of hard drugs like cocaine is a staple component 
of the human- rights- based objections to youth participation in 
war (Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers 2008; Human 
Rights Watch 2004). Though there are former fighters like Thomas 
who recall being given drugs by commanders, the extent to which 
this was formal military procedure is not clear. Some of the ex- 
combatants in my work remembered using cocaine, which they 
obtained through commanders, others remember smoking mari-
juana, but were not exposed to cocaine, opiates, or other stronger 
substances.
“We had marijuana, or grass,” Michael remembered. “There was 
a big place in Bong County. The grass came from there. There was 
cocaine, but I didn’t see much of that. In my experience, only the big 
generals really had that. Most of the soldiers didn’t really see much 
of it. We had the grass and the cane juice, Talent White, sleeping 
pills. It would make you to feel drunk. Yeah, real drunk. You take five 
or ten of those and you feel real drunk. It makes a sort of white saliva 
around your mouth. Soldiers would be talking real slowly.”
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“What was the purpose of wanting to feel drunk like that?”
“It changes the way you see things. If you see a man he will be 
looking real short, like a small person. He will be looking like an 
animal, short, you will not be afraid. You don’t feel pain. You’re not 
afraid.”
“What do you mean you don’t feel pain? You don’t feel pain 
inflicted upon you, or the pain of inflicting harm on someone else?”
“Both. You won’t feel it as much if you get hurt because of 
the drugs. But you won’t feel that pain in harming someone else, 
either. . . . A lot of it too, was to make you look fearful. The drugs 
would turn your eyes red. People would be afraid when they saw 
you. There was also a leaf that they would take and squeeze the 
juice in their eyes. It made them turn red. This was all to make us 
look fearful.”
It is possible that warlords at the highest levels of authority 
sanctioned or provided hard drugs such as cocaine, or both, though 
there is no concrete evidence (as far as I am aware) that warlords 
like Charles Taylor or Prince Johnson administered these drugs to 
their troops. This is an important point to raise because it calls the 
human rights discourse into question. The argument from rights 
groups is that children were coerced and forced to take addictive 
substances. Many were drug dependent, though not all, and the 
extent to which drug use was forced under the duress of abusive 
commanders is unclear. Most soldiers recalled drugs as merely part 
of the practice of preparing for combat, as fixtures of the environ-
ment more than substances taken under orders or due to addiction.
“Spiritual” medicine and drugs were two of the most high-
lighted aspects of soldier life that were highlighted in memories 
shared by the ex- combatants and noncombatants in this study. 
These substances signified a drastic difference between the sol-
diers’ experience of the war, and the wartime experiences of others. 
Young men were participating in a violent way of life, one that was 
supported by supernatural protection as well as some drug- induced 
mental and emotional distance from foes and victims. They were 
usually cited as a primary indicator of the vast difference between 
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life as a small boy in a town or village, and life as a young fighter 
in an armed group.
Becoming Men
There is now an established body of work identifying young peo-
ple’s feelings of prestige during war and the young men in this 
chapter add to that observation. In this section and the next, I 
highlight the social relations that were built during the war, and 
reflect on how these new hierarchical relations were woven over 
time through reciprocity and how they had important implications 
for respect. Relationships forged during the conflict are also vital 
to the analysis presented in the next chapter about ex- combatant 
reintegration.
There is widespread observation of affectionate relationships of 
exchange between commanders and their recruits, though some 
assert that these are still the product of manipulation and coercion 
(see Boothby, Crawford, and Halperin 2006; Schafer 2004). It is 
impossible to know how abusive or intimate such relations were 
without firsthand empirical data. Ex- combatants remembered 
different experiences of abuse and affection, and the variance is 
undoubtedly due to particular social and structural relations that 
were specific to their different units. Morris recounted an inci-
dence of violence dealt to a small boy who disobeyed an order from 
their commanding officer. His story conveys a tremendous exercise 
of brutality, similar to violent discipline and abuse that has been 
reported throughout wars across the continent (see Cheney 2005; 
Honwana 2005; Machel 2001).
“The general gave us an order to kill our friend.”
“I said ‘I will not do that.’ The general beat me.”
“He beat you?”
“Yeah.”
“He beat you for not killing your friend?”
“Yeah, because I was [looking out] for my little friend. I was 
too wicked. If anybody will do bad I will kill you. But I decide [not 
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to do it, not to kill my friend]. So they beat me and all. Then the 
general end up killing the man.” Morris’s superior beat him, and 
ended up killing his little friend, though in the end, despite his 
threats, he spared Morris.
I cannot speak to the extent to which coercion occurred in 
the ranks or how brutal and violent the chain of command could 
become. However, it was evident that brutality and aggression 
were not the only or even the most defining features of hierarchical 
relationships in armed groups. Randall, who drove a truck for the 
NPFL during the war, spoke confidently and affectionately of his 
relationship with his former commander.
“We been together during the crisis,” he remembered. 
“During the crisis we were friends. He can’t leave me. When I in 
problem, he in problem. So he was more like a brother. We were 
all together. We move like that, like a brother. Yeah, that how we 
live together .  .  . serving each other’ life.  .  .  . [It was] the same 
man (commanding officer) that been with every one of us.  .  .  . 
He brought us up during the crisis. We work for him. He like a 
godfather for us. That the man that take care of us, do everything 
for us.”
Armed groups were a new social platform in which young peo-
ple’s life chances continued to be supported through interdepen-
dent and intergenerational relationships. From his work in Sierra 
Leone, Hoffman (2011b, 133) relates:
As a patron, a “commander” would be responsible for his “clients” 
in ways not defined by military necessity or protocol. In addition 
to providing food, shelter, weapons and ammunition, a patron- 
commander would be a resource in family emergencies or an 
arbiter for disputes among equals. He would be expected to stand 
for those beneath him in cases where allegations were made by 
local authorities or others within the movement. In return, the 
patron- commander’s dependents would be expected to offer 
security for the “big man,” share a portion of whatever wealth 
they might accumulate, and tend to his needs as necessary.
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Participation with armed groups meant establishing new wealth 
in people. Survival, security, and status were embedded in relation-
ships within the ranks. That is not to say that no one had patron-
age with families or kin outside of armed groups. However, their 
loyalty and allegiance was to armed groups first, and it was within 
that social order that some young men developed relationships 
that would sustain their lives and increase their status.
The gun gave young people the capacity to control others like 
they had never done before. Recalling his training with the NPFL, 
Michael explained, “They would say to us, ‘the gun is your mama 
and your papa.’ It meant that the gun could give you everything 
you need. If you have the gun, it can give you the money you need, 
the power you need, the car you need.”
Guns gave young men positions of dominance. They did not 
have to ask parents to buy them things. They could take them from 
unarmed civilians, or scavenge through the spoils of a new territory.
“A soldier man have authority,” David recalled. “He violate at 
any time against the civilian. You understand? He do his will at any 
time. A soldier man can choose, because he with gun. You know, 
what he want [he get] because he got gun against the civilian, so 
that he got authority. Civilian are much afraid.”
Podder (2011) argues that the gerontocratic and patrimonial 
nature of Liberian society underwent a reversal during the war. 
She notes that “violence and symbolic power of the gun became 
a source of power and authority over parents and elders, often at 
the behest of obedience, compliance and respect which for genera-
tions had been inculcated into youth to perpetuate a gerontocratic 
hierarchy” (59). This was true to the experience of many encoun-
ters between civilians and combatants. Armed with weapons and 
the support of a military force, very young boys were allowed to 
demand material goods and services from very elderly unarmed 
civilians who were no longer in positions of authority over them, 
to whom their allegiance was no longer attached.
During a focus group in West Point, an elderly gentleman 
named Elijah remembered encountering young fighters. “I walk 
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by small child, like my grandchild, holding arm [gun]. They killed 
fifty- seven people. But the day before they killed sixty people. They 
‘pop- pop- pop- pop’!,” he related, making the sound of gunfire, his 
eyes wide. “‘Papé, you will move!,’” he remembered being ordered.
Rather than a total reversal of gerontocratic norms, young 
fighters experienced a more fundamental break with social life 
outside of their factions. Age hierarchies appear to have persisted 
within the ranks. Taylor’s forces were known for having “small boy” 
units. Young ones were put in their own unit, with their own set of 
military responsibilities, much like children were set apart for par-
ticular household tasks within the home. Prior to the war, young 
people would not have been able to speak to Elijah as they do in 
the above quote. With their guns and with their position in an 
armed faction, young men were given dominance over unarmed 
elders. In short, there was a sharper break with society outside of 
armed groups, rather than a universal inversion of gerontocracy.
Earlier I argued that while it is difficult to know how much sta-
tus was conferred through ritual initiation, it is evident that young 
people achieved benchmarks of social status through performance 
of roles and responsibilities (see Utas 2003). Armed groups offered 
a helping hand that accelerated socioeconomic mobility during the 
war. At a very basic level, being part of a faction meant that the 
daily necessities of life as well as additional material possessions 
were readily available. Rations like rice, cassava, and liquor were 
provided on a regular basis.
“As a soldier I eat on time,” Nathaniel commented.
It was a stark contrast to his postwar situation and that of many 
of his friends. But as a soldier in the NPFL his needs had been 
taken care of. In addition to basic provisions, anything that could 
be taken from civilians or from the front lines as spoils of war 
would add to a soldier’s wealth.
“Some people love the operation,” Michael reflected, “where 
they go on attack. When you go on attack, and your enemy retreat, 
whatsoever in that environment comes to you: looted materials, 
arms, you know whatsoever, water, soap, rice, yeah the drinks.”6
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“Because of looting properties,” Peter explained, “looting cash, 
they [young fighters] began to establish families. They began to live 
on their own, earn money during the war by using gun during the 
war to earn money. They began to behave like men. They began to 
behave like a man and take responsibilities.”
Fighting with armed groups enabled sustainable livelihoods 
and prospects for starting families, or at least maintaining relation-
ships with girlfriends (see Coulter 2009; Utas 2005b). Young people 
were able to instruct and demand goods and services from civil-
ians because they were armed. Within the ranks, as new recruits 
became more seasoned they were given responsibilities over others. 
All of these markers of greater socioeconomic maturity were asso-
ciated with adulthood— and all of them were earned over time, and 
through experience and performance of roles and responsibilities.
Becoming Big Men
Recall how the street youth described big men in chapter 3. They 
ride in cars. They have houses and other people work for them. 
They hold positions, most of them in the government. And when 
they come into the community, they want to be popular, and they 
help people. Some of the ex- combatants in this work were able to 
take on responsibilities and to act not just in ways that reflected 
adulthood but that earned them status as bigger men. None of 
my informants were among the top generals who collaborated 
with warlords like Charles Taylor, Roosevelt Johnson, or Ahlaji 
Kromah. However, some of them were given responsibilities that 
reflected status as bigger men. Sekou’s experience with the NPFL 
is a case in point.
Sekou was recruited during the earliest months of what became a 
very long war. When he was twelve or thirteen, he was taken from his 
school in Nimba County to be initiated and trained to fight with the 
NPFL. He rose through the ranks and told me stories of operations 
he led. Once, Charles Taylor personally thanked him for a successful 
operation he executed to capture a town in a strategic area. Taylor gave 
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him cash money as a reward for himself and his men. We talked about 
his role as a leader and his reputation for being impartial— he would 
punish even his friends if they stepped out of line.
“What do you miss about being a soldier?,” I asked.
Commanding his men, came the immediate reply. “Telling this 
one to go there, telling this one to go there,” he motioned.
“You miss being in charge?”
He smiled, and I wondered if I had embarrassed him. “Yeah. 
Sometimes when we were camped, we get food, and we make it 
for all the town people. We have musicians come in to entertain us. 
We’d have enough liquor, beer. Everyone would come. It would be a 
time of enjoyment. I really miss that.”
“You liked treating people?”
“Yes. It was a part of my job. I would take care of the people.”
He was a general, commanding hundreds of men at points— a 
significant number of dependents who looked up to him. It was a 
position that afforded him the prestige that came through victory, 
and through dominance and displays of largesse. He could prom-
inently and proudly bestow gifts and services on his men and on 
civilian communities they occupied— garnering greater honor and 
prestige all along the way.
For a young man not yet in his thirties at that time, this was an 
inconceivable position to be in outside of the context of the war, 
both in regards to generation and to class. Big men who had posi-
tions in dense networks of wealth in people were well past their early 
twenties. Most were also strongly attached to the government, and 
deeply indebted among the ruling class of Americo elites prior to 
Samuel Doe’s takeover of state power. Young men in rural villages 
and towns were unlikely to gain the sort of power and prominence 
of big man status to begin with, and especially at such young ages.
Conclusion
There is much we cannot know about the complexity of the interper-
sonal and social experiences of becoming young soldiers. The child 
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soldier phenomenon is well trod with speculation and with accounts 
that emphasize the sensational and extreme aspects of being young 
and being soldiers. Such accounts often downplay other structural 
forces that are enormously important for our understanding of 
conflict participation and postwar experience. There were two tran-
sitions during wartime that provided an essential foundation for ex- 
combatant’s life chances after war. One was a horizontal transition 
to a new, hierarchical network of support in armed groups. The pri-
mary labor and allegiance of young people shifted from families, kin, 
and communities to comrades and commanders. They were under 
new patrons, and became patrons to others in a social system that 
was supported by engagement in warfare. The other was a vertical 
transition into higher socioeconomic status on an individual level.
Higher social status achieved over time became a point of inter-
personal tension for many in the aftermath of the war. Young men 
invested years of their lives, their energy, their bodies, and their 
intellect with armed organizations that recognized their achieve-
ments and rewarded their efforts. Noncombatants, most of whom 
were deeply affected by the violence and exploitation these young 
soldiers exercised, were unable to appreciate their achievements as 
soldiers. Those achievements came at the immense, unquantifiable 
cost of lives, injuries, rape, and destruction of property and liveli-
hoods. Many ex- combatants felt themselves at odds with those who 
could not recognize their bigger status, achieved through intense 
and demanding experiences of participation with armed groups. I 
say this not to sympathize with the aggression and dominance prac-
ticed by armed groups but to highlight how the intense experiences 
of fighters over time could mean a great deal during the war, but 
lose efficacy when ex- combatants transitioned to social situations 
beyond the ranks. Their negotiation of these and many other post-




Reintegration as Social Process
In postwar contexts ex- combatants are the subjects of numerous 
reactions and stereotypes that are more often than not marked 
with alarm and panic (Boyden 2007; Denov 2012). Much of the 
policy discourse, and a good deal of academic rhetoric, presents 
ex- combatants and former child soldiers in binary terms. They 
are victims or perpetrators. Rights- based and psychological liter-
ature advocate help for the victims, while postwar policy discourse 
highlights the necessity of managing ex- combatants through 
security measures designed to prevent them from ruining fragile 
peace agreements. At each end of these polarized perspectives, ex- 
combatants are objectified as entities that must be dealt with in 
particular ways. By extension, reintegration becomes a set of mea-
sures to be implemented or achieved. One of my primary aims at 
the outset of this research was to probe past these objectifications 
of former fighters. This chapter builds from a body of anthropo-
logical work previously conducted with former soldiers in West 
Africa (see Shepler 2014; Utas 2003; Vigh 2006a). It describes and 
explains the experience of reintegration as an ongoing, fluid pro-
cess in which ex- combatants relate and act along a continuum of 
experience that is not captured in much of the literature. All of 
the contributors to this chapter had been victims and perpetrators 
of violence. A good deal of their postwar transitions out of armed 
groups were spent managing social stigma associated with them 
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as violent killers, and with a quest to reassert or establish honor 
and prestige in the absence of the armed organizations that pro-
vided the ways and means to achieve respect during the war. This 
chapter builds on the previous empirical chapters, demonstrating 
that reintegration is a relational process. Thus far we have seen 
that survival, honor, and prestige are achieved in networks of social 
relationships. The same is true for ex- combatants. Their processes 
of reintegration were defined by those among whom they were 
interdependent and with whom they sought to achieve honor and 
prestige once their armed groups were no longer waging war.
Much of the content in this chapter is drawn from time I spent 
in Slipway, sitting and talking with the young men there in the 
same way that I spent time sitting and talking with the youth 
in chapter 4. Slipway is a small community tucked beneath the 
bypass to Capitol Hill and right next to the waterway leading to 
the ocean. In the mornings men clustered in the shade around 
the public toilets. They sat on stones or stairs, propped themselves 
against the chain- link fence, cigarettes hanging loosely between 
their rough dark brown fingers. We spoke about politics, the state 
of the country, and I asked for time to speak with them individu-
ally as I did with Timothy and the youth in Red Light. I did inter-
views with ex- combatants in Gardnersville and Bernard’s Farm as 
well. However, these areas were further afield, and so the greater 
bulk of my time with ex- combatants was spent in Slipway, talking 
and passing the time outside of the public toilets.
Making Life outside of Armed Groups
Titus, a student at the University of Liberia, commented about his 
peers, saying:
When the war ended, people were confused. . . . What made 
them confused was because they were used to one person who 
had authority. That was Charles Taylor. Then Charles Taylor 
left . . . So you know, most youth, you know most of them were 
fighters. After the war, the person who gave them the authority 
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was no more. So you could just find young people roaming the 
street not doing anything, not having any sense of direction.
His observation provides a useful starting point for the overar-
ching theme of this chapter. In the previous chapter we observed 
young men being culled out of their families and communities and 
embedded within a new web of hierarchies that organized their 
everyday lives, gave them purpose, and guided their social and 
economic transitions. They were taken from one set of relational 
systems and placed into another. Transitions out of armed groups 
were confusing for many because these transitions lacked the clar-
ity and purpose that transition into armed groups had. Going into 
armed groups, young men quickly learned what was expected, 
what their role was, and to whom they must answer. Coming out 
of armed groups was very much the opposite. There was almost a 
sense of being dumped out of armed groups and into an ambigu-
ous postwar social terrain.
That is not to say that there was no structure to their transi-
tions. The final ceasefire occurred in June 2003. The Comprehen-
sive Peace Agreement was signed in August2003. Charles Taylor 
accepted asylum in Nigeria, and by December 2003 the United 
Nations– supported disarmament and demobilization of armed 
groups was under way in Monrovia. Disarmament and demo-
bilization continued in other parts of the country later in 2004. 
Ex- combatants who participated received 150 U.S. dollars for their 
weapon. Most were taken to cantonment sites where they spent 
five days undergoing “psychosocial support” activities (see NCD-
DRR 2006). Ex- combatants recalled being told not to take drugs 
and how to live in “normal” society. They were issued ID cards that 
they could use to identify themselves at vocational and educational 
programs set up specifically for them. If training was completed, 
another 150 U.S. dollars was given to enable them to start busi-
nesses of their own. Young people under the age of eighteen were 
taken to Interim Care Centres where they received counseling and 
some education, ranging between a few days up to three months.
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By their own admission, the United Nations Mission in Liberia 
and the Joint Implementation Unit were unprepared to conduct a 
thorough DDRR process. The primary emphasis was placed upon 
disarmament and demobilization. “Rehabilitation” and “reintegra-
tion” were never properly defined, prioritized, or implemented in 
an effective way (NCDDRR 2006). This research demonstrates 
that part of that ineffectiveness lies in the manner in which rein-
tegration was understood— as a process by which ex- combatants 
gained civilian status and the means to earn a sustainable living. 
It was conceived of as a project to put ex- combatants “back” into 
society (McMullin 2013). This institutional objective to put ex- 
combatants “back” leads McMullin to ask “back into what?”
When their armed groups were disbanded and, with them, 
their way of making life, these social and material foundations were 
replaced with promises of skills training and livelihoods through 
DDRR. However, for most of the young men in this research, 
these promises came to little fruition in an economically strapped 
postwar job market.
“If you come and take the gun from my hand, and just send me, 
to whom are you sending me to?,” Sumo queried. A former general 
for the NPFL, he was pointed about the social repercussions of his 
conflict participation. “To my father who I have abused and disre-
spected because the power of the gun I was carrying? To whom are 
you sending me to?”
One of the most salient limitations of promoting reintegra-
tion through skills training lies in the lack of opportunities in an 
economically depleted context. Where opportunities do exist, they 
are embedded in social networks of trust and respect. The inter-
national agenda to put ex- combatants “back” falls flat for former 
fighters who have no one to go “back” to. Because life chances are 
so deeply embedded in reciprocal and hierarchical social relations, 
“back to whom?” was the primary question that ex- combatants had 
to answer.
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“Programmed Killers”
So many young people lost their families to death and displace-
ment during the war. For others, families were alive and living 
in the country, but unwilling to receive them. David recounted 
a recurring theme of social isolation among ex- combatants after 
the war. I saw him often in Slipway. He wore a soft expression, 
worn clothes, and when there was no day labor, he could be found 
lazing about, smoking or drinking cane juice, “nothing doing.” 
A former soldier with Taylor’s forces, he had been abducted to 
fight before completing high school. When the war ended he was 
twenty years old.
“No job,” he related. “Because of the war, you know. Because 
after war business, people take me to be a bad guy. . . . People say 
I’m a rebel, you know. All kind of stuff. [I wound up] on the street, 
making my own way through, yeah. . . . I cannot go home. They 
will not take me. . . . So I call to talk to them [parents], make them 
understand, and they just left myself on the street.”
Like Timothy, he eventually made a friend, someone who was 
willing to let him sleep in his room while he hustled for his daily 
bread. It is possible that some ex- combatants were rejected out of 
preservation of family honor— a sense of shame that their chil-
dren were involved in committing the atrocities of war. Detailed 
research with the families of ex- combatants was beyond the scope 
of this work, and without adequate data, it is best not to speculate 
about what motivated family rejection of former fighters. What 
was apparent to the informants of this work, both ex- combatants 
and noncombatants, were ascriptions of deviance and dangerous 
behaviors that made former fighters untrustworthy and instilled 
fear in other people.
Recall the elder Flomo’s description of the remnant of the child 
soldier as a pollutant. There was a pervasive perception of former 
soldiers as having been altered by their wartime experiences— 
polluted in a way that predisposed them to thoughtless violence. 
Ex- combatants were thought to have a blood lust and a propen-
sity for erratic commission of violence. During my interview with 
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Esther, a psychosocial youth worker who was involved in rehabili-
tation with ex- combatants, she told me that she herself had fought 
in the war and related how she negotiated social stigma in the 
aftermath: “If you ex- combatant, you live in any community, for 
me— I will always give an example of myself. Where I live, people 
don’t know that I fought war. Nobody know .  .  . because if they 
know I will feel embarrassed. People won’t want to come around 
me. People won’t want to feel free with me because they will feel 
that I ex- combatant. I killed. So anytime I can kill anybody. I can 
harm anybody. So you see?”
This was not an overblown assumption about how noncom-
batants perceived former fighters. While I was sitting with some 
of the young men in Red Light on a typically slow day, someone 
mentioned that a man in the community had recently beaten a 
child to death.
“A three years old child,” Gibson kept repeating.
“The man was a former fighter,” another piped up. “They get 
used to killing like that. They just like to see blood.”
Popular conceptions of ex- combatants often feature assump-
tions about their having become “programmed killers” during the 
war, and remaining nothing more afterwards (see Denov 2010). 
The notion that ex- combatants had become programmed killing 
machines who liked to see blood was present on the local commu-
nity level in Liberia as well. In the face of unexplainable behavior, 
speculations about how the war “spoiled” soldiers through drug 
addiction and bloodlust were tossed into social discourse like the 
example above.
Socialization into violence, which has been depicted as though 
it were outright “programming,” is often assumed to be a cause 
for violence after war (see Achvarina and Reich 2006, 130). In her 
work in Uganda, Vermeij (2011) argues that socialization in the 
Lord’s Resistance Army was a cause for ex- combatants’ uncon-
strained commission of violence after leaving armed units. We 
should exercise caution in such an assessment. Though she defines 
“socialization” as a process by which naïve individuals are taught 
skills, values, and behaviors, and relates practices that the Lord’s 
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Resistance Army used to train their recruits, she never actually 
provides a theorization of socialization as direct cause for behavior. 
Because she fails to situate her argument within a vast literature 
on the topic,1 she problematically reifies notions of ex- combatants 
as “programmed killers.”
Trauma is another, perhaps more prolific cause assumed to 
be behind aggressive and violent actions of former fighters after 
war— at the local level as well as in the literature. I heard this 
reasoning often and from the very first day of fieldwork. As we 
were driving from the airport the day I arrived I remember Daniel 
turning around in the car to talk about “our war- torn country.” At 
one point he said, “The ex- combatants, some put their guns down 
with their hands, but not in their minds. They are traumatized.” 
For him, and for so many others, this explained their criminal and 
violent behavior after the war.2
A vast literature tracks the psychological implications of expo-
sure to, and participation in, violence (see Berman 2001; Gear 
2002; Yule 2000). Quantities and qualities of exposure to violent 
acts, or commission of violence, have been associated with depres-
sion, anxiety, and post- traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), among 
other psychological disturbances (Bayer, Klansen and Adam 2007; 
Derluyn et al. 2004; Kanagaratnam, Raundalen, and Asbjørnsen 
2005; Khort et al. 2010; Kuwert et al. 2008; Medeiros 2007). In 
particular, PTSD has been associated with increased instances of 
violent behavior (Norman 2014). In their comparative study of ex- 
combatants and noncombatants, Blattman and Annan (2010) find 
that ex- combatants have had higher rates of experience with and 
exposure to violence, and unsurprisingly this is associated with 
more numerous and difficult psychosocial implications after war.
Though experience with violence itself can hardly be contested 
as a cause of later difficulties, a number of scholars have challenged 
the “biomedical” approach of psychologists and psychiatrists who 
travel to postconflict countries and refugee camps to assess levels 
of disturbance. They cite limitations in reporting and a Western, 
“universalist” bias that informs the trauma paradigm as clear and 
problematic shortcomings of the biomedical paradigm (Bracken, 
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Giller, and Summerfield 1995; Eyber and Ager 2004; McKay and 
Wessells 2004; Summerfield 1999). Yet qualitative research with ex- 
combatants, conducted beyond the confines of diagnostic scales and 
indices, reveals instances of violent flashbacks— the sort that cause 
mental and emotional disturbance and have consequences for ex- 
combatants’ ability to participate in relationships, or cause them to 
avoid certain areas associated with traumatic experience (Boothby 
2006). I have not engaged the trauma discourse substantially, as I 
did not collect data regarding psychological history or experiences of 
disturbance. However, though the means and methods of assessing 
trauma may deserve intellectual scrutiny and some methodologi-
cal improvement, the manifestation of trauma in ex- combatants’ 
lives— as well as those of noncombatants— is not up for debate.
In terms of being “socialized” into violence a small pocket of 
research suggests that young people who are forced to perpetrate 
violence often come to enjoy it, to find it appealing and exciting 
(Elbert, Weierstall, and Schauer 2010). The research links “appeti-
tive aggression” to early recruitment at young ages and to higher 
instances of perpetrated violence (Hecker et al. 2012; Weierstall 
et al. 2013). There is much to learn about this connection between 
early perpetration of violence and the enjoyment of violent aggres-
sion, and we should be extraordinarily careful not to overgeneralize 
assumptions about ex- combatants becoming killing machines who 
“like to see blood.” Though their training and experience empow-
ered and required them to perpetrate violence of various forms, 
there is no research that links participation in armed groups with 
prolific, ongoing postwar violence that is the result of some sort 
of cognitive reorganization. Once the militias were disbanded and 
the weapons, drugs, alcohol, and supplies were no longer organiz-
ing life and providing a purpose for violence, ex- combatants had 
much less incentive or opportunity to commit the kinds of violent 
acts they had perpetrated during the war.
While some ex- combatants like Esther negotiated ascribed 
identities as deviant and dangerous persons, other ex- combatants 
achieved the reputation that was applied more broadly to every-
one. One night in the yard my friend Terry began to speak about 
Reintegration as Social Process 109
his brother who had been recruited to fight with the NPFL as a 
small boy.
“My brother fought . . . my brother fought.”
“He fought in the war?” I ventured carefully.
“Yes, he fought in the war. He is not encouraging us.” He was 
referring to his family, particularly his siblings. He said his brother 
didn’t want to do anything productive. He just wanted to take 
things. He did not care about anybody else. He said his brother 
drank a lot, and they were afraid of him. As he continued to speak 
I learned that the brother had stolen repeatedly from the fam-
ily. He had taken his sister’s laptop and held it for ransom. He 
returned it only after she agreed to pay him 100 U.S. dollars. He 
had been put in jail at one point, for allegedly beating a small child. 
I met the young man while visiting Terry’s family. I slept with my 
own laptop in the bed with me that night, afraid that he would 
break in and attempt to steal my things.
Psychological work on trauma or aggression attends to changes 
in the individual’s psyche. Theoretical work in this field would 
understand Terry’s brother as having experienced psychological 
changes that resulted in his individual propensity to violate the 
trust and goodwill of his family. These are interpretations to which 
this research raises questions, but cannot rigorously address. What 
it can demonstrate is a social experience and adjustment that ex- 
combatants made in different ways as they negotiated changes in 
the postwar space.
Making Life through Violation
Ex- combatants are seen as a significant threat in the policy dis-
course. The breakup of factional networks is considered vital to 
postconflict security (see Spear 2002; UNDP 2011). If left together, 
armed groups are considered potential “spoilers” of postconflict 
peace. Frustrated ex- combatants who remain armed and organized 
might upset a fragile peace agreement. In his critical discourse 
analysis of the DDR process undertaken in Liberia, McMul-
lin (2012, 390) argues that “the ex- combatant is constructed as a 
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‘permanent outlaw’ who represents a ‘bundle of threats’ unless he 
can be tempered by the post- conflict state under international 
tutelage.” The aim of the demobilization, disarmament, and rein-
tegration framework is to minimize security threats by occupying 
ex- combatants with education and job training, and removing as 
many weapons as possible. It is important that they have some-
thing “positive and constructive” to do, the UN (2010) asserts. As 
one aid worker commented in McMullin’s (2013) work, vocational 
training is seen as something of a parking lot, a “holding position.” 
It buys time for the consolidation of peace, regardless of whether 
it is actually effective in the lives of ex- combatants.
There is unquestionable evidence that ex- combatants can pose 
challenges to consolidation of postwar governance. In Liberia 
there is a well- documented instance in which several hundred ex- 
combatants took over the Guthrie Rubber Plantation, generating 
significant resources for their own purposes and posing a challenge 
to the state (see Cheng forthcoming; Persson 2012). By the time of 
my fieldwork, such “hot spots,” as they are called, had diminished 
over time, in part due to the continued efforts made by the state 
and the international community to intervene and disrupt the 
power bases of these groups. Similarly, Lemasle (2010) observes 
that on a macro- level, patronage networks established in armed 
groups had significantly eroded by the time of her comparative 
study in Liberia and Sierra Leone.
Still, on a micro- level survival and respect could be man-
aged among peers and patrons from the war. As I listened to 
ex- combatants talk about forming gangs after the war, it became 
apparent that these were not organizations of ideological opposi-
tion to the state. Gangs were social vehicles that preserved their 
recognition as big men and allowed them to make life through 
violation and violence, as they had done during the war. To go 
home to civilian families would require (most of ) them to forfeit 
status they had earned during conflict. Sumo described this sce-
nario quite well. After spending five days in the DDR cantonment 
camps, he was released, but he had no plans to return to his family.
Reintegration as Social Process 111
“Well, when I was taken out of the [cantonment site], after five 
days I came out,” he related. “I was given 150 USD. . . . If you come 
and take the gun from my hand, and just send me, to whom are 
you sending me to? . . . When we had the arm [gun] we feel we 
had power that we carry. So we felt that we was mature. So when 
the war subsided, and they took the arm from us, we felt shame. 
We felt too big to return to our parent’ houses to be called ‘baby.’”
Isaac explained this further. He was a local pastor who worked 
in rehabilitation with young ex- combatants. During his time work-
ing in an interim care center for former child soldiers he knew a 
young man who provides a stark contrast between the prestige of 
holding a gun during the war and the demotion that would occur if 
he were to reenter the household hierarchies in his parents’ home.
“He told me, he said, ‘I was a whole squad leader.’ It meant he 
was a big man. ‘I was a squad leader and if I go back to my parents 
they will ask me to go wash dishes, ask me to scrub the floor, ask 
me to wash their clothes.’” He was about fifteen years old when 
Isaac worked with him. At such an age these were tasks that a 
fifteen year old could reasonably expect to do.
“He said that he could not see himself going that road again. 
Out of the status that he had come from, out of the colonel rank, 
then seeing himself to go back to work to wash dishes, he said ‘no.’ 
He could not see himself to go back to it.”
This is a well- established pattern among former fighters in 
postwar contexts. In Liberia, Utas (2005a) suggests that some for-
mer fighters choose not to go back to lives as civilians because this 
would “remarginalize” young men who had achieved status as big 
men, just as Isaac describes. In Mozambique, McMullin (2013, 8) 
relates a running joke among ex- combatants, as expressed by one 
man, “The government told us, ‘Congratulations. Now you are all 
equally poor. You have been reintegrated back into basic poverty.’”
Ex- combatants like Sumo were uninterested in that sort of 
remarginalization. With factions disbanded in the months fol-
lowing the cease- fire, warlords like Taylor were no longer supply-
ing their men. The ex- combatants were obliged to acquire drugs, 
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alcohol, and food for themselves. From his “base,” Sumo remem-
bered running “operations” with his gang in Monrovia:
I resulted to a high class criminal. . . . I was head of the armed 
robbery group here in Liberia. As a matter of fact, I controlled 
the entire Freeport at the time. . . . It was already known to me 
that police is nobody to me. Yeah, the police, other people, I 
consider them a subordinate. . . . My recruit, we move here and 
there. . . . I never remember [carrying out operations] in the 
night. All is broad day. I even remember some four years ago, I 
remember I arrived on Broad Street it was from in the morning 
to 12:00. Yes, and I wasn’t arrested by any of the police. I always 
resisted. And under the Gyude Bryant government, two, three 
police were killed from me. . . . Ah, under this present govern-
ment under which we are here, ah two got killed.
Years later, a former general came to him and encouraged him 
to stop. The teachings of Pentecostal Christianity were an integral 
part of his decision to put an end to the abuse and exploitation he 
had levied on the community with his gang. Sumo spoke at length 
about the spiritual teachings that gave new meaning to his life 
and his decision to desist from the violation of others and their 
property in Monrovia. At a social level, what is evident in his story 
is a renewed and redirected loyalty and allegiance to a big man 
from the war. This social attachment must not be missed. Every-
one’s ability to survive, belong, and be acknowledged with respect 
was bound up in their social networks. When young soldiers were 
incorporated into the ranks, their obligations to elders and to oth-
ers were redirected to the ranks of their military organizations. 
After the war, they were told that their factions were no more, and 
to stop their way of life. Recall what David said about being a sol-
dier man: “I violate at any time.” Too “big” to go home, and unat-
tached to the communities of noncombatants around them, many 
like Sumo continued to make life with their ex- combatant peers 
through the violent and violating means that were part of their 
everyday lives during the war. It took a relationship with someone 
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that they respected to shift their orientation to the postwar space. 
In the following section, Randall’s relationship with his family and 
then a former commander help to illustrate the importance that 
these relationships could have during difficult transitions.
Reorienting to Life without a Gun
Randall returned to a family who cared a great deal for his well- 
being. However, he struggled to negotiate social relations with 
noncombatants, and got into disagreements over money and inter-
personal conduct on several occasions. He remembered that family 
imploring him to manage himself without causing trouble, and 
related some of the trouble that he caused. For example, at some 
point after the war he had been loaned a motorbike.
“Sometimes I would carry the bike two days, three days, myself 
I can be using it for my private use. I gave it to my friend and 
my friend went and sold it. He escaped. The [owner] said, ‘I don’t 
know the man you gave the bike to, but I know you. How you say 
you gave the bike to someone?’”
Randall’s mother came to the owner and paid the value of 
the motorbike on Randall’s behalf. “My mother came to pay 400 
dollars U.S. to the man. The woman say, ‘I must pay my money 
because my heart hurting me. So I can advise you. The thing you 
are doing, it bad on me, and you getting me? We gotta sit down 
and think. No more Charles Taylor business. Charles Taylor is not 
the one that born you— are you getting me? It only war came into 
this country and some of y’all took part inside. So long war, every 
day, but the war finish. Gotta sit down to think, gotta go back to 
school.’”
Randall never related exactly what he was using the motorbike 
for, but his mother’s admonishment suggests that he was doing 
something of which she disapproved. At a more basic level, he had 
failed to be responsible for a costly vehicle that resulted in a great 
deal of expense for her.
“My mother called family meeting. Yeah, and she told me, 
‘don’t go in jail. Don’t look for problems. Because when you go in 
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jail, myself I’m looking for it, eh? I beg you, don’t get in problem. 
Take time with yourself in life.”
She encouraged Randall to go back to school, to pick up where 
he had left off when he joined the NPFL in 1989. He had no 
patience for school, however, and left. His family communicated 
how much they wanted him to be all right, but eventually told him 
that they were at the end of their tether to know how to help him 
live and get along outside of “the Charles Taylor business” that had 
subsumed his life for so long. Eventually, he returned to the man 
he spoke about in chapter 5, the one who was like a godfather to 
him and his comrades.
“I came back to the man [commanding officer] I was with in 
the wartime,” he related. “Because I don’t have anybody, so he was 
assisting me. I used to drive for him also. During the wartime I 
used to drive for him. So he called me, and I was doing it— he do 
everything for me. He feed me, giving [to] me. . . . [It was] the same 
man that been with every one of us. . . . He brought us up during the 
crisis [the war]. We work for him, he like a godfather for us. That the 
man that take care of us, do everything for us. . . . I was not his son, 
nothing. But we had been together, serving one another life, and up 
to now we were able to live, to see the end. . . . I fall into trouble, he 
advise me. He said, ‘You are not my son, but we fought war together. 
You must take time with yourself. Don’t get into problem.’”
Serving one another’s lives is an apt description of reciproc-
ity. In a circumstance in which his family was unable to sustain-
ably graft him into their lives, a former authority figure from the 
war was able to do so. He did it by offering Randall a socially 
acceptable livelihood and encouraging him not to make trouble 
for other people. They maintained their relationship as benefactor 
and dependent, and the respect that came with it. Similar circum-
stances emerged in numerous interviews with former command-
ing officers and soldiers. Instances like this one demonstrate that 
ex- combatants are not always or only “bundles” of threats. They 
are capable of wielding their influence and authority among their 
networks in ways that foster nonviolent social practices that are 
necessary for sustainable peace.
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Separation and Intersection
Thus far, the life stories of Sumo and Randall may give the impres-
sion of rather fixed postwar trajectories, in which they continued 
to make life through violation until a turning point or conversion 
of some kind. When retold in this way, these turning points appear 
to alter completely the course of their lives, bringing them into 
socially acceptable modes of action within the postwar landscape. 
In the final section, Boima recounts a similar turning point. Part 
of this may be a result of memory, a product of hindsight, in which 
certain events signal changes that profoundly redirected their life 
courses. Some may have experienced very stark shifts as the result of 
relationships like the ones Sumo and Randall described. My time 
in Slipway, and among other ex- combatants in the city, suggests 
that major transitions were not so linear or so sudden for many 
ex- combatants. Rather, their willingness and ability to accommo-
date acceptable social norms and conduct among other Liberians 
could be disjointed and uncomfortable, a patchwork of their desire 
to assert themselves on their own terms blended together with 
attempts to do life as others would have them live. They did all this 
in an effort to maintain honor and prestige among one another as 
well as with noncombatants, most of whom regarded them with 
fear, skepticism, and at times deep contempt.
“The issue of stigma always making them to come together, 
to live together,” Mary noted. A trained rehabilitation special-
ist, Mary had worked with a lot of ex- combatants in programs 
designed to help them reintegrate. “If you feel stigmatized, you 
always look for wherever you can find ex- combatants who will be 
somebody like you. I will tell you, ‘at least I am safe to where I am.’ 
You will want to join me. And I will start to call others from out 
there who will come and join.”
Stigma was not only an issue because of acts of violence 
committed by ex- combatants in the aftermath of the ceasefire. 
Negative impressions of ex- combatants were also coupled with 
experiences that occurred during the war. Many Liberians could 
remember the soldiers who hurt them or their loved ones. On 
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occasion, perpetrators and victims ran into each other. Memories 
of the past were carried into present exchanges that resulted in 
immense discomfort for both parties. Violent and abusive experi-
ences that induced fear and harm for victims during the war could 
turn to resentment in the aftermath.
One of my neighbors recalled a vivid example of this kind of 
encounter. During the early years of the crisis soldiers were going 
house to house, killing anyone they suspected of being Americo. 
Suspicion was enough reason for the soldiers to fire on the spot. 
My neighbor Josephine and her aunty fled the house, her small 
son strapped to her back. On their way up the street a young sol-
dier stopped them and threatened them at gunpoint. Her aunty 
dropped the things she was carrying. Feeling faint, Josephine 
nearly fell backwards, and her son began to slide from her back. 
She caught him by his leg. Seeing her struggle, a man rushed from 
behind to help her with her son. The soldier boy shot him in cold 
blood.
Years later, after the war, the very same young man occasionally 
passed through Josephine’s yard to go to a shop on the other side 
of her property. One day she stopped him as he and some friends 
were passing through. “Do you know me?” The young man said 
“No.” She asked him again, “Do you know me?” He replied “No,” 
again, adding that he met lots of people. She recalled to him the 
day he threatened her, the woman with the baby on her back, and 
the man that he shot. He asked her to please put it in the past. 
Things had changed. His friends encouraged him to be nice to 
her, telling him that if she were a wicked woman she would find 
him and poison him in revenge. He never passed through her yard 
again.
Most ex- combatants chose to live with one another. Pockets 
of ex- combatant communities were peppered all throughout the 
greater Monrovia area, and people knew where they were. Fac-
tion affiliations were common and groups often clustered around 
a big man from the war. Interestingly, having been a fighter in 
the civil war was enough to draw ex- combatants together. Young 
men from different, opposing factions became members of the 
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same ex- combatant communities. Shared social identities as ex- 
combatants— even from opposing sides— became the tie that 
bound them together. Clumped in ghettos and residential areas 
and living separately from others reaffirmed the distinction 
between themselves as men and women from war and others who 
were not a part of their wartime lives or experience.
Slipway was such a community. It was notorious in a way that 
raised eyebrows when I mentioned to my neighbors that I was 
spending time there. “You’re a real tough guy!” Tee exclaimed when 
she heard where I had been going during the day. “Even I wouldn’t 
go there,” she continued. “I know where to look over from the car. 
But I wouldn’t go in.”
Liberians expected ex- combatants to be loud, rowdy, sometimes 
rude and aggressive. They were known for drinking and smoking 
and careless if not reckless behavior. Drug use and violence were 
expected in their enclaves, and people like my neighbors preferred 
not to enter ex- combatant spaces.
Though ex- combatants found support among one another 
in these communities, most places like Slipway were not self- 
sustaining enough to exist without interaction with the wider 
urban community. Ex- combatants needed jobs. Slipway was in 
desperate need of water and road repair. A former general named 
Brutus was a leader in Slipway and one of my first contacts. His 
attempt to leverage resources, assert his prestige as a big man, and 
protect his honor as a husband demonstrate the disjointed patch-
work of social practice that converged in social interactions and 
across social spaces.
Our relationship developed over the months that I visited the 
community, and eventually there was a community celebration 
that he invited me to. All of the women were wearing the same 
print, which I obtained and had a dress made from. The president’s 
son Robert Sirleaf was supposed to be there to see the community, 
a point that Brutus was immensely proud of. That day he wore a 
three- piece suit and spoke to the crowd with the demeanor of a 
statesman. He was a big man. The president’s son had arranged to 
have some public works done in Slipway, and he was the social link 
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in the chain of resources from the government. We took pictures in 
our fine outfits, and celebrated the new developments that would 
help the community. In all of this, Brutus was asserting his prestige 
in Slipway. He had obtained a position of leadership and authority 
over others, one in which he was working with the government 
that had overthrown Charles Taylor— his former warlord and 
leader. He had adapted to the new conditions in the country, and 
been willing to accommodate a new regime. All of this suggested 
significant shifts in his allegiance to a new system of authority and 
a different way of doing life after guns.
Though this kind of social practice illustrates adjustment 
to “acceptable” postwar life, he could also exemplify the deeply 
ingrained stereotypes that fueled the stigma associated with ex- 
combatants. One morning not long after the community celebra-
tion I rode over to Slipway. I bought Brutus a big beer, and we 
shared it with several other men in a little hutch that was made for 
shelter from the sun. It was not yet noon, but Brutus was already 
feeling the affects of previously consumed alcohol, if not also mari-
juana. I wondered if his intoxication would prove a barrier to other 
conversations I had looked forward to having. I had just settled 
into a glass of beer, and Brutus’s slurred, unrelenting monologue 
about something in the community, when a young police officer 
came by and sat down to speak with him. The day before there was 
“confusion” (conflict) between Brutus and an elderly gentleman.
“Abby, this man . . . ,” Brutus began to relate. “This man . . .” He 
explained that the older man had gotten on a megaphone the day 
before, and said all kinds of things about Brutus in the community, 
especially how he had been loving to another woman that was not 
his wife. In outrage, Brutus called the police and had the older 
man thrown in jail. In the midst of his inebriated recounting of 
the story, Brutus rattled off his wedding date to all of us who were 
sitting in the little hutch. “Legally married!,” he kept exclaiming in 
defense of his honor as a husband. “Legally married!,” he contin-
ued, noting the cost of his wife’s wedding dress, and how he had 
ordered it and had it brought over from the United States. Mean-
while, since the older man’s accusations over the megaphone the 
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day before, Brutus’s wife had been unhappy with him, which was a 
problem. He insisted that his honor had been impugned and that 
they settle the matter formally, in court.
What happened next was a paradox, in which Brutus insisted 
on clearing his honor through increasingly dishonorable forms 
of conduct. The conversation in the little hutch escalated quickly. 
Suddenly the group of us was walking across the street to the 
police depot, where Brutus demanded that they bring the old man 
out. He was brought out, quiet and handcuffed, gray stubble pok-
ing through his leathery chin. Brutus made a scene. There was a 
lot of shouting and shoving, and Brutus was in the middle of it 
until finally he got his way. They put the old man, still handcuffed, 
onto a motorbike and we all rode over to the court in West Point, 
a neighboring community where there was a small court in which 
Brutus insisted that his honor as a husband be vindicated.
At the courthouse Brutus continued to be loud and ornery 
while he was waiting to be seen by the judge. At some point he 
had an exchange with an elderly lawyer who was in the waiting 
area. He insulted the man, who had somehow offended him, and 
proclaimed, “I am a friend of the president’s son!”
“Then why do you disgrace the name of the president by behav-
ing in this way?,” the lawyer queried him.
“Shut up!,” Brutus spat back. “Shut up!”
The scandalous rebuke of an elder in that way had everyone 
imploring Brutus to desist. Brutus tried to pick a verbal argument 
with the older lawyer, demanding that he come outside for palaver. 
The older man ignored him, calmly pulling his coat on, “behaving 
like that . . . ,” he muttered softly as he left the building.
The ruckus subdued when the judge brought Brutus in. He 
was calm, and looked at Brutus squarely. “I don’t like to be disre-
spected in this chair,” he said. “You have liquor on your breath. I 
drink liquor, but not when I’m here. And I don’t hear people who 
are under the influence. You’re under the influence.” He continued 
along that vein for a little while, telling Brutus that he couldn’t 
reason well, and that he was being loud and emotional because of 
the liquor. “I can smell it on you. I can smell it on you.” The second 
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point, he said, is that “you have brought an old man. If it was a 
younger man, I might have heard the case. But you have brought 
an older man. What could this man have done so bad to you? You 
are the leader of that organization in the community. The leader,” 
he kept reiterating. “What could this man have done so bad to 
you? Is your skin that thin?”
Somewhat contrite at this stage, Brutus tried to interject, start-
ing with how the man impugned his honor by saying he had been 
loving to another woman. The judge stopped him: “I’m not here 
to hear that today. You got liquor on your breath. Go back, try to 
resolve it in the community. You couldn’t resolve this thing in the 
community?”
With that, the judge threw the case out. Exhausted from the 
amount of relational conflict I was not accustomed to, I flagged 
down a motorbike and rode home.
When I retold the story over beers in the yard that evening, it 
rang true for my friends as the rowdy stereotype of ex- combatants 
misbehaving in their own community, and elsewhere. Brutus had 
been rude, and verbally and physically aggressive. Worst of all, he 
had dragged an older man to jail and then to court, and while there 
he had maligned another man who had not offended him at all. It 
was a severe offense to disrespect one’s elders in such a way.
This evocative account of respect and disrespect is multilayered 
and rich with contradictions that reflect the complexity of postwar 
social relations. There are a couple of themes that are especially 
important for this work. First, this episode demonstrates how 
blended ex- combatants’ social conduct could be. Brutus’s early 
morning boozing and bullheaded actions were indicative of the 
pollutant Flomo talked about. His alcohol- infused behavior was 
a testament of the remnant of the child soldier, amoral and dis-
regarding of the norms and values on which the society was built. 
He had acted out the stereotype that most ex- combatants were 
saddled with after the war.
Knowing him as I did, the whole fiasco was more compli-
cated. It demonstrated a disjointed attempt to preserve his honor 
by adhering to competing codes of respect. On the one hand, 
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he asserted himself over the elderly gentleman— and insulted 
another— with no regard for the gerontocratic position they held 
in society. This harks back to the kinds of conduct armed soldiers 
displayed with noncombatant elders during the war. Their value to 
society was not recognized by many armed groups, leading to the 
kinds of memories that the older gentleman related in the previous 
chapter. Brutus’s behavior resembles the same kind of disregard 
for social values regarding the elderly. It demonstrates that he has 
not fully realigned himself to the accepted codes of conduct— as 
Randall and Sumo appear to do in the earlier sections. At the same 
time, however, he was very fixated on nonviolent, formal means 
of vindication. He chose to have the police and the court system 
involved, rather than choose violent or violating means of asserting 
power over his elderly accuser. All of this was in an attempt to clear 
his name as a husband to a wife who had been with him during the 
war and who had remained with him afterward. He introduced me 
to her proudly on one of my earliest visits. “She been with me since 
the war,” he smiled. She had smiled too at that statement, and 
they pulled out pictures of their son, boasted of his school achieve-
ments, and showed me photos of their wedding. The whole event 
of jailing his elderly accuser and taking him to court appeared to 
me as a disjointed attempt to preserve his honor through formal 
postwar institutions, while failing to comply with one of the most 
significant social values— respecting the position of one’s elders.
Some might see his disrespect for both elders in this story as 
evidence that armed groups inverted gerontocratic norms during the 
war, and continued to act that way afterwards. I would contend that 
neither of these gentlemen was in his network of hierarchical reci-
procity. His behavior with them demonstrated an ongoing relational 
break with the larger society— one that he is seeking to bridge in 
part by using formal court systems set up by the postwar state.
Second, this instance demonstrates a far more contentious and 
complicated adjustment to life after guns, a kind of uneven and 
patchy transition, where movement in and out of ex- combatant 
enclaves is not so fluid or seamless as the account of Sumo and 
Randall might lead us to believe. While they describe very linear 
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trajectories out of the “Charles Taylor business” and ways of life, 
Brutus acts in contradictory ways in an effort to assert his prestige 
over the older man and preserve his honor. It is messy and difficult, 
and not clear cut.
Some weeks later I invited Brutus and Sekou, who featured in 
the previous chapter, to my neighborhood where my friends were 
throwing a going- away party for me. My own neighbors would not 
have dared to venture into their community in Slipway, but they 
were tenuously welcomed to ours. Brutus brought his wife and 
another friend, and they came and celebrated with us. They were 
smiling and friendly. They chatted with other people. No one was 
too loud, too drunk, or “inappropriate” in any way.
Reciprocity and Respect in Families
In this final section I draw from Boima’s postwar story. His post-
war transition represents some of the primary trends among young 
men who “put the gun down in their minds,” and were able to do 
so in no small part through the relationships they reestablished 
with families, kin, and within communities. Initially, when the war 
ended, Boima continued to perpetrate violence and crime, much 
like Sumo described.
He remembered, “During those years [before the war ended in 
2003] my life was all right, because I was depending on the arm 
[gun]. And after then, we had properties that we looted, and we 
were sustaining ourselves with it. So I was living good life. But 
for now we know that the life we were living was not a good life. 
Because we forcibly take things from people, we did things to peo-
ple, and, you know, to make people feel bad. And we discouraged 
people. And we ourselves, we were discouraged in life too.”
Importantly, and not to be minimized, despite notable and pro-
lific critiques of the UN DDR process, Boima responded favorably 
to the programs implemented with ex- combatants. He, like many 
other former fighters, spoke well of the counseling he received.
“We came for disarmament. That how the UN came into the 
country. When the UN came, that how they disarm us. So some 
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of us decided to go for disarmament. I was disarmed in Buchanan. 
I was disarmed and they compensated me $150 U.S. People came. 
People came to counsel us. We had a counselor who came to us 
from the UN. Some people who hold gun [ex- combatants], they 
came to talk to us, to convince us that what we were doing was 
not good. And we ourselves began to realize, our own knowledge 
began to open, we began to realize that what we were doing was 
not nice. So we decided to desist from it.”
For Boima, at least in his remembrance of that period in his life, 
there was an “ah- hah” moment during the DDR counseling. For 
Sumo, a similar turning point came through accepting the teach-
ing of a Pentecostal preacher. In other instances, ex- combatants 
did not express such responses to teaching or rehabilitation of one 
kind or another. Randall’s transition to socially acceptable relation-
ships and modes of action in the postconflict period occurred over 
time, as he bumped into trouble over money, caused strife in his 
family, and eventually reattached himself to someone he respected. 
Also important for Randall, his former commander was able to 
supply him with an acceptable livelihood as a driver. In Boima’s 
case, the livelihood training he received through the DDR process 
was effective.
“After three months, when they call, we get another 150 U.S.,” 
he explained. “That three hundred dollars. They asked everybody 
if they wanted to go to school, if you want to learn trade. Any-
thing you decide to do, you can do it. I decide to do trade. So 
now I do general construction. Yeah, that what I decide to do. 
Yeah, so I can build house [that can repel or keep out water], I 
can bring it up to level. Roofing, plastering, I can do it, and you 
can pay me what I ask you. That what I learn after the war. That 
how I living now.”
Boima’s response, both to the counseling and the vocational 
training provided through the DDR process, is a best case sce-
nario, and one that was not experienced by many of his peers. 
They took the money given to them for the purpose of invest-
ing in their newly acquired livelihood skills, and spent it on other 
things. Sumo recalled going straight to the ghetto. “We brought 
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the money, and— for me, I didn’t even reach my own, my house . . . 
I was in the ghetto. I already finish all.” Ex- combatants were also 
known for selling tools provided in vocational school, rendering 
their training rather ineffective without the instruments to build 
houses, run pipelines, or grow crops.
In her extensive work with former child and youth soldiers in 
Sierra Leone, Shepler (2014) argues that skills training was rarely if 
ever enough to provide young people with sustainable livelihoods. 
She suggests that apprenticeships in intergenerational hierarchies 
were more socially acceptable, and grafted young people into rela-
tionships that society could understand and approve of. Some 
of the ex- combatants in Liberia were apprenticed, with rehabil-
itation workers recalling varying levels of success. Regardless of 
being formally apprenticed, what seems most important is that 
ex- combatants have personal networks that trust them and will 
patronize their business. As long as stigma inhibits the trust of the 
wider community, ex- combatants are likely to struggle for their 
daily bread, regardless of how appropriate their skills training is 
to the demands of the market. They will have only their networks 
from war, which are unlikely to provide enough for subsistence, 
especially if so many of them earned the same skills and vie for 
opportunities where demand is already low.
What made the difference in Boima’s case was his integration 
with his family, relationships in which he could earn social honor 
in their eyes and in the eyes of his community. Boima was the head 
of his house, the breadwinner, and the responsible son who took 
care of an elderly father.
“I got four children. I even got my woman living with me,” he 
told me proudly. “My father, everyone . . . For now, everything I’m 
doing for now, it’s for my children. I’m not doing it for myself. For 
me now, I got my own place. I’m not depending on anybody now. 
I’m only depending on myself. I lose my mother three years ago. I 
only got my father now, living. I supporting him now. Now, I have 
learned something to sustain my family. . . . The life we are living 
today is a good life, because now we sweat for what we get at the 
end of the day.”
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The ex- combatants who were involved in their family systems 
were proud of their relationships, roles, and responsibilities. I was 
introduced to parents and children. They proudly emphasized their 
accomplishments within their families, be it supporting elderly 
parents or paying for children’s school fees. As Boima pointed out, 
he was responsible to care for and support not only his wife and 
his children but also his father. He was fully embedded within 
the accepted intergenerational hierarchies that organized Liberian 
family life. He spoke repeatedly of being called for construction 
jobs in his community, of how others recommended him for work.
“We decide for no war to be in our country again,” Boima 
said. “Yeah, for now, we just relax, we don’t have no problem with 
nobody. Because of what we have achieved, and what we living for 
now.”
Conclusion
Reintegration is social more than vocational. In a context organized 
by hierarchical networks of patrons and clients, and in which there 
were not nearly enough jobs— formal or informal— one’s networks 
of support were far more important than vocational skills. Boi-
ma’s ability to capitalize on his training had everything to do with 
his social networks in the community. Without them, he would 
have been in a similar position to Ben or David, struggling to find 
shelter, out of work, and frustrated by their inability to make a 
life. Horizontal transitions out of armed groups were not as direct 
or clear- cut coming out of the war as going in. Ex- combatants 
negotiated, and sometimes played into, varying degrees of stigma 
from families and communities that strongly influenced their tran-
sitions within the postwar terrain, much of which revolved around 
making life and maintaining respect within social relations, be 
they with former fighters, families, or some combination.
Utas (2008) suggests that vertical transitions downward to 
lower socioeconomic status made for an experience of abjection, 
of being “thrown down.” I would add that the abjection felt related 
not only to losing social status in the vertical sense but also to their 
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horizontal transitions out of armed groups and into an ambiguous 
postwar terrain, where to whom and to what they were supposed 
to transition was not straightforward. The armed groups that had 
organized and sustained their lives disbanded, their communities 
and families regarded them with varying levels of acceptance and 
rejection, and subsistence was a struggle. Many like Ben expressed 
feelings of abjection that resonate with Jackson’s (2006) articula-
tion of being ground down in an environment where their agency 
appeared to be largely in the hands of others. Those who did not 
express abjection in this way had been able, like Randall and 
Boima, to maintain respect as social honor— if not also prestige— 




On Dominance and Discourse
I set out to provide an ethnographic sketch of actors in context, 
one that would render a fuller appreciation of the social contours 
in which these young men make life in the aftermath of war. My 
aim was to challenge and inform a limited and pejorative binary 
about youth as damaged or damaging. One of the principal errors 
of such dichotomies is that they fixate on violence as it is received 
or dealt at the site of the individual person, or in this case a gen-
der and generation, ignoring and obscuring broader systems of 
violence at work across groups and built up over time. This book 
speaks most directly to the notion that young people pose partic-
ular risks to fragile environments. If I have been successful, the 
reader will leave with a more nuanced sense of context and struc-
ture in postwar Monrovia, and with questions and observations 
about how young men fit into local, national, and international 
configurations of power and possibility.
This research contributes to scholarship in youth studies in a 
couple of important ways. It situates youth as far more nestled 
within intergenerational relations than they often appear in the 
literature. It gives us a fuller grasp of their social positions among 
family and kin and how those relationships affect their life chances 
and transitions. This is particularly relevant among ex- combatants. 
DDR policy and programs stress skills training and education as 
vital components of sustainable transitions to life outside of armed 
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groups. While vocational training can be useful, as in Boima’s case, 
the young men in the study make it clear that networks of reci-
procity and indebtedness are precursors to jobs and livelihoods.
I want to conclude this book with several reflections about 
dominance and dignity and structural reproduction. I argued 
that the war was not caused by a demographic overabundance of 
violent young men, greed, or grievance, but rather by a legacy of 
dominance that denied dignity within the country, and that can 
be traced all the way back to the slave trade in the United States. 
The dominant white landowners and slave owners in the United 
States set the terms by which some people could be valued as civ-
ilized. They decided who could be human enough to be worthy of 
an equal place in American society. People of color were deemed 
unworthy. When free black men, women and children journeyed 
across the Atlantic to West Africa, ideas about who was civi-
lized and what was civilized were not reconfigured or challenged, 
but instead transplanted, resown like seeds in the new nation of 
Liberia, fortifying the dominance of the Americo elite and the 
structural subjection of the indigenous majority. Chapter 3 illus-
trates how the structural dominance of the Americo elite resur-
faced in the social norms and values espoused by postwar young 
men. The only way to get ahead was to assimilate into Americo 
criteria for sociocultural life, and to achieve the U.S.- based cre-
dentials that were at their disposal, and completely unattainable 
to the vast majority. The historical continuity of the class divide 
is particularly visible in the national coat of arms, an emblem 
attached to nearly all official government business. It still reads 
at the time of this writing “The love of liberty brought us here” 
(emphasis added). The perpetuation of structural inequality 
throughout their history as a nation suggests that as long as the 
Americo minority set the agenda, the majority of Liberians will 
likely struggle to feel ownership of a country where “love of lib-
erty” brought others to their shores, or to feel worthy of a place 
in their country.
Similarly, the structural dominance of former slave- owning and 
colonial powers in the West has been reproduced, as evidenced by 
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the “loose molecules paradigm”— which is really just an extension 
of the New Barbarism applied specifically to young men. Unable 
(perhaps unwilling?) to comprehend wars like those waged across 
the continent, proponents of the New Barbarism concept ascribe 
armed conflict to the primal nature of black Africans. In postcon-
flict settings, the viability of a sustainable peace is dependent upon 
the successful management of young people and ex- combatants, 
who are presumably— by nature— predisposed to instigating and 
perpetuating violence. In so doing, this underlying paradigm rein-
forces the distinction between the kinds of people who need to be 
managed and the kinds of people who should manage them.
McMullin (2012, 2013) effectively identifies this discourse in the 
threat narrative that pervades DDR policy and practice within the 
United Nations and their institutional partners. The research in 
this book demonstrates that similar appropriations of young men 
are reproduced within the country itself, and among young men’s 
own communities. The weight of stigma was a significant burden 
both to ex- combatant and noncombatant youth. This is where a 
theoretical interpretation of structure, agency, and structural repro-
duction becomes so critical. If we assert that underlying values and 
norms form the basis for social relations and the distribution of 
power within them, and that it is through enactment of those core 
assumptions and evaluations, through agency, that the structure of 
society, local and global, is reproduced over time, then all actors 
are co- contributors to the remaking or reformulating of structure. 
Agents at local and global levels have reasserted a discourse of 
youth as troublesome and violent, perpetuating not just the stigma 
around youth but the occlusion of structural violence at all levels.
One of the primary critiques of this theoretical approach is in 
its duality. Structure informs agency, agency bolsters structure, and 
the two perpetually reinforce one another in a rather deterministic 
cycle. My argument over the course of this book emphasizes that 
duality, as I have mainly highlighted the reproduction of domi-
nance versus any sort of substantial change in the Liberian case. 
That is why Joshua’s assessment of his livelihood as a drug dealer 
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is so intriguing and illuminating. As long as the dominant cul-
tural fraction sets the terms by which dignity could be achieved, 
young men like Timothy and his friends in Red Light will struggle 
for worthiness. Joshua presented a more liberated assessment of 
himself, far less burdened by the stigma Timothy expressed. Recall 
Timothy’s words about smoking marijuana: “A real mother will 
not accept her child doing drugs. So you won’t be with your par-
ents and doing it.” Yet Joshua’s mother did accept her child, and 
affirmed his effort to support himself. She reformulated the terms 
by which Joshua could be valued, and her assessment was the one 
that really mattered to him. I raise this circumstance not to advo-
cate for parental promotion of drug dealing but as an observation 
of discourse at work in a young person’s life. It is an example of 
how discourse can imbue or inhibit dignity. It is an insight about in 
whose eyes one is considered worthy or found wanting. As long as 
the dominant view was the most important, young men like Tim-
othy and Joshua would not measure up. The criteria for worthiness 
were largely out of their reach. Dignity is ultimately claimed by 
achieving worth in the eyes of those considered the most worthy— 
whether that is one’s mother, one’s self, or one’s community. And 
if it is over dignity that wars such as this one are fought, then 
the ultimate battleground is one of discourse, in which dominant 
views regarding social worth are challenged in everyday life, in the 
law, in the media, in research, and in theory.
At a large scale I have argued that the underlying cause for 
the Liberian civil war shows strong signs of remaking itself in the 
years since the cease- fire. Are Liberia and other lower income 
countries submerged in a perpetual, and deterministic, cycle of 
oppression and inequality? Regarding structural duality Sewell 
(1992) suggests that structural change can happen for a number 
of reasons. Among them, he observes that when resources become 
scarcer or more abundant, the balance of power in society is likely 
to shift. If structural contexts overlap or converge they are prone 
to inform and question one another and the practice of everyday 
life. With these and other instances, Sewell is getting at the signif-
icance of experience— experience of something new, of something 
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different, of some kind of change. With that experience comes the 
opportunity to reassess, to alter, or to reconfigure the values and 
norms that form the foundation for agency— for the reproduction 
or alteration of the world in which we live. Lubkemann (2008) 
asserts that wars are an opportunity to do just that. Joshua and 
his mother appear to have taken that opportunity in their own 
lives and in their relationship with each other. That opportunity to 
reassess the terms by which we value one another exists at national 
and international levels, too, where the underlying prejudices held 
by our collectives shape the economic and political decisions taken 
between and across continents, and with sweeping affects for the 
everyday lives of our fellow human beings.
I argue that the war in Liberia was caused by dominance 
exercised not just by the Americo elite, but that it had roots in 
the United States, where the “civilizing” project to remove freed 
slaves was ultimately an attempt to manage the problem of slav-
ery. Getting rid of free men and women of color was easier than 
taking responsibility for their degradation and integrating them as 
equals. Strains of that prejudice so evident in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries persist in the New Barbarism, the loose mol-
ecules paradigm, and the threat narrative that scapegoats young 
men as causes of violence and upheaval. As long as young men 
and the countries where they live are viewed in this way, they will 
always need help and management, and the dominant global frac-
tion in the West can be reasserted through pejorative discourses 
about “the other.” Dominance bestows and denies dignity within 
national borders and on a global scale. The history of this small 
West African nation demonstrates that ideas about the other fuel 
structural violence and lay the foundation for deadly conflict. As 
long as these destructive, essentializing stereotypes persist, so too 
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Notes
Chapter 1. Introduction
 1. I use the term “Global South” sparingly, and with some reservation, to 
refer to smaller countries outside of the West. I use it in lieu of reference 
to their state of “development,” or their position in a first, second, or 
third place lineup— both of which assume a hierarchy that requires a 
great deal of unpacking.
 2. The ex- combatant occupation of the Guthrie Plantation is a prime 
example; see Cheng forthcoming and Persson 2012.
 3. An example can be seen on page 14 of the UNDP 2003– 2004 Activity 
Report.
Chapter 2. A History of Violence
 1. See Bourgois’s (2009) working definition for structural violence, accom-
panied by definitions of symbolic and normalized violence.
 2. There were 697,624 at the first census taken in 1790, see U.S. census 
report “Statistics of Slaves” at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/
documents/00165897ch14.pdf.
 3. See Levitt (2005) for a thorough and analytical review of the conflicts 
between various tribes and the American settlers in Liberia.
 4. “The Planting Agreement of 1926” can be found in its entirety in Buell’s 
(1947) appendix 5.
 5. Taken from a census quoted in Reno 1998.
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 6. For example, see Boley’s (1983) long list of Tolbert’s appointments of 
family members to public office. See Liebenow’s (1962) chart for an 
earlier example of the kinship ties that crossed extensively through local 
and national level political positions.
Chapter 4. Street Youth
 1. This was less than four and a half U.S. dollars at the time Washington 
related the story.
 2. This is a conflation similarly observed in Abramowitz’s (2014) work in 
Liberia.
 3. Fieldnote, February 14, 2010.
 4. Fieldnote, March 7, 2011.
Chapter 5. Life in Armed Groups
 1. I am borrowing Stewart’s (2008) use of horizontal to think across 
groups, and vertical to indicate differences in status between people.
 2. One use for the word “embarrass” in Liberia— the use being applied 
here— is to hurt or cause great discomfort. It is a stronger meaning than 
to make someone shy.
 3.  See the 1997 issue of Africa Development 22 (3– 4).
 4. For more thorough and detailed accounts of the Poro and of bush 
school, see Bellman (1984), Fulton (1972), Little (1965, 1966), and Welm-
ers (1949).
 5. From his work with the Kpelle, Welmers (1949) relates a wide range of 
meanings for “medicine” (sále) that could include substances, utterances, 
actions, and even organizations that were believed to possess unusual 
powers. Medicines could be curative or contaminating— so poisons were 
also called medicine.
 6. Marks (2013) relates that looting was implemented by the Revolutionary 
United Front as a regular strategy for feeding the troops.
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Chapter 6. Life after Guns
 1. To name only a few, see work on social learning theory (Bandura 1977; 
Bandura, Ross, and Ross 1961; Sutherland 1956), social control (Hirschi 
1969; Hirschi and Gottfredson 1995), violent and impoverished envi-
ronments (Stewart, Simons, and Conger 2001), and socialization for 
aggression, war, and violence (Bandura 1980; Ember and Ember 2007).
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